2018

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Asia Pacific Dispute Resolution Project
Working Paper No. 18-6

Human Rights Protection: The Role of Institutional Capacity and Selective Adaptation

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HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION: THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY AND SELECTIVE ADAPTATION*

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We have examined previously the role of institutional capacity and selective adaptation in the interaction between international rule regimes on trade and human rights and local norms and practices, in the context of globalization. This work is ongoing, through archival and survey research on the relationship between acceptance of globalized rule regimes among interpretive communities charged with interpreting, applying, and enforcing non-local rules, and the resilience of local norms. This paper will examine the potential application of selective adaptation and institutional capacity to understanding of international human rights norms and practices.

I. Protection of Human Rights: Issues of Institutional Capacity

Enforcement of international human rights norms depends on the capacity of intermediary institutions. Institutional capacity refers to the ability of institutions to perform their assigned tasks. Institutional capacity has been examined from relational perspectives that focus on issues of responsibility between organizations and their constituencies; efficiency in performance and the use of resources; and accountability to varying sources of authority. Functional perspectives have also been applied to the question of institutional capacity, in such areas as access to information; effectiveness and methods of communication; organizational symmetry; and ability to enforce rules and directives.

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* This paper was prepared as a working paper in 2005 for a conference at Mofid University in Qom, Iran. I did not attend the conference due to human rights abuses in Iran. This working paper has not been published or updated, although parts have been updated and included in subsequent publications.

However useful these approaches may be in the abstract, actual institutional performance remains contingent on domestic political and socio-economic conditions. In many economies, local conditions of rapid socio-economic and political transformation pose particular challenges for institutional capacity. Accordingly, institutional capacity in China may usefully be examined by reference to issues of institutional location, orientation, cohesion, and most importantly institutional purpose.

Institutional capacity also depends on issues of Geographical Location, particularly the question of balancing central authority with decentralization of social and economic development initiatives. Many societies exhibit tension between local and central authorities and among the regions. The practical divisions of power and authority between local and central government departments permit an interplay of power and politics between the central and sub-national governments that echoes practices of federalism. Yet this may conflict with state-directed ideals of conformity and unity. In the process of bargaining that accompanies the allocation of resources and the distribution of costs and benefits of policy initiative, requirements of submission to the unified state may limit the flexibility of local officials. Rigid adherence to contested ideals of unitary authority also may limit the ability of legal institutions at both local and national levels to exercise even limited autonomy in support of predictability and stability in socio-economic and political relations. As a result institutional capacity of the legal system more broadly suffers. In the human rights context, this may affect the ability of local institutions to carry out central government edicts purporting to protect human rights.

Institutional capacity also depends on Institutional Orientation. Orientation refers to the priorities and habitual practices that inform institutional performance. For human rights institutions, orientation involves particularly the tension between formal and informal modes of operation. Much has been written on the role of informal networks as vehicles for socio-economic regulation and development. Informal networks may serve as a

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substitute for the norms and processes associated with formal institutions, allowing more flexible responses to increasingly complex social, economic and political relations. However, the potential role of informal institutions is often challenged by development policies of political regime which insist on maintaining formal organizational systems to defend ideological orthodoxy and enforce political loyalty. The tension between statist ethics of formal institutionalism and local informal arrangements may work to divert resources from institutional performance and undermines institutional capacity. In the human rights context, this may undermine the ability of governments to deliver the opportunities for development that the right to development requires as well as the civil and political rights envisioned under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Finally, institutional capacity depends on issues of Institutional Coherence, involving the willingness of individuals within institutions to comply with edicts from organizational and extra-organizational leaders, and enforce institutional goals. Compliance concerns the recognition and enforcement of norms. Conflicts arise when the norms of particular organizations differ from those of the individuals within these organizations—such as where norms of public policy that drive organizational priorities require subordination of parochial interests of individual officials within the organization. Often the lack of institutional coherence is revealed through the presence of corruption. This has an effect not only on the emergence of human rights abuses, which often are the result of challenges to arbitrary and abusive exercise of authority, and their resolution, which may require punishment of officials protected by extensive patronage networks.

Of the elements of institutional capacity that affect enforcement of human rights norms, perhaps the most important is Institutional Purpose. Institutional purpose concerns the way in which the goals of institutions reflect material and ideological contexts, the availability and nature of financial, human and other resources, and the various limitations that attend institutional performance. Institutional purpose plays a significant role in determining the capacity of institutions to respond to socio-economic change. Political and legal institutions

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often function according to the policy priorities imposed upon them by the local regimes. The “relative autonomy” ascribed to legal institutions in the European and North American traditions is often limited in developing economies outside the European tradition. Thus, the capacity of legal institutions reflects the extent of commonality of purpose between legal norms and processes and the policy imperatives of the local government. This involves a dynamic of selective adaptation.

II. Selective Adaptation: An Overview

As discussed previously, the notion of “selective adaptation” proceeds from assumptions about the importance of cultural norms in influencing behavior. Cultural norms are reflected in rules, including formal laws and regulations and informal procedures and practices. The distinction between rules and the cultural norms they represent becomes especially important when rules particular to one cultural group are used by another, without a corresponding assimilation of underlying norms. This phenomenon is reflected in current conditions of globalization, as liberal rules of governance generally associated with the Europe and North America are disseminated to other areas, but little attention is given to questions about local acceptance of the norms on which these rules are based.

Selective adaptation describes a process by which practices and norms are exchanged across cultural boundaries. Selective adaptation is made possible by ways in which governments and elites express their own normative preferences in the course of interpretation and application of practice rules. Selective adaptation also operates within societies as different groups interact with and respond to dominant discourses. While selective adaptation explains much about the general conditions for exchange of practices, rules, and norms between cultural communities, more work is needed to confirm the operational details of selective adaptation, identify the internal components, and explain the implications for cross-cultural dispute resolution.

Selective adaptation depends on a number of factors, including perception, complementarity, and legitimacy. Perception influences understanding about foreign and local norms and practices. Perceptions about the purpose, content and effect of foreign and local trade law norms and practices affect the processes and results of selective adaptation.
For example, local government efforts to comply with international trade rules on transparency while still pursuing local policy priorities may hinge on the content and accuracy of perceptions about treaty norms and practices and their relationship to local systems. The interpretation and application of non-local rules in light of local norms thus depends on perceptions about both. Drawing on principles of nuclear physics, *complementarity* describes a circumstance by which apparently contradictory phenomena can be combined in ways that preserve essential characteristics of each component and yet allow for them to operate together in a mutually reinforcing and effective manner.\(^7\)

Complementarity may allow adjustment of norms and practices of particular cultural communities to satisfy expectations imposed from outside, while still protecting local needs. For example, local compliance with international trade rules on state subsidies may depend on complementarity in procedure, as the formality of imported practice rules is reconciled with the flexibility of local performance standards. Thus, complementarity affects the potential for non-local rules and local norms to be mutually sustaining.

*Legitimacy* concerns the extent to which members of local communities support the purposes and consequences of selective adaptation.\(^8\) Whereas the forms and requirements of legitimacy may vary, the effectiveness of selectively adapted dispute resolution norms and practices depends to an important degree on local acceptance. For example, if local economic actors challenge efforts to regulate production costs according to international anti-dumping rules, this will affect the possibilities for selective adaptation. Other factors, such as coincidence, socio-economic or political crisis, and voluntary experimentation may also play a role.

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III. Selective Adaptation of Human Rights Norms: The Right to Development in Comparative Context

The dynamic of selective adaptation is illustrated in the ways that divergent international human rights norms have been accepted by developing economies. In contrast to liberal norms of individual liberties and civil and political rights, many developing economies have emphasized the right to development. The right to development has been the focus of much debate and discussion, particularly in the context of its relationship to other human rights and in light of the economic development achievements and aspirations of states in the East Asian Region. A comparison of two major human rights documents of 1993— the Bangkok Declaration and the Vienna Declaration—reveals significant differences of view concerning the right to development and its place in international human rights law. The Bangkok Declaration suggested that state governments should be free to give development goals priority over other human rights policies, which themselves could be limited by local cultural and historical conditions. This approach was viewed with some trepidation by outside observers, in part because the Bangkok Declaration also suggested that the recognition and enforcement of human rights generally should be controlled by local governments free from outside scrutiny. The Vienna Declaration, by contrast, stressed that the lack of development may not be used to justify abridgement of internationally recognized human rights, thus underscoring the principles accepted elsewhere that all human rights (including the right to development) are universal, indivisible, and interrelated.

The contradiction over the relationship of the right to development and its attendant circumstances and other human rights reveals significant philosophical differences concerning the nature of development and the nature of rights. While these contradictions are

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10 See “Final Declaration of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights” (1993) 14 Hum Rts LJ 370, Art. 8 [“Bangkok Declaration”].
11 Ibid, Art. 24 provides that the conceptualization and eventual establishment of national human rights institutions should be left to the States to decide.
12 See United Nations World Conference on Human Rights, “Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action” (1993) 32 ILM 1661 at 1665–66, Arts. I (5) and I (10). While the Bangkok Declaration repeated some of the standard doctrinal language of human rights law on universality and indivisibility, its emphasis on the prerogatives of state governments and the contextualization of rights marked a significant departure.
unlikely to be resolved in the short term, the approach to development embodied in the
Bangkok Declaration may have less than positive political implications for authoritarian
development regimes. More importantly, these differing perspectives play a significant role
in the formation of institutional purpose as an element of institutional capacity.

A. Summary of the Discourse of the Right to Development

While it would be superfluous in the extreme to retrace in detail the genealogy of the right to
development, a brief summary may be useful as background. It is useful as well to note the
institutional context within which these debates take place.

1. Recognition of the Right to Development as a Human Right

International recognition of the right to development as a human right has often been traced
to a speech by Mr. Justice Keba M’Baye, First President of the Senegal Supreme Court, to the
International Institute for Human Rights in 1972. However, the idea has long-standing roots
in the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, and other international instruments. The politics of North-South relations
and particularly the call for a “New International Economic Order” have contributed as well
to assertions about the existence of a right to development. Support for the right to
development has been found in scholarly studies, and gradually a series of international

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13 See Keba M’Baye, “Le Droit au developpement commen un droit de l’Homme” (1972) 5 Revue des Droits de
l’Homme 503. See also Hector Gros Espiell, “The Right to Development as a Human Right” (1981) 16:2 Texas
Int’l LJ 189 at 192; Russel Lawrence Barsh, “The Right to Development as a Human Right: Results of the Global
Consultation” (1991) 13:3 Hum Rts Q 322.

287; Ved P. Nanda, “The Right to Development: An Appraisal” in Ved P. Nanda, George W. Shepherd, Jr., and
Eileen McCarthy-Arnolds, eds., World Debt and the Human Condition: Structural Adjustments and the Right to

15 For a useful collection of articles presented at a 1991 seminar convened in Calcutta by the Committee on Legal
Aspects of the New International Economic Order of the International Law Association, see Subrata Roy
Chowdhury, Erik M.G. Denters, & Paul J.I.M. de Waart, eds., The Right to Development in International Law
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992). Also see Mohammed Bedjaoui, “Some Unorthodox Reflections on the
‘Right to Development’” in Francis Snyder & Peter Slimn, ed., International Law of Development: Comparative

16 Among the earliest and most articulate proponents of the right to development have been Roland Rich and
Philip Alston. See e.g. Rich, “The Right to Development as an Emerging Human Right” supra note 14 and
instruments has emerged recognizing and expanding on the right to development.\textsuperscript{17} Ideas about the right to development have undergone further revision in the context of the dynamic growth of economies in the East Asian region, and amid suggestions that these economic successes vindicate an “Asian” cultural approach to development that stands as an alternative to much of Western human rights thinking.\textsuperscript{18}

But there have been dissenting voices. Some suggest that the right to development is little more than an attempt by authoritarian governments to insulate their regimes from outside scrutiny.\textsuperscript{19} Sceptical observers also suggest that the right to development has little if any legal support and is in effect an attempt to enshrine the laudable goal of development as a right, rather than recognizing that development may be the end-product of the enforcement of various civil, political, economic, social and/or cultural rights, but is not (and should not be) a right in itself.\textsuperscript{20} Other critics have suggested that the emerging doctrine of the right to development gives undue attention to economic growth, which not only entrenches a flawed view of development generally, but also works to further the subjugation of disadvantaged groups for whom the right to development ought to operate most strongly.\textsuperscript{21}

A middle ground of sorts is occupied by observers who accept the notion of a right to development, but who insist that it operate only as a complement and not a substitute for other


\textsuperscript{18} Perhaps the most comprehensive articulation of the right to development in the context of the East Asian experience was the 1993 Bangkok Declaration, in which the emphasis was placed on local historical, cultural and religious conditions as context for human rights conditions. See Bangkok Declaration, supra note 10. Also see Susumu Awanohara, Michael Vatikiotis, and Shada Islam, “Vienna Showdown” (June 17, 1993) Far Eastern Economic Review at 16.


human rights. The interaction of development with other human rights has been seen to require that the local peoples affected by economic development projects have meaningful opportunities for participation and consultation. The right to participation has been expanded yet further in an effort to suggest that it might be a basis for protection of cultural rights against oppression from authoritarian states.

2. Institutional Contexts

Debates over the right to development operate against a background of political structures that affect and often pre-determine the content of the debate. Of particular importance are the views of national governments, international aid agencies, non-governmental organizations, and the scholarly community. Although there are of course significant interdependencies among these institutions, their identity, power, and goals each play a significant role in determining the content of views expressed by their representative interlocutors.

As international law is the creation of states, it is not surprising that state governments have played a critical role in discussions of the right to development. Governments in developing states have been particularly eager to have a right to development recognized at the international level, and for institutional mechanisms for enforcement to be put in place. Thus, for example, the UNESCO Secretary General’s Report on the right to development emphasized the moral duty of industrialized states to repair the economic disparities that

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characterize their relations with developing countries, an NIEO theme that has been taken up repeatedly in subsequent instruments on the right to development.\textsuperscript{25} Obviously, such an approach to international rights and duties suits the economic interests of developing states, particularly where implementation mechanisms and policies are established. On the other hand, international instruments on the right to development also reflect the views of industrialized states in noting the importance of domestic development efforts.\textsuperscript{26}

Much of the discussion over the right to development has concerned efforts by international aid agencies to explain and justify their activities. As with most formal institutions, international aid agencies have organizational interests and a parochial commitment to continuing their work and maintaining control over it.\textsuperscript{27} Thus, aid agencies have been quick to respond to human rights criticisms of their work. Employees of aid agencies, while careful to note that they speak in their personal capacity, more often than not reflect the views of their employers. Thus, in response to claims that international aid should be tied to the human rights records of recipient counties, the General Counsel of the World Bank has argued that the Bank’s charter mandates an effort to promote economic development and the raising of living standards, without direct attention to political questions.\textsuperscript{28} As well, the point is made that the right to development gives the Bank’s activities a direct human rights element. In response to claims that they play insufficient attention to local participation, international aid agencies often resort to examples of linkages with local elite organizations without much reflection as to whether these linkages contribute to meaningful local participation.


\textsuperscript{27} See generally, Robert A. Packenham, \textit{Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).

The role of NGOs in the debates over the right to development has become increasingly important. While they often are subject to repression from local governments—either through direct repression or through the establishment of government organized competitors (GO-NGOs),—non-government organizations have often embarked on courageous efforts to articulate views on development matters that stand in contrast to those of state governments and international development agencies. And while they are often accused of being dominated by local elites rather than broadly participatory, NGOs have shown a capacity for expanding the discourse of the right to development beyond the confines often imposed by state governments.

While academic scholars are usually employed by universities, their loyalties are often to schools of thought rather than to the organizations with which they are associated. These loyalties play a significant role in setting the parameters for academic discussion. Thus, for example, scholars who criticize the right to development adopt liberal paradigms which focus on the individual as the primary beneficiary of political rights. Other critics have challenged the right to development through allegiance to and application of the principles of feminist theory. By contrast, those who have argued in support of the right to development have done so by reference to ideas about the importance of collective rights as at least equal to (and often with priority over) individual rights. In each of these lines of argument, the views expressed owe as much to the authors’ underlying conceptual paradigms as they do to their immediate research and analysis. Thus, along with the political perspectives of national governments and

the institutional perspectives of aid agencies and their employees, the views of academics on
the right to development reveal structural determinants which are not less real for their basis
in ideas rather than organizations.

B. The Nature of Development and the Nature of Rights
Discussion about the right to development reflects different ideas about the nature of
development and the nature of rights. An examination of these underlying paradigms is useful
in understanding the broader debates about the right to development.

1. Dimensions of Development
Among the many points of conflict in approaches to development are the questions about the
international dimensions of development and underdevelopment; the goals of development;
and the implications of development for social, economic and political relations.

a. International Dimensions of Development: The Issue of Dependency
Between supporters and opponents of the right to development, the basic issues revolve
around issues of international political economy. Proponents of the right to development are
heavily influenced by the conclusions of dependency theory. Critics on the other hand
suggest that dependency theory explains very little, and that local conditions offer more
powerful explanations for development and under-development.

The cadre of scholars broadly labelled dependency theorists, hold in general that
underdevelopment in all its forms is due in large part to the exploitation and oppression by
the industrialized West—first through colonialism and later through domination of the
international finance, technology, and commodity systems. Early proponents of dependency

35 For example, the Human Rights White Paper issued by the People’s Republic of China in 1991 makes much
of the century of colonial oppression suffered by China during the 19th and early 20th centuries. See “Text of
36 There is a rich and wide-ranging literature on the problems of dependency. Among the most useful works are
Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil (New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1967); Celso Furtado, Development and Underdevelopment: A Structural View of the
Problems of Developed and Underdeveloped Countries (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964); Johan
Galtung, “An Economic Theory of Imperialism” (1971) 8:2 J Peace Research 81 at 81–117; Alejandro Portes,
Analysis” (1974) 16:4 Comp Studies Soc’y & History 1 at 1–26; and Charles K. Wilber, ed., The Political


39 See Packenham, The Dependency Movement, supra note 36, esp. at 315.


41 See e.g., Osinbajo & Ajayi, supra note 22.

b. The Goals of Development

Among proponents of the right to development, there is substantial disagreement over the goals of development. While most scholars and international instruments agree that development means more than simply economic growth, some national governments have suggested that economic growth is the primary feature of development.

The primary documents articulating a right to development are fairly clear that development entails more than simply economic growth. Thus, the UNESCO Secretary General’s Report indicates that development includes both material and non-material elements.43 The UN General Assembly Resolution on the Right to Development contains similar provisions—indicating that development is a comprehensive phenomenon entailing economic, social, cultural, and political elements.44 These views are supported and reiterated by a substantial body of scholarly literature. In the wake of perceived failures of development policies that gave primacy to economic growth,45 the field of development studies has moved steadily toward a multi-dimensional view of development.46 This theme appears throughout the literature on the right to development, which asserts consistently that development means more than simply economic growth.47

Despite this apparent uniformity, a number of national governments in the East Asian region suggest that development means primarily if not exclusively economic growth. Thus, the Bangkok Declaration draws an explicit link between development and the international macroeconomic system.48 In its various human rights White Papers, the government of the

43 UNESCO Secretary General, Report on the Right to Development, supra note 17 at 13. Most recently, see the UNESCO Secretary General’s Position Paper delivered to the 1995 Copenhagen Summit, in which the point is made that development is first and foremost social, rather than economic.
44 See United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 25, Preamble and Art. 1.
46 A seminal work in pointing to the failures of uni-dimensional development policies was Robert A. Packenham, Liberal America and the Third World, supra note 27. Other influential early works were Mahbub ul Haq, The Poverty Curtain: Choices for the Third World (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976).
48 See Bangkok Declaration, supra note 10, Preamble and Art. 18.
PRC explicitly adopted a position supporting the primacy of economic growth by stressing the right to subsistence as primary right from which all other rights derive.\textsuperscript{49} Similarly, the yearly reports issued by the PRC government on economic and social development give clear priority to economic achievement.\textsuperscript{50} Singaporean representatives have consistently made clear their conclusions about the primacy of economic growth as a precursor to other aspects of development.\textsuperscript{51} These views stand in marked contrast to the conclusions of international instruments and development scholars that development must mean more than economic growth. More importantly, they have implications for the ways in which state governments address the relationship between economic development and other social, cultural and political relationships.

c. Development and Social, Economic and Political Relations

Tied closely to notions about the goals of development are questions about the relationship of development to social, economic and political relations. Thus, as might be expected, international instruments and scholarly analyses that assert development to mean more than simply economic growth also argue that the pursuit of development cannot operated to the detriment of other human rights. The UNESCO Secretary General’s Report asserts that the right to development operates in tandem with other civil, political, social, cultural, and economic rights.\textsuperscript{52} The UN General Assembly Resolution on the Right to Development


\textsuperscript{52} See UNESCO Secretary General, Report on the Right to Development, supra note 17 at 13.
asserts that as a human right the right to development is indivisible and interdependent on other human rights.\textsuperscript{53} Similarly, the scholarly literature is nearly uniform in its insistence that the right to development cannot be used to justify denial of other human rights.\textsuperscript{54}

However, these views are contradicted by policies and behavior of various governments in the East Asian Region. Reflecting their conclusions about the economic bases for development, some states have subordinated the enforcement of human rights norms in social, economic, and political relations to policy goals of economic development. Relying partly on a critique of liberal paradigms that limit state involvement in economic life through to establishment of free market systems supported by private law rules and institutions,\textsuperscript{55} the right to development has been used to justify continued restriction of effective judicial systems that might lay a foundation for meaningful civil and political rights.\textsuperscript{56} By asserting that countries have the right to determine their own political systems through which to pursue economic, social, and cultural development, the Bangkok Declaration clearly subordinated the pursuit of civil and political rights.\textsuperscript{57} China’s human rights White Papers emphasize suggest that civil and political relations must continually be subordinated to the pursuit of the right to development.\textsuperscript{58} The Director of the State Council Information Office has supported

\textsuperscript{53} See United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 25, Art. 6.

\textsuperscript{54} See sources cited in note 20, supra.


\textsuperscript{56} Perhaps the most direct expression of this sentiment has been attributed to Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad: “developing nations cannot always afford luxuries such as human rights . . . liberty must take a back seat to the exigency of economic expansion . . . you must eat before you vote.” See Boo Tiong Kwa, “Righteous Talk” (June 17, 1993) Far Eastern Economic Review at 28.

\textsuperscript{57} See Bangkok Declaration, supra note 10, Art. 6.

\textsuperscript{58} See “Text of Human Rights White Paper” supra note 35.
explicitly the primacy of economic conditions as the basis for development: “[W]e enable our people to have the economic foundation upon which they can enjoy political rights.”59

2. The Nature of Rights

Debates over the right to development also reflect fundamental differences about the nature of rights. These differences include divergent views on the sources and beneficiaries of rights.

Much of what might be termed the conventional human rights discourse derives from European ideas about the nature of rights. The inalienable character of human rights and the claim that they are enjoyed by virtue of being human is entrenched in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as the International Covenants on Civil and Political and on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. These ideas about the inherency of rights reflect European natural law theories about the equality of human beings,60 which in turn derived from a range of political and economic interests.61 Despite recent efforts to reconceptualize rights as claims set in a context of diverse social, political and economic interests,62 the notion of inherency retains its appeal and distinguishes the European ideal of rights from that which is emerging in the East Asian region.63

In contrast to natural rights theories that view rights as inalienable and intrinsic to the human condition, proponents of the so-called “Asian approach” to rights suggest that rights are conferred by social organizations—families, communities, and governments. Under this approach rights are not inherent, but rather are specific benefits conferred and enforced at the

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discretion of the state. Such an approach permits governments to silence their critics under the guise of legal process.

Divergent views on the sources of rights have led in turn to significant differences concerning the beneficiaries of rights. In keeping with natural law theories that treat rights as inherent to human beings, the European liberal tradition has long held that human individuals are the primary beneficiaries of rights. 64 Reflecting this tradition, international human rights instruments provide that human rights are enjoyed by individuals, while the bulk of scholarly literature on human rights suggests as well that the primary beneficiary is the individual.65 While currently there is a growing body of literature that challenges this view,66 or at least suggests that individual rights can be meaningfully enforced only in the context of community,67 the primacy of the individual in the dynamic of legal rights and obligations remains a dominant feature of European and North American rights doctrine.

In the course of the human rights discourse, some governments in East Asia for example claim that groups and communities should be the primary beneficiaries of rights, and by implication at least that the rights of individuals should be subordinated. 68 This approach is supported by arguments about social and historical traditions, and references to an East Asian familial tradition that derives from Confucianism and its assumptions about authority and hierarchy in social organization. 69 In this regard, it is useful to note that while the tradition of collective

64 See generally, Lukes, supra note 60; Raz, “Rights and Individualism”, supra note 60.
68 For indicators of the Chinese view, see references to the primacy of national political stability and the livelihood of people throughout the country, in “Text of Human Rights White Paper”, supra note 35 at 4 and references to human rights conditions of the Chinese people as whole in “Interview with Zhu Muzhi, Director of the State Council Information Office” (November 2, 1991) Xinhua, in FBIS Daily Report-China (November 4, 1991) at 15–16. See e.g. De Jonge, supra note 51. Also see Boo Tion Kwa, supra note 56 at 28.
rights in the Asian tradition is much discussed, there is also significant evidence to suggest that the role of the individual was once highly prized.\textsuperscript{70} The importance of the individual in traditional Chinese philosophy, for example, came gradually to be suppressed as a result of the political and ideological imperatives of the Chinese state.\textsuperscript{71} Moreover, it should be noted that Confucianism and the collectivist norms it has engendered have been severely criticized by many contemporary Chinese thinkers as overly authoritarian and repressive.\textsuperscript{72} Nonetheless, the Confucian tradition remains important in the views of some governments in East Asia regarding the beneficiaries of rights.

These basic differences over nature of development and the nature of rights pose significant obstacles to attempts to reconcile differing approaches on the human right to development — differences which are entrenched further by the institutional contexts within which the various views are articulated. In this regard, it is of particular interest to note the emphasis placed by the 1993 Bangkok Human Rights Declaration on a “dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting” as a context for human rights ideals.\textsuperscript{73} This suggests a hope on the part of some East Asian governments that the human right to development as a multi-faceted, inherent and inalienable right might ultimately yield to a different vision, one that holds the right to development as priority that permits economic growth to take precedence over such other human rights as may be conferred by state governments on their subjects.

\textsuperscript{70} See Donald J. Munro, \textit{The Concept of Man in Early China} (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969) at 17: “all people are equally deserving; all should be tolerated, none singled out for favor”. While the Taoists did espouse a primitive solidarity within society, this was derived from a fundamental respect for the identity of the individual. See generally, Joseph Needham, \textit{Science and Civilization in China}, vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954) at 99 et seq. and 139 et seq.

\textsuperscript{71} For discussion of individualism and its suppression by early Confucian orthodoxy, see Etienne Balazs, \textit{Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy}, A.F. Wright, ed., trans. H.M. Wright (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964) at 21–22, 177. The emergence of activism and reformism in the “new text Confucianism” of the 19th century raised the possibility of increased tolerance for individualistic scholarship and research within the literati elite—a significant departure from the staid intellectual collectivism of prior years, although this too was ultimately unsuccessful. See Benjamin A. Elman, \textit{From Philosophy to Philology: Intellectual and Social Aspects of Change in Late Imperial China} (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984) at 26–36 and Benjamin A. Elman, \textit{Classicism, Politics, and Kinship: The Ch’ang-chou School of New Text Confucianism in Late Imperial China} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), Ch. 9.


\textsuperscript{73} See “Final Declaration of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights”, \textit{supra} note 10, Art. 8. See also Osinbajo & Ajayi, \textit{supra} note 22.
The affirmation of the human right to development has put fundamental questions about development and rights on the public agenda of international law and politics. The discourse may yield increasingly effective calls for a multi-dimensional approach that validates social, cultural, and political development as essential counterparts to economic growth. And while it remains to be seen whether authoritarian regimes in the East Asian region will come to adopt such an approach in the near term, the liberalization policies of Taiwan and South Korea suggest that political self-preservation may mandate the adoption of comprehensive development strategies. The development aspirations of the people in the region generally would seem to depend on similar transitions from state-controlled uni-dimensional economic development to a more comprehensive approach. This in turn will depend on how the philosophical differences and political implications of the right to development are resolved.

IV. Conclusion

Enforcement of international human rights norms depends on the capacity of local political and legal institutions. Institutional capacity depends on issues of location, orientation, and cohesion, but most of all on factors of institutional purpose. Questions about institutional purpose invite discussion of the relationship between the goals of certain international human rights norms and the goals of local political authorities. The right to development offers a vision of human rights that differs markedly from the liberal ideals of individual rights, and offers an example of the ways in which the dynamic of selective adaptation operates to mediate international norms and local enforcement. Selective adaptation might also offer an approach to resolving tensions between conflicting international and local human rights norms, and thereby a bases for mutual understanding and common commitment to recognizing and protecting the rights of all people.