The Meaning of Capacity and Consent in Sexual Assault: R. v. G.F.

Authors

Isabel Grant, Allard School of Law at the University of British ColumbiaFollow
Janine Benedet, Allard School of Law at the University of British ColumbiaFollow

Faculty Author Type

Current Faculty [Isabel Grant] & Current Faculty [Janine Benedet]

Published In

Criminal Law Quarterly

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2022

Subjects

sexual assault, consent, capacity, sufficiency of reasons, appellate intervention, Criminal Code 273.1(2) and s. 265(3)

Abstract

The Criminal Code provisions dealing with sexual assault have been amended in a piecemeal fashion several times since the major reforms of 1982, which replaced the offences of rape and indecent assault with a three-tiered sexual assault offence. Many of these reforms were brought forward in response to particular judicial decisions that provoked controversy and concern. In most cases, new provisions were added without removing or amending related provisions already in place. What remains is a set of provisions that do not work together as a coherent whole.

Citation Details

Isabel Grant & Janine Benedet, "The Meaning of Capacity and Consent in Sexual Assault: R. v. G.F." (2022) 70:1 CLQ 78.