Faculty Author Type

Current Faculty [Wei Cui]

Document Type

Book Chapter

Publication Date

2026

Subjects

Taxation, International, History

Abstract

A careful reading of recent scholarship on the early history of international taxation, especially on the League of Nations ’ work on ‘ double taxation ’ , ought to have dislodged many myths about this history. But more often than not, such scholarship is taken to offer mere details without altering our fundamental understanding. This chapter suggests that this reception refl ects a longstanding pattern in discourses about international taxation: participants perpetuate or cling onto narratives that are easily seen to be false. The chapter exposes this pattern by summarising evidence for four rarely-acknowledged conclusions about the League ’ s output on international taxation. First, rather than advancing any agreed proposal, the 1923 ‘ Four Economists Report ’ refl ected fundamental disagreements (in both theory and practice) between the world ’ s then two leading capital exporters, the US and Britain. Second, the League ’ s 1925 Technical Experts Report substantially changed the topic from the Four Economists Report. By focusing on coordination conventions among countries imposing only source-based taxation, it offered little of interest to the US and Britain, and rendered international agreement even more diffi cult by confl ating distinct policy issues. Meanwhile, it launched an institutional narrative that, whatever the problems of international taxation were, the League offered relevant solutions. Third, this narrative began to allow lobbyists like Mitchell Carroll to advance business interests under the League ’ s disguise in the 1930s. Fourth, by the time of the Mexico Model, ‘ the League ’ s ’ double taxation work served little more than narrow institutional and personal interests. In each of these last three stages of the League ’ s work, despite the lack of genuine intellectual continuity, parties appealed to earlier League outputs to legitimise their own (often questionable) pursuits. This practice continued in the activities of the

Organisation for European Economic Cooperation in the 1950s, and one suspects that it is even more signifi cant today. The chapter suggests that the durability of this practice may be attributable to both ambiguous principal-agent relationships in the context of weak international organisations sponsoring informal norm setting, and persistent intellectual confusion about the subject of international taxation.

DOI

10.5040/9781509981762.ch-009

Share

COinS
 
 

To view the content in your browser, please download Adobe Reader or, alternately,
you may Download the file to your hard drive.

NOTE: The latest versions of Adobe Reader do not support viewing PDF files within Firefox on Mac OS and if you are using a modern (Intel) Mac, there is no official plugin for viewing PDF files within the browser window.