2013

Bordering on Failure: Canada-U.S. Border Policy and the Politics of Refugee Exclusion

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Canada-U.S. Border Policy and the Politics of Refugee Exclusion

Efrat Arbel
Alletta Brenner

Harvard Immigration and Refugee Law Clinical Program
Harvard Law School
November 2013
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November 2013
The Canada-U.S. border dividing Stanstead Québec and Derby Line, Vermont, lined with flowers. Sept 2012. © Efrat Arbel
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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Funding
Research for this report was supported by the Harvard Immigration and Refugee Law Clinical Program. Portions of the Canadian research were supported by the Refugee Research Network, and a research grant from Metropolis British Columbia funded through the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, held by Catherine Dauvergne and Efrat Arbel at the University of British Columbia. We are grateful for this support.

Thanks
We wish to extend our sincere thanks to the attorneys, practitioners, non-governmental organizations, and government agencies in Canada and the United States who agreed to participate in our research, and provided the information and opinions included in this report. Our warm thanks also to Sabrineh Ardalan and Bonnie Rubrecht of the Harvard Immigration and Refugee Law Clinical Program for their incredible support, to Pierre-Gerlier Forest of the Johns Hopkins University Institute for Health and Social Policy for his invaluable feedback, and to Harshada Deshpande and Catherine Repel for their editorial assistance.
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>BIA</td>
<td>Board of Immigration Appeals (United States)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBSA</td>
<td>Canada Border Services Agency (Canada)</td>
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<td>CBP</td>
<td>Customs and Border Protection (United States)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIC</td>
<td>Citizenship and Immigration Canada (Canada)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCO</td>
<td>Designated Country of Origin (Canada)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security (United States)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOIR</td>
<td>Executive Office for Immigration Review (United States)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICE</td>
<td>Immigration and Customs Enforcement (United States)</td>
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<td>INA</td>
<td>Immigration and Nationality Act (United States)</td>
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<td>IRB</td>
<td>Immigration and Refugee Board (Canada)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRPA</td>
<td>Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (Canada)</td>
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<td>IBET</td>
<td>Integrated Border Enforcement Team (Canada-United States)</td>
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<td>MBS</td>
<td>Multiple Borders Strategy (Canada)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAD</td>
<td>Refugee Appeal Division (Canada)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCMP</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police (Canada)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMU</td>
<td>Statement of Mutual Understanding (Canada-United States)</td>
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<tr>
<td>STCA</td>
<td>Safe Third Country Agreement (Canada-United States)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (International)</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCIS</td>
<td>U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (United States)</td>
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<td>USCIRF</td>
<td>U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (United States)</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In June 2012, the Canadian government ushered in sweeping reforms to Canada’s refugee system. These reforms brought debates about Canadian refugee protection to the forefront of legal and political discourse. In advancing these reforms, the Canadian government has asserted that Canada’s refugee system is among the most generous and compassionate in the world. Canada’s doors, the Canadian government has stated, remain open to legitimate refugees.

This report evaluates these claims by examining the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country Agreement and border measures implemented under the rubric of the Multiple Borders Strategy, and analyzing their effects on asylum seekers. A detailed examination of these measures is necessary to evaluate the generosity of Canada’s refugee system, and to accurately frame debates about Canadian refugee protection.

This report concludes that through the Safe Third Country Agreement and the Multiple Borders Strategy, Canada is systematically closing its borders to asylum seekers, and circumventing its refugee protection obligations under domestic and international law. While Canada has a valid interest in regulating its borders to ensure refugee protection is reserved only for genuine refugees, neither the Safe Third Country Agreement nor the Multiple Borders Strategy effectively serve this interest. Instead, these measures deter, deflect, and block asylum seekers from lawfully making refugee claims in Canada in arbitrary and unprincipled ways, and do not effectively serve the goal of protecting the integrity of the Canada-U.S. border. Examining these measures, this report finds:

1. Canada is systematically closing its borders to asylum seekers and avoiding its refugee protection obligations under domestic and international law;

2. Through the Safe Third Country Agreement, Canada jeopardizes asylum seekers’ ability to obtain fundamental legal protections by returning them to the United States despite clear deficiencies in the U.S. asylum system;

3. The Safe Third Country Agreement has prompted a rise in human smuggling across the Canada-U.S. border, making the border more dangerous and disorderly, and raising security concerns for Canada and the United States.
The Multiple Borders Strategy is a broad strategy that re-charts Canada’s borders for the purposes of enhanced migration regulation. Its stated goal is to “push the border out” – outside the edge of Canadian territory – to facilitate Canada’s ability to intercept improperly documented persons as far away from Canada’s territorial borders as possible. The Canada Border Services Agency charts the Multiple Borders Strategy as follows:

Canada enacts measures that deter and deflect the arrival of asylum seekers at each of the external borderlines marked by the Multiple Borders Strategy: countries of origin; visa screening points; airline check-in points; points of initial embarkation; transit areas; points of final embarkation; and points of final arrival. These measures include offshore screening, visa restrictions, carrier sanctions, and other interdiction measures discussed in detail below. Canada has relied on these measures for decades, but had intensified and expanded their use in recent years. Together, these measures systematically close Canada’s borders to asylum seekers, making it harder for asylum seekers to lawfully reach Canada’s territorial frontiers by air, water, or land.

The Multiple Borders Strategy measures erect significant legal barriers for asylum seekers. Under domestic and international law, Canada is obligated to extend certain legal protections to asylum seekers present at or within its territorial borders. Canada’s legal obligations towards asylum seekers outside its territorial borders, however, are ill defined. By “pushing the border out” and subjecting asylum seekers to border inspection offshore, Canada seeks to avoid its legal obligations, and in so doing, weakens the legal protections available to asylum seekers under domestic and international legal instruments.
The measures enacted under the rubric of the Multiple Borders Strategy work in tandem with the Safe Third Country Agreement, a bilateral Agreement between Canada and the United States in effect since December 2004. The Safe Third Country Agreement forces asylum seekers to advance refugee claims in the first country they reach: either Canada or the United States. It prohibits asylum seekers who are in the United States, or traveling through the United States, from making refugee claims in Canada at the land border (and vice versa). Canada recognizes four exceptions to this Agreement, permitting entry to asylum seekers who: have the necessary documentation to enter Canada, can show they have a family member in Canada, arrive as unaccompanied minors, or are subject to the death penalty. Since it came into effect, the Safe Third Country Agreement has triggered a sharp decline in the number of asylum claims made at the Canadian border.

This report examines the Safe Third Country Agreement and Multiple Borders Strategy measures through legal analysis, data collection, and fact-finding investigations conducted along the Canada-U.S. border. Given the bilateral nature of the measures examined, this report focuses equally on Canadian and U.S. law. The researchers examined materials in both jurisdictions, including: relevant international agreements, their enabling legislation and associated regulations; domestic law; cases and petitions; legal scholarship and commentary; and data obtained pursuant to Freedom of Information requests from government agencies in Canada and the United States. This analysis established the legal framework against which the research undertaken at the Canada-U.S. border was evaluated.

The researchers also interviewed representatives from non-governmental organizations, faith group workers, practitioners, and attorneys at four ports of entry along the Canada-U.S. border and adjacent city centers: Buffalo, New York - Fort Erie, Ontario; Champlain, New York - Lacolle, Québec; Detroit, Michigan-Windsor, Ontario; and Blaine, Washington-White Rock, British Columbia. The researchers requested interviews with representatives from the Canada Border Services Agency and Citizenship and Immigration Canada. Both agencies provided all requested data and statistics and complied with all Freedom of Information requests, but declined to participate in an interview.

This report arrives at the following conclusions:
1. **Canada is systematically closing its borders to asylum seekers and avoiding its refugee protection obligations under domestic and international law**

- **Under the rubric of the Multiple Borders Strategy, Canada has expanded and intensified its use of offshore interdiction, inspection, and deflection measures.** These measures work in concert to block and deter asylum seekers from reaching Canada's territorial frontiers, making it harder for asylum seekers to lawfully seek refugee protection in Canada.

- **For example, Canada positions Liaison Officers in strategic offshore locations and tasks them with blocking and intercepting improperly documented persons, including asylum seekers, before they board Canada-bound boats or planes.** Canada has relied on the Liaison Officer Program (formerly the Migration Integrity Officer Program) for decades, but has intensified its use in recent years. Canada currently positions sixty-three officers in forty-nine strategic locations around the world. Liaison Officers train and work with airlines, local immigration authorities, and local law enforcement agencies to identify improperly document persons, including some asylum seekers, and block them from boarding Canada-bound boats or planes. Since asylum seekers are, by definition, individuals who have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in or by their countries of origin, it is often impossible or too dangerous for them to flee these countries using proper identity documents. It is for this reason that the United Nations Refugee Convention prohibits signatory states like Canada from imposing sanctions on asylum seekers who arrive at their territory using false documents or no documents to escape persecution. This principle is also incorporated into Canadian law via section 133 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. By positioning Liaison Officers offshore, and by training and working with surrogate screeners, Canada subjects asylum seekers to inspection before they reach Canada's territorial border and formally trigger these protections. However, delegating authority to surrogate screeners does not absolve Canada of its refugee protection obligations under domestic or international law. Moreover, the general law of state responsibility, as well as international refugee and human rights law, make clear that activities taking place outside state territory must still comply with basic principles of refugee protection.
Canada’s Liaison Officer Program blocks thousands of people from reaching Canada annually without ensuring adequate protection for asylum seekers. Between 2001 and late 2012, Liaison Officers intercepted over 73,000 people in offshore locations, or roughly 4,300-8,700 people each year. Since Liaison Officers are not required to consider the specific circumstances of intercepted individuals, or to differentiate between those who are fleeing persecution and those who are not, it is impossible to know how many of these individuals are genuine refugees. Furthermore, Liaison Officers intercept individuals when they are extremely vulnerable. Egregious consequences can occur when Liaison Officers intercept asylum seekers in countries that are not signatories to the Refugee Convention without referring them to an office of the UNHCR. When this occurs, asylum seekers may be arrested, detained, or returned to countries where they face persecution, torture, or death.

Canada also enlists private carriers to act as informal proxies for Canadian border enforcement, thereby indirectly blocking asylum flows. Canada imposes sanctions on third party carriers like airlines, railways, and shipping companies when they bring foreign nationals who lack proper documentation into Canada. The threat of sanctions creates serious incentives for private carriers to err on the side of caution and block travelers who appear to lack proper identification from boarding Canada-bound planes or boats, without considering the possibility that they may be genuine refugees. It is widely recognized that carrier sanctions prevent asylum seekers from making refugee claims in Canada.

Private carriers sometimes engage in improper conduct to avoid incurring sanctions, including throwing asylum seekers overboard on the high seas to meet their death. These activities occur outside the purview of Canadian law. Because Canada does not regularly monitor private carriers, it is difficult to speculate how frequently such conduct occurs. The few reported cases involving such conduct highlight the grave human toll associated with these policies. For example, in 1997, the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia heard a case involving seven officers of the Taiwanese vessel Maersk Dubai, who discovered three Romanian men stowed away aboard a Halifax-bound ship. The officers were accused of throwing the men overboard on the high seas to avoid incurring carrier sanctions upon their arrival in Canada. Despite finding sufficient evidence to warrant a trial for second-degree murder and
manslaughter, the Court found insufficient jurisdiction to issue a warrant of committal and discharged the officers. In the United States, the U.S. District Court heard a case in 2007 involving a Chinese ship crew who discovered five asylum seekers aboard a Texas-bound ship. To avoid incurring sanctions upon arrival in the United States, the ship captain promised the crewmembers bonuses if the ship arrived “stowaway free”. When the crew discovered the men, they threw two of the men overboard, and left three on a raft in the ocean. The men in the raft were saved by another vessel. The shark eaten bodies of the two other men were found sometime later. When the surviving men and their families filed suit against the companies that owned and operated the ship in U.S. District Court, their case was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendants. These cases show that policies that “push the border out” can create gaps in jurisdictional authority and place improper conduct outside the reach of Canadian and U.S. law.

• **Canada imposes visa restrictions on refugee producing countries when refugee arrivals from that country increase, primarily to block asylum seekers.** Canada has a long history of imposing visa requirements on refugee source countries when refugee arrivals from that country increase. Because Canada does not issue visas for the purposes of seeking asylum, visa restrictions often operate to stem asylum flows. Imposing visa requirements on countries that generate refugees often results in substantial drops in asylum claims. In July 2009, for example, the Canadian government imposed visa requirements on Mexico and the Czech Republic, and was candid in its position that imposing such requirements would help stem refugee flows from these source countries. These 2009 visa requirements triggered a sharp decline in the number of asylum claims made from Mexico and the Czech Republic, so much so that Canada dropped in UNHCR’s ranking of top refugee receiving countries. These restrictions work in tandem with offshore inspections and carrier sanctions to deny many asylum seekers the opportunity to lawfully enter Canada to seek refugee protection.

• **Canada blocks and deters thousands of asylum seekers form making refugee claims at the Canada-U.S. border through the Safe Third Country Agreement.** As noted above, the Safe Third Country Agreement prevents asylum seekers who are in the United States, or traveling through the United States, from making asylum claims in Canada (and vice versa) subject to certain exceptions. Since the Agreement came into effect in December 2004, Canada has blocked several-hundred asylum seekers at the border each year.
These numbers, however, only tell part of the story. Since the Agreement not only turns asylum seekers away at the border, but also deters asylum seekers from presenting themselves at the border, its effects are more significant than these numbers reveal. Statistics obtained from the Canada Border Services Agency show that before the Agreement came into effect, between 6,000 and 14,000 asylum claims were made at the Canadian border each year. After the Agreement came into effect – and then again after Canada removed an exception that permitted entry to claimants from “moratorium countries” in 2009 – the claims made at the border dropped to roughly 4,000 per year. This number reached a low point in 2011, with only 2,563 asylum claims made at the Canadian border that year.

- **Since it came into effect, the Safe Third Country Agreement has kept large numbers of asylum seekers out of Canada and in the United States.** While the Agreement was designed as a “burden sharing” mechanism, its effects have been felt unevenly on either side of the border. Indeed, Canada and the United States were driven by different motivations in entering the Safe Third Country Agreement. While the United States entered the Agreement primarily to fortify the border, Canada entered into the Agreement primarily to deter asylum seekers from making refugee claims in Canada. In a 2010 report released by U.S. Custom and Border Protection, the Canada Border Services Agency, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the agencies explain: “[w]hile the primary focus for the United States was security, Canada sought to limit the significant irregular northbound movement of people from the United States who wished to access the Canadian refugee determination system.”

- **The Safe Third Country Agreement’s exceptions are applied inflexibly and inconsistently, suggesting that some asylum seekers who should be admitted into Canada are being turned away for arbitrary and unprincipled reasons.** Of the four exceptions identified in the Safe Third Country Agreement, the family member exception is the most frequently used. Refugee practitioners on both sides of the border described significant inconsistencies in evaluating the Agreement’s family member exception, including inflexible evaluation standards. To trigger this exception, an asylum seeker must satisfy a Canadian border services officer that he or she has a family member in Canada. While the burden of proof is on the claimant, officers are required to make reasonable efforts to confirm family relationships. When the Agreement was first implemented, Canadian
officials stated they would take a generous and liberal approach to the family member exception. However, data collected for this report indicates that due to the application of rigid evaluation standards, asylum seekers who should be granted entry into Canada are being turned away.

- Practitioners on both sides of the border also pointed to a growing culture of disbelief at the Canadian border, and described a prevailing attitude of suspicion and hostility, wherein asylum seekers are regularly demeaned and dismissed. Practitioners pointed to a “huge shift” in the prevailing attitude at the Canadian border after the Safe Third Country Agreement came into effect, and noted that since then, asylum seekers are increasingly being “treated as if they’re criminals before they’re found guilty.” This raises further concerns that given the prevailing culture of disbelief, asylum seekers are being denied entry into Canada for arbitrary or unprincipled reasons.

2. Through the Safe Third Country Agreement, Canada jeopardizes asylum seekers’ ability to obtain fundamental legal protections by returning them to the United States despite clear deficiencies in the U.S. asylum system

- The operational legitimacy of the Safe Third Country Agreement hinges on the assertion that the United States and Canada are equally “safe” countries for refugees. They are not. Several key aspects of U.S. asylum law and policy fall below international standards and fail to ensure fundamental protection for asylum seekers. For example, unlike other states parties to the Refugee Convention, the United States imposes a higher standard of proof for withholding of removal, a more limited form of protection which provides only basic non-refoulement protection without the associated entitlements that come with a granting of asylum. U.S. law also imposes a one-year filing deadline on asylum seekers, creating tremendous and unfair burdens on genuine refugees. The one-year filing deadline does not comply with international standards prescribing that asylum requests should not be excluded from consideration based on failure to fulfill formal requirements. It has been widely criticized for undermining the efficiency of the asylum adjudication system, for leaving asylum seekers in legal limbo, for diverting limited time and resources in ineffective ways, and for having a particularly detrimental impact on women fleeing gender-related
persecution. U.S. law further bars from asylum and withholding any person who has provided “material support” to terrorist organizations or activities. These provisions jeopardize asylum seekers, and have been heavily criticized for being overbroad, and for straying from international standards that require individual responsibility to justify exclusion of an individual from refugee protection. Before the Safe Third Country Agreement came into effect, deserving asylum seekers denied asylum or barred from asylum in the United States successfully obtained protection in Canada. With the implementation of the Agreement, this important safety valve has been largely closed.

- **The Safe Third Country Agreement endangers asylum seekers by placing them at risk of detention in the United States.** Data collected for this report indicates that asylum seekers who are returned to the United States pursuant to the Safe Third Country Agreement are often subject to detention. Returned asylum seekers are held in dedicated immigration detention, jails, or dual-purpose facilities doubling both as jails and immigration detention centers. Given the relative absence of female-dedicated detention facilities along the Canada-U.S. border, women asylum seekers returned to the United States under the Agreement are more likely to be detained in jails in penal conditions of confinement.

- **The U.S. immigration detention system has come under increasing critical scrutiny in recent years, given core problems at the level of law, policy, and practice.** For example, in a report released in 2013, the non-partisan United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) concluded that despite stated commitments by the Department of Homeland Security and Immigrations and Customs Enforcement to overhaul the immigration detention system, longstanding concerns about asylum seekers held in detention remain unaddressed. The mistreatment of asylum seekers and other immigrant detainees in U.S. detention facilities is also substantially documented, and includes inadequate medical care, discrimination, penal conditions of confinement, as well as physical and sexual violence. In a number of facilities, detainees are subject to humiliating strip searches, inmate “counts”, physical restraints, or solitary confinement. Studies also show that some detainees are subject to greater incidents of mistreatment, for example women and LGBTQI detainees.
• **The U.S. immigration detention regime falls far below international law requirements.** UNHCR has long made clear that in principle, asylum seekers should not be detained, and that detaining asylum seekers for anything but a brief period of time is contrary to international law norms and should be avoided. The U.S. immigration detention system fails to comply with these standards, as asylum seekers are detained for lengthy periods of time. In addition, many detained asylum seekers do not have access to prompt court review of their detention. This is inconsistent with UNHCR’s 2012 Guidelines on Detention, which emphasize that detained asylum seekers should be granted the right to prompt review before a judicial or other independent authority. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants’ 2012 Report similarly emphasizes the need for automatic, regular and judicial review of detention in each individual case. The U.S. immigration detention system violates these internationally recognized standards. U.S. law also does not require detention decisions to be made on an individual basis, but rather, permits detention to be applied automatically for broad categories of non-citizens. This approach, precluding individualized, case-by-case assessments, results in the detention of asylum seekers without any consideration of their specific circumstances, medical needs, trauma, past trauma, or language comprehension. For example, the United States mandatorily detains asylum seekers subject to expedited removal, a process discussed in detail below.

• **Once detained, asylum seekers face significant barriers to advancing successful asylum claims.** Data collected for this report suggests that detained asylum seekers encounter obstacles in securing legal assistance, and that in some detention facilities asylum seekers have little access to legal counsel and legal aid organizations. Practitioners interviewed for this report further explained that some asylum seekers held in detention end up withdrawing their claims because they simply cannot bear to stay in detention. In its 2013 report, USCIRF similarly emphasized that penal detention conditions risk re-traumatizing asylum seekers, and may lead some to prematurely terminate their claim.

• **The Safe Third Country Agreement further endangers asylum seekers by placing them at risk of expedited removal upon return to the United States.** Data collected for this report indicates that in at least some cases, asylum seekers returned to the United States pursuant to the Safe Third Country Agreement are placed in expedited removal proceedings. Expedited removal
is a process by which the United States removes persons classified as “arriving aliens” attempting entry at the U.S. border or who are apprehended within 100 miles of it, who have no documents or whose documents are deemed false or inconsistent with visa status, except in the case of some asylum seekers. Practitioners noted that at some border crossing points, asylum seekers were put in expedited removal proceedings automatically upon their return to the United States, while at others only sporadically. The rates varied by location and by officer. This finding is alarming given that U.S. legal directives prohibit the use of expedited removal for asylum seekers returned to the United States pursuant to the Safe Third Country Agreement.

- The U.S. expedited removal process is riddled with problems, such that *bona fide* asylum seekers often pass through the process unrecognized and unprotected. The deficiencies in the expedited removal process have been well documented. In a study released in 2005, the non-partisan USCIRF identified serious flaws in the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers in the expedited removal process, including failure to provide applicants with crucial information, failure to ask mandatory questions, failure to refer cases to an asylum officer where credible fear is expressed, applicants signing sworn statements allowing for their removal without reviewing the statements, and officers completing forms containing incorrect details, or otherwise lacking crucial information. In response to the reactions generated by this criticism, the Department of Homeland Security stated that it would take measures to improve the expedited removal process. However, in its 2007 and 2009 follow up evaluations, USCIRF continued to criticize the Department of Homeland Security for failing to take specific action with respect to some of the most serious flaws in the expedited removal process, and reiterated its concern that the expedited removal process can deny *bona fide* asylum seekers fundamental protection and put them at risk of being returned to countries where they face persecution.

- The Safe Third Country Agreement also endangers asylum seekers by diminishing their rights entitlements in Canada. Canada’s new refugee determination system precludes asylum seekers who lawfully enter Canada under one of the Agreement’s exceptions from appealing a negative decision to the Refugee Appeal Division. This policy imposes an arbitrary distinction on Safe Third Country Agreement claimants and weakens the legal protections available to them for no principled reason.
3. The Safe Third Country Agreement has prompted a rise in human smuggling across the Canada-U.S. border, making the border more dangerous and disorderly, and raising security concerns for Canada and the United States.

- Since the Safe Third Country Agreement came into effect, more asylum seekers are making unauthorized border crossings into Canada. Data collected for this report indicates that since the Agreement was implemented in 2004, unauthorized border crossings and human smuggling attempts across the Canada-U.S. border have increased. Findings made by Canadian and U.S. government agencies further support this claim. For example, a 2012 report issued by the Integrated Border Enforcement Team indicates that Canada-bound human smuggling attempts between ports of entry increased by 58 percent in 2011 as compared with the previous year. A 2010 Study by the Canada Border Services Agency similarly indicates a rise in irregular entries into Canada between ports of entry by individuals seeking to avoid the Safe Third Country Agreement. Before the Safe Third Country Agreement came into effect, critics cautioned that its implementation would encourage unauthorized border crossings, make the border less secure, and leave asylum seekers more vulnerable to violence and exploitation. And indeed, away from official ports of entry, the border is now more disorderly and more dangerous. This not only threatens the lives and safety of asylum seekers, but also raises serious security concerns for both Canada and the United States.

- In some cases, attempts to cross the Canada-U.S. border without inspection have turned tragic, resulting in needless suffering and even death. With the tightening of the U.S.-Canada border, asylum seekers have resorted to dangerous measures to seek refuge in Canada, sometimes risking their lives doing so. Some have drowned while attempting to enter Canada by swimming the Niagara River. Others have lost life or limb by crossing into Canada by way of railway bridges. Uniformly, practitioners on both sides of the border interpreted these attempts as signs of extreme desperation. These stories show the human toll that comes with preventing persecuted people from lawfully seeking asylum in destination states like Canada.
• **Canada’s border measures have a disruptive impact on refugee shelters and centers along the Canada-U.S. border.** As the number of asylum seekers being processed and aided by non-governmental organizations, faith groups, and refugee shelters along the Canada-U.S. border has decreased, some have been forced to consider alternative functions for their shelters. These groups offer life-saving services like housing, security, legal assistance, and emotional support. If these groups close their doors, the border will become even more dangerous for asylum seekers.

**CONCLUSIONS**

For decades, Canada’s refugee system was regarded as one of the fairest in the world, and the Canadian people recognized for their generosity in matters of asylum. Canada’s commitment to refugee protection is aptly captured by several decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada. In its landmark 1985 decision in *Singh v. Canada*, for example, the Court held it would be “unthinkable” to deny asylum seekers basic legal rights. The Court also stressed that refugees who do not have safe haven elsewhere are entitled to rely on Canada’s willingness to live up to the obligations it has undertaken as a signatory to the Refugee Convention. In its 1993 decision in *Canada v. Ward*, the Court reiterated Canada’s commitment to refugee protection, and further underscored the importance of not “render[ing] illusory Canada’s provision of a haven for refugees.” Most recently, in its 2013 decision in *Ezokola v. Canada*, the Court emphasized the international community’s “profound concern for refugees” and its commitment “to assure refugees the widest possible exercise of . . . fundamental rights and freedoms.”

An analysis of the Multiple Borders Strategy and the Safe Third Country Agreement shows a clear gap between the promise of refugee rights protection as outlined in these decisions, and the record of their enforcement in Canadian border policy as it stands today. Under the rubric of the Multiple Borders Strategy and pursuant to the Safe Third Country Agreement, Canada is increasingly taking deliberate measures to close its borders to asylum seekers without due regard for its refugee protection obligations as outlined in domestic and international law. These measures result in the effective denial of rights to which asylum seekers are entitled under domestic and international law.
The Multiple Borders Strategy and Safe Third Country Agreement undermine Canada’s proud history of refugee protection, as well its global leadership in asylum matters. By implementing and intensifying these measures, Canada sets a poor example for other countries, and contributes to the deterioration of refugee protection around the world.

The Canada-U.S. border dividing Stanstead, Québec and Derby Line, Vermont, July 2012. ©Efrat Arbel
INTRODUCTION

In June 2012, the Canadian government passed the Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act, ushering in sweeping reforms designed to make Canada’s refugee system faster and fairer, to deter abuse, and to enhance the safety and security of Canadians. In justifying these reforms, the Canadian government has repeatedly asserted that Canada’s refugee system is among the most generous and compassionate in the world, and that Canada’s doors remain open to legitimate refugees. This report evaluates these claims by examining border measures implemented under the rubric of the Multiple Borders Strategy (MBS), and the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA).

1 Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act, 2012 S.C., ch.17 (Can.).
2 Citizenship and Immigration Canada News Release, Harper Government Introduces the Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act (Feb. 16, 2012) available at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/releases/2012/2012-02-16.asp (last visited Oct. 23, 2013) (announcing new legislation “to protect the integrity of Canada’s immigration system”, and noting that the proposed measures “include further reforms to the asylum system to make it faster and fairer” as well as measures that address human smuggling, and make the provision of biometric data mandatory in certain circumstances. The news release further states that the reforms are aimed to deter “abuse of Canada’s generous immigration and refugee system”, and protect the integrity of Canada’s immigration programs as well as the safety and security of Canadians).
3 Id. (noting that “Canadians take pride in the generosity and compassion of immigration and refugee programs”). See also e.g. “Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Speaking Notes for the Honourable Jason Kenney, P.C., M.P., Minister of Citizenship, Immigration, and Multiculturalism (Feb. 16, 2012) available at: http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/speeches/2012/2012-02-16.asp (last visited Oct. 23, 2013) (stating “Our refugee system is amongst the most generous in the world. It is internationally recognized for its fairness”); Debra Black, Canada’s Immigration System Lacks Heart, Critics Say TORONTO STAR (Jun. 28, 2013) available at: http://www.thestar.com/news/immigration/2013/06/28/canadas_immigration_system_lacks_heart_critics_say.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2013) (citing Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Canada responding to allegations that Canada’s refugee system has lost its heart by saying “In every respect, we are a model of generosity . . . Find me one other country that is more generous with respect to immigration and refugees”); Annie Bergeron-Oliver, Feds and medical community disagree on impact of refugee health cuts IPOLITICS (Aug. 19, 2013) available at http://www.ipolitics.ca/2013/08/19/feds-and-medical-community-disagree-on-impact-of-refugee-health-cuts/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2013) (citing Health Minister Rona Ambrose stating that “When it came to the cuts in refugee health, let’s be clear, Canadians are very compassionate people and our refugee system is something that matters greatly to all of us”).
4 Citizenship and Immigration Canada News Release, supra note 2 (stating “Our Government is sending a clear message that our doors are open to those who play by the rules, including legitimate refugees. However, we will crack down on those who endanger human lives and threaten the integrity of our borders”).
5 See e.g. CANADA BORDER SERVICES AGENCY CBSA STRATEGY AND COORDINATION BRANCH, ADMISSIBILITY SCREENING AND SUPPORTING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: EVALUATION STUDY (2009), available at http://cbsa-
This report follows up on a Harvard report released in 2006, titled *Bordering on Failure: The U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country Agreement Fifteen Months After Implementation.*\(^7\) The 2006 report concluded that at that time, the Safe Third Country Agreement was endangering asylum seekers, denying asylum seekers access to legal protections, making the border less secure, and contributing to the deterioration of refugee protection in North America.

Revisiting the 2006 report, this report finds that the problems identified in 2006 persist, and are made worse by the continued expansion of Canada’s border technologies under the rubric of the Multiple Borders Strategy. The Multiple Borders Strategy and the Safe Third Country Agreement deter, deflect, and block asylum seekers from lawfully making refugee claims in Canada. Their effect is to weaken the legal protection afforded to asylum seekers under domestic and international law. Moreover, these measures do not effectively serve the goal of protecting the integrity of the Canada-U.S. border. Instead, they have prompted a rise in human smuggling and unauthorized border crossings, endangering the lives of asylum seekers, making the border more dangerous and disorderly, and raising security concerns for both Canada and the United States.

This report is comprised of five parts. Part One explains the methodology adopted in conducting research for this report. Part Two charts an overview of key principles in Canadian refugee law, and outlines the legal framework and operation of the Multiple Borders Strategy and the Safe Third Country Agreement.

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Part Three charts an overview of key interdiction policies implemented by Canada at the external borderlines established by the Multiple Borders Strategy. Part Three also surveys associated interdiction measures implemented by the United States. Part Four analyzes the effects of the Safe Third Country Agreement on asylum seekers, and documents central findings.

Part Five concludes that the Multiple Borders Strategy and the Safe Third Country Agreement systematically close Canada’s borders to asylum seekers, contravene Canada’s refugee protection obligations under domestic and international law, make the Canada-U.S. border more dangerous and disorderly, and undermine Canada’s proud history of refugee protection.
PART ONE: METHODOLOGY

The material presented in this report is based on comprehensive legal research, data collection, fact-finding, and analysis. Trained in Canadian and U.S. law, the researchers examined materials in both jurisdictions, including: relevant international agreements, their enabling legislation and associated regulations; cases and petitions; and legal scholarship and commentary. The researchers also analyzed statistical data obtained pursuant to Freedom of Information requests from government agencies in Canada and the United States. This analysis established the legal framework against which the activities and actions undertaken at the Canada-U.S. border were evaluated.

The researchers conducted fact-finding investigations at four ports of entry along the Canada-U.S. border and adjacent city centers: Buffalo, New York - Fort Erie, Ontario; Champlain, New York - Lacolle, Québec; Detroit, Michigan-Windsor, Ontario; and Blaine, Washington-White Rock, British Columbia. The researchers interviewed representatives from non-governmental organizations, practitioners, faith workers, and attorneys on both sides of the border.

The researchers followed established ethics protocols when carrying out data collection, documentation, and reporting. They applied informed consent guidelines to all interviews. Where consent was given, interviews were recorded and transcribed. Information was collected and stored to maximize privacy and security. The researchers were guided by core human rights fact-finding principles of accuracy, confidentiality, sensitivity, impartiality, independence, integrity, and professionalism. Interviews were conducted between May and

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8 Research was conducted in accordance with ethics criteria established by the University of British Columbia Office of Research Services, Behavioral Research Ethics Board. See Ethics Approval Certificate H11-01275 (Jul. 2011). Research ethics review is a process of initial and ongoing review and monitoring of research involving human participants. The process requires the independent evaluation of all proposed research by an independent committee that examines the research study from the perspective of prospective participants. The committee's assessment of a proposed study's ethical acceptability is guided by the core principles of research ethics: respect for persons, concern for welfare, and justice. The underlying value of research ethics review is respect for human dignity. The review process ensures that research involving humans is sensitive to the inherent worth of all human beings and the respect and consideration they are due. For more information, see: http://www.rise.ubc.ca/content/human-ethics (last visited Nov. 12, 2013).

September 2012. All of the interviews were conducted in English with English speakers.

The researchers prepared a uniform interview guide and applied it to interviews through a semi-structured interview format. The researchers sought information about many issues relating to border security and border crossing, focusing primarily on the application and effects of the Safe Third Country Agreement. The interviewers ensured that asylum seekers were not identified by name or other identifying criteria in the course of data collection.

In the United States, the researchers interviewed representatives at Vive La Casa (Buffalo, New York), Vermont Immigration and Asylum Advocates (Burlington, Vermont), Freedom House (Detroit, Michigan), and Northwest Immigrant Rights Project (Tacoma, Washington). The interviewers also met with attorneys in New York, New York and Bellingham, Washington. Interviews were conducted in-person and by telephone.

In Canada, the researchers interviewed representatives at Peace Bridge Newcomer Center (Fort Erie, Ontario), Casa El Norte Refugee Assistance Program (Fort Erie, Ontario), South Asian Women’s Community Centre (Montréal, Québec), Centre Scalibrini (Montréal, Québec), the Canadian Council for Refugees (Montréal, Québec), Matthew House (Windsor, Ontario), Inland Refugee Society (Vancouver, British Columbia) and MOSAIC B.C. (Vancouver, British Columbia). The interviewers also met with attorneys in Vancouver, British Columbia. Interviews were conducted in-person and by telephone.

Interviews were requested with various Canadian government officials, including representatives from the Canada Border Services Agency and Citizenship and Immigration Canada. Both agencies provided all requested data and statistics and complied with all Freedom of Information requests, but declined to participate in an interview.

PART TWO: BACKGROUND, CONTEXT, LAW

1. Canada’s Commitment to Refugee Protection

“[A] Convention refugee who does not have a safe haven elsewhere is entitled to rely on this country’s willingness to live up to the obligations it has undertaken as a signatory to the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.”

Canada is signatory to the United Nations 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, as amended by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.11 As a signatory to the Refugee Convention, Canada assumes responsibility to extend certain legal protections to asylum seekers who arrive within its territorial borders seeking protection. More specifically, Canada assumes responsibility not to return refugees to a country where they face a well-founded fear of persecution. Article 33 of the Refugee Convention prohibits signatory states from expelling or returning refugees “in any manner whatsoever” to face persecution.12 This principle is known as non-refoulement, and is incorporated into Canadian law via section 115 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.13

In its 1985 decision in Singh v. Canada,14 the Supreme Court of Canada gave clear expression to Canada’s refugee protection commitments. The Court held that asylum seekers who are present at or within Canada’s borders are entitled to basic constitutional protection under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

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12 Id. art. 33.
13 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. ch. 27 (2001) (Can.) (hereinafter IRPA). Section 115(1) provides: “A protected person or a person who is recognized as a Convention refugee by another country to which the person may be returned shall not be removed from Canada to a country where they would be at risk of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion or at risk of torture or cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.”
14 Singh v. Canada, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 (Can.).
and Freedoms. It reasoned that it would be “unthinkable that the Charter would not apply to entitle [asylum seekers] to fundamental justice in the adjudication of their status.” The Court explained that “a Convention refugee who does not have a safe haven elsewhere is entitled to rely on this country’s willingness to live up to the obligations it has undertaken as a signatory to the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.”

In its 1993 decision in Canada v. Ward, the Court again reiterated Canada’s commitment to refugee protection. The Court explained that the regime established by the Refugee Convention was “formulated to serve as a back-up to the protection one expects from the state of which an individual is a national”, and is designed to extend “surrogate or substitute protection” to persecuted persons. The Court further underscored the importance of not “render[ing] illusory Canada’s provision of a haven for refugees.” The provision of refuge, the Court explained, aligns with the underlying purpose of refugee law, namely, “the international community’s commitment to the assurance of basic human rights without discrimination.” Most recently, in its 2013 decision in Ezokola v.

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15 Id. The Court held at that “every human being who is physically present in Canada and by virtue of such presence amenable to Canadian law,” including asylum seekers, is protected by section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which provides that “everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.” Singh, 1 S.C.R. 177, at para. 35. See also Catherine Dauvergne, How the Charter Has Failed Non-Citizens in Canada: Reviewing Thirty Years of Supreme Court of Canada Jurisprudence, 58(3) McGill Law Journal 663, 665-669 (2013) (noting that in extending these protections to asylum seekers present at or within Canada’s borders, the Court “explicitly rejected a distinction that would have hinged Charter protection to citizenship and similarly rejected a distinction, based on US law, between those present in the country and those seeking entry”, and further analyzing how despite Singh’s early promise, the Charter has been disappointing to non-citizens in Canada, in “jarring contrast to the reputation that Canada has sought for itself as an immigrant-welcoming international human rights leader”).

16 Id. at para. 52.

17 Id. at para. 20.


19 Id. at 709.

20 Id. at 726.

21 Id. at 733. This decision has been credited with anchoring the refugee analysis within a human rights paradigm. See e.g. Deborah E. Anker, Refugee Law, Gender, and the Human Rights Paradigm, 15 Harv. Hum. RTS J. 133 (2002) (explaining that “the Supreme Court of Canada signaled in Ward [that] refugee law increasingly refers to, and more explicitly acknowledges its foundation in, an international human rights paradigm”); Linda E. Tranter, A Step Forward in Protecting Human Rights: Canada v. Ward, 14 Refuge 16, 16 (1993) (noting that Ward affirmed that the “protection of those at risk of serious human rights violations is the lens through which refugee law must be focused”).
Canada,"\textsuperscript{22} the Court again emphasized the international community’s “profound concern for refugees”, and its commitment “to assure refugees the widest possible exercise of . . . fundamental rights and freedoms”.\textsuperscript{23}

Canada’s commitment to refugee protection may also be gleaned from the goals identified in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).\textsuperscript{24} The IRPA proclaims that Canada’s refugee regime “is in the first instance about saving lives and offering protection to the displaced and the persecuted.”\textsuperscript{25} It emphasizes Canada’s commitment “to offer safe haven to persons with a well-founded fear of persecution,”\textsuperscript{26} and to “establish fair and efficient procedures that will maintain the integrity of the Canadian refugee protection system, while upholding Canada’s respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all human beings.”\textsuperscript{27} The pledge to offer “fair consideration to those who come to Canada claiming persecution” is proudly displayed in the IRPA as a “fundamental expression of Canada’s humanitarian ideals.”\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{22} Ezokola v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration, 2013 SCC 40 (Can.) (clarifying Canada’s interpretation of the refugee exclusion provisions under Art. 1F(a) of Refugee Convention, rejecting a guilt-by-association approach and requiring proof that the claimant made a significant contribution to the crime or criminal purpose of a group for that claimant to be excluded from refugee protection).

\textsuperscript{23} Id. at para. 32.

\textsuperscript{24} IRPA, S.C. ch. 27 (2001) (Can.), supra note 13.

\textsuperscript{25} Id. at § 3(2)(a).

\textsuperscript{26} Id. at § 3(2)(d).

\textsuperscript{27} Id. at § 3(2)(e).

\textsuperscript{28} Id. at § 3(2)(c).
2. Canadian Border Policy: An Overview

“[S]ince asylum seekers’ entitlement to claim refugee status is triggered by reaching the frontier of the asylum state, if the border is no longer the border, the state can deny responsibility for entertaining the refugee claim.”

Notwithstanding Canada’s stated commitment to refugee protection, Canada has long relied on interdiction tactics to block or deter asylum seekers from seeking refugee protection in Canada. Interdiction is not a new phenomenon; the Canadian government has engaged in interdiction for decades. Canada has, in fact, been labeled as “something of a pioneer in instruments of interdiction.”

30 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees defines interdiction as “one of the measures employed by States to: i) prevent embarkation of persons on an international journey; ii) prevent further onward international travel by persons who have commenced their journey; or iii) assert control of vessels where there are reasonable grounds to believe the vessel is transporting persons contrary to international or national maritime law.” See UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Executive Comm. for the High Commissioner, Protection Safeguards in Interception Measures, Conclusion No. 97, October 10, 2003, UN Doc Nos. A/AC.96/987, 12A (A/58/12/Add.1), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3f93b2894.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2013). Interdiction tactics often overlap with interception tactics, which similarly disrupt the movement of asylum seekers across borders, and prevent them from physically reaching a country’s territorial borders. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has stated that while an internationally accepted definition of interception does not exist, the term’s meaning can be derived from past and current state practice. UNHCR defines interception as “encompassing all measures applied by a State, outside its national territory, in order to prevent, interrupt or stop the movement of persons without the required documentation crossing international borders by land, air or sea, and making their way to the country of prospective destination.” See UNHCR, EXCOM, Interception of Asylum Seekers and Refugees: the International Framework and Recommendations for a Comprehensive Approach, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. EC/50/SC/CRP/17 (Jun. 9, 2000), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/49997afa1a.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2013).
32 Macklin, supra note 29 at 378-379. See also Janet Dench, Controlling the Borders: C-31 and Interdiction, 19(4) Refugi 34, 37 (2001) (noting that Citizenship and Immigration Canada boasts of its
In the last decade, Canada has expanded and intensified its use of interdiction tactics under the rubric of the Multiple Borders Strategy. These measures are examined in detail below.

(i) The Multiple Borders Strategy

Canada monitors and regulates its borders through a complex matrix of legal measures and agreements. Principal among these is the 2001 Smart Border Declaration and Action Plan, a bilateral agreement between Canada and the United States designed to enhance border security and border control. The Action Plan provides for common standards of biometric information collection, extensive sharing of information on high-risk travelers, increased visa coordination, programs to facilitate the movement of low-risk people and goods across the Canada-U.S. border, and restrictions on asylum, among other things.


34 See Canada Border Services Agency, North American Partnerships: Working with the United States, (Jan. 12, 2007), available at http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/agency-agence/partner-partenaire-eng.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2013) (explaining that the Smart Border Declaration and Action Plan were put into effect in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks to improve security and services on the Canada-U.S. border). While the September 11, 2011 attacks have been identified as a catalyst for Canada’s expansion of its border technologies, as François Crépeau and Delphine Nakache explain, the “securitization agenda” that underpins many of these technologies emerged long before the attacks. See François Crépeau and Delphine Nakache, Controlling Irregular Migration in Canada: Reconciling Security Concerns with Human Rights Protection, 12(1) IMMIGR. AND REFUGEE POL’Y CHOICES 13 (2006) (noting that the September 11, 2011 attacks nonetheless “gave authorities more incentive to radically change migration policies and make them harsher toward unwanted migrants”).

35 The Action Plan is based on four pillars: secure flow of people; secure flow of goods; investing in secure infrastructure; and coordination and information sharing in the enforcement of these objectives. See Smart Border Declaration, id. (explaining the four principles).
border security and border management.\textsuperscript{36} In August 2003, the parties signed an Asylum Annex to facilitate information sharing in asylum matters.\textsuperscript{37}

These measures are premised on a strategy known as the Multiple Borders Strategy (MBS), described as follows in the preamble to the Statement of Mutual Understanding:

Recognizing that moving the focus of control of the movement of people away from our shared land border to overseas, where potential violators of citizenship or immigration laws are interdicted prior to their arrival in the United States and Canada, enables Canada and the United States to manage more effectively their movement into and within North America. Canada and the United States are pursuing a regional approach to migration based on the Multiple Borders Strategy . . . At every checkpoint along the travel continuum — visa screening; airport check-in; points of embarkation; transit points; international airports and seaports; and the Canada-United States border — there is an opportunity for the Participants to link the person and the document and any known intelligence.\textsuperscript{38}

The MBS effectively re-charts Canada’s borders. Its stated purpose is to “push the border out”\textsuperscript{39} — beyond the formal edge of Canadian territory — to allow Canada to “identify and intercept illegal and undesirable travellers as far away from North America as possible”, while keeping the border “open to legitimate travellers and goods.”\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{36} SMU, supra note 5 at paras. 1-3 of Preamble. The SMU consists of sixteen articles that establish a variety of information sharing arrangements.


\textsuperscript{38} SMU, supra note 5.

\textsuperscript{39} CBSA ADMISSIBILITY STUDY supra note 5 (stating “A key element of the CBSA’s approach to combat irregular migration is its “multiple borders strategy” (Exhibit 3). The strategy strives to “push the border out” so that people posing a risk to Canada’s security and prosperity are identified as far away from the actual border as possible, ideally before a person departs their country of origin.”)

The CBSA charts the MBS as follows:

**Exhibit 3: Multiple Border Strategy**

To advance the goal of “pushing the border out”, the MBS “defines a border for immigration purposes as any point at which the identity of a traveller can be verified.” As the CBSA explains, the strategy “views the border not as a geopolitical line but rather a continuum of checkpoints along a route of travel from the country of origin to Canada or the United States.”

Identified by the Canadian government as a “key element of the CBSA’s approach to combat irregular migration,” the MBS entrenches a policy of enhanced interdiction into Canadian migration policy. By “pushing the border out”, the Multiple Borders Strategy expands state power outside Canada’s territorial frontiers, and permits the screening of travelers at various external, offshore locations. This is one of the MBS’s stated goals, namely, to screen and intercept individuals “as far away from the actual border as possible, ideally before a person departs their country of origin,” and to shift the locus of border control away from Canada’s territorial borders “to the many, more effective, ‘borders’ that a traveller will pass through before reaching North America.”

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41 CBSA ADMISSIBILITY STUDY, supra note 5 at Overview.
43 SMU, supra note 5 at Preamble, para.3.
44 CBSA ADMISSIBILITY STUDY, supra note 5 at Overview.
45 Id.
46 OAG 2003, supra note 40 at 8.
Indeed, under the rubric of the MBS, Canada has intensified its use of interdiction and interception measures at each of the external borderlines marked in the above diagram: countries of origin, points of departure and arrival, points of transit, and points of initial and final embarkation. These measures impact asylum seekers in detrimental ways, either directly by preventing them from reaching Canada, or indirectly by closing avenues by which they would otherwise travel to Canada. These measures are analyzed in Part Three.

(ii) The Safe Third Country Agreement
While the measures implemented under the rubric of the MBS make it difficult for asylum seekers to enter Canada by air or water, the Safe Third Country Agreement, or STCA, makes it difficult for asylum seekers to enter Canada by land. 47 The STCA is a bilateral agreement between Canada and the United States, in effect since 2004, designed to regulate asylum claims across the Canada-U.S. border. 48

The STCA prohibits foreign nationals who first set foot in the United States from making refugee claims in Canada, and vice versa. Article 4(1) of the STCA empowers Canada and the United States to summarily turn back foreign


48 Canadian law requires three factors to be considered in designating a country as “safe”: whether the country is a party to the Refugee Convention and the Convention Against Torture; its policies and practices with respect to claims made under these conventions; and its human rights record. See IRPA, S.C. ch. 27 (2001), supra note 13 at § 102(1)(a) (prescribing that a country designated as “safe” must comply with Art. 33 of the Refugee Convention, and Art. 3 of the Convention Against Torture, which prohibit signatory states from returning a claimant to a country where he or she faces torture or persecution). See also IRPA § 102(2) (prescribing that in designating a country as “safe,” the Governor-in-Council is required to also consider its policies and practices with respect to claims under the Refugee Convention and the Convention Against Torture, as well as its human rights record). To date, the United States is the only country designated as a safe third country by Canada. See Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), Canada-U.S. Safe Third Country Agreement (last modified Jul. 23, 2009), http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/laws-policy/menu-safethird.asp (noting that the United States is the only country designates as a “safe third country”).
nationals who arrive by land from the other country.\footnote{Art. 4(1) of the STCA provides: “the Party of the country of last presence shall examine, in accordance with its refugee status determination system, the refugee status claim of any person who arrives at a land border port-of-entry on or after the effective date of this Agreement and makes a refugee status claim.” STCA, supra note 6, art. 4(1).} This clause is subject to four exceptions: the family member exception, the unaccompanied minors exception, the document holder exception, and the public interest exception.\footnote{See Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Canada-U.S. Safe Third Country Agreement – Exceptions to the Agreement (Jul. 7, 2009), available at http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/agency-agence/stca-etps-eng.html#exception (last visited Oct. 29, 2013) (describing the STCA’s exceptions).} The STCA only applies to asylum seekers who make refugee claims at the Canada-U.S. border; it does not apply to claimants who arrive by water or air, or who make “inland” claims from within Canadian or U.S. territory.\footnote{STCA, supra note 6 at Art. 4. The STCA can apply at airports, but only if “a person seeking refugee protection in Canada who has been determined not to be a refugee in the United States, has been ordered deported from the United States and is in transit through Canada for removal from the United States”. See Canada Border Services Agency, Canada-U.S. Safe Third Country Agreement (last modified Jul. 23, 2009) available at http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/agency-agence/stca-etps-eng.html#where (last visited Oct. 29, 2013). See also CCR v. Canada [2007] F.C. 1262, at para. 29 (stating “A feature of the STCA regime is that, in accordance with the Regulations, it only operates at land ports of entry. The STCA regime does not apply to travellers arriving in Canada by air or water from the United States.”).}

The STCA came into effect on December 29, 2004.\footnote{See News Release, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Safe Third Country Agreement Comes Into Force Today (Dec. 29, 2004), available at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/releases/2004/0420-pre.asp (last visited Oct. 29, 2013) (announcing the coming into force of the STCA).} Since then, it has triggered a precipitous drop in the number of asylum claims made at the Canadian border each year.\footnote{The STCA only applies to asylum seekers who make refugee claims at the Canada-U.S. border; it does not apply to claimants who arrive by water or air, or who make “inland” claims from within Canadian or U.S. territory.} The effects of the STCA are examined in detail in Part Four.

\textsuperscript{49} See Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Canada-U.S. Safe Third Country Agreement – Exceptions to the Agreement (Jul. 7, 2009), available at http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/agency-agence/stca-etps-eng.html#exception (last visited Oct. 29, 2013) (describing the STCA’s exceptions). The family member exception allows an asylum seeker to make a refugee claim in the receiving country if she or he has at least one “family member” – defined in §1(b) to include spouses, children, parents, legal guardians, siblings, grandparents, grandchildren, aunts, uncles, nieces, and nephews – who has been accepted as a refugee or has lawful residence status in the receiving country. See STCA, supra note 6 at §§ 4(2)(a), 4(2)(b). The unaccompanied minors exception creates an exception for asylum seekers under eighteen without a spouse or common law-partner, who do not have a parent or guardian in Canada or the United States. \textit{Id.} at §4(2)(c). The document holder exception creates an exception for asylum seekers who arrive in the receiving country with a valid visa (other than a transit visa) or who do not require a visa to enter the receiving country but would require one to reenter the country of departure. \textit{Id.} at §4(2)(d). The public interest exception provides either party the discretion to hear refugee claims otherwise barred by the agreement “where it determines that it is in the public interest to do so.” \textit{Id.} at §6. In Canada, the public interest exception applies to asylum seekers facing the death penalty. See Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227, § 159.6 (Can.) (hereinafter IRPR). In the United States, the public interest exception can apply where “the Attorney General finds that it is in the public interest for the alien to receive asylum in the United States.” See INA § 208(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A).\textsuperscript{50} See also CCR v. Canada [2007] F.C. 1262, at para. 29 (stating “A feature of the STCA regime is that, in accordance with the Regulations, it only operates at land ports of entry. The STCA regime does not apply to travellers arriving in Canada by air or water from the United States.”).
PART THREE: THE MULTIPLE BORDERS STRATEGY

This section charts an overview of key interdiction and interception measures implemented by Canada at each of the external borderlines marked by the Multiple Borders Strategy (MBS) namely: countries of origin; visa screening points; airline check-in points; points of initial embarkation; transit areas; points of final embarkation; and points of final arrival. Given the bilateral nature of the MBS, this section also surveys associated interdiction and interception measures implemented by the United States. This analysis is essential for understanding the effects of the MBS measures on asylum seekers.

1. Countries of Origin

“Canada maintains that it respects its international obligations toward the protection of refugees, but nothing in the Canadian government’s interdiction and interdiction policies provides for an effective means of allowing migrants in real need of protection to come to Canada.”

(i) Canada
Since 1998, Canada has positioned Liaison Officers (formerly Migration Integrity Officers) in strategic offshore locations. In 2011, the CBSA significantly expanded the scope of its Liaison Officer network to deliver “the full spectrum of the Agency’s mandate” overseas. Liaison Officers are tasked with protecting the integrity of the Canadian border abroad, which involves, *inter alia*, identifying, collecting information about, and intercepting so-called “irregular”

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53 The STCA has also been criticized as resulting in the effective denial of protections to which refugees are entitled under international law, and for contributing to the deterioration of asylum protection in North America. See e.g., *Bordering on Failure* 1 (2006), *supra* note 7 at 2-4.
55 CBSA, *Fact Sheet: CBSA International Network* para.2 (June 2012), available at http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/media/facts-faits/113-eng.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2013) (hereinafter *CBSA Fact Sheet*) (stating that with the expansion of the CBSA international network’s profile in 2011 “migration integrity officers (MIOs) were renamed CBSA liaison officers”).
56 Id. (stating that in “spring 2011, the CBSA began to expand the scope of its international network to better reflect the full spectrum of the Agency’s mandate”).
migrants before they depart for Canada.\textsuperscript{57}

Canada currently positions sixty-three Liaison Officers in forty-nine strategic locations around the world.\textsuperscript{58} The Liaison Officer Program is wide in scope, and encompasses “intelligence gathering, analysis and reporting related to visa or immigration application fraud, organized crime, irregular migration, public security and terrorism, and war crimes and crimes against humanity.”\textsuperscript{59} One of its stated objectives is to facilitate the CBSA’s ability to “combat irregular migration.”\textsuperscript{60} The program advances this goal through a multi-layer approach, which consists of identifying and intercepting people in offshore locations, and also, training and working with airlines, local immigration authorities, and local law enforcement agencies to do the same. As the CBSA explains, Liaison Officers work “with local, regional, national and international partners to screen people and goods along the travel continuum at the earliest opportunity overseas, during transit, and upon arrival at the Canadian border.”\textsuperscript{61} According to CBSA,

\textsuperscript{57}\textit{Id.} (stating that Liaison Officers “focus on liaison, risk assessment, interdiction, information collection and training to deliver on the full spectrum of the Agency’s mandate” and listing specific activities undertaken by Liaison Officers to “protect the integrity of the Canadian border”). \textit{See also} CBSA, 2005-2006 DEPARTMENTAL PERFORMANCE REPORT 20 (2006), \textit{available at} http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/20071126140658/http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/dpr-rmr/0506/bsa-asf/bsa-asf_e.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2013) (explaining that “In accordance with our ‘Multiple Borders Strategy,’ the CBSA currently has 45 Migration Integrity Officers located in 39 key locations abroad. The implementation of the strategy, which included the overseas deployment of Migration Integrity Officers and Intelligence Liaison Officers, has strengthened the CBSA’s capacity to interdict irregular migrants overseas”). While Canada and the United States were the first countries to place liaison officers at international locations, Australia and other countries later adopted this model. \textit{See} ANDREAS SCHLOENHARDT, MIGRANT SMUGGLING: ILLEGAL MIGRATION AND ORGANIZED CRIME IN AUSTRALIA AND THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION (2003) at 297.

\textsuperscript{58} Canada also deploys temporary duty officers as needed “to provide support during emergencies or to assist in strategic operations related to issues such as human smuggling prevention activities”. \textit{See} CBSA FACT SHEET, \textit{supra} note 55 at para. 8. For an overview of Liaison Officers located abroad \textit{see} CBSA, GUIDE FOR TRANSPORTERS: OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE PROTECTION ACT 57-61 (Jan. 2012) \textit{available at} http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/publications/pub/bsf5023-eng.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2013) (listing locations and operations of Liaison Officers located abroad).


the program has “strengthened the CBSA’s capacity to interdict irregular migrants overseas.”

Principally concerned with preventing “improperly documented” persons from reaching Canada, the Liaison Officer Program does not ensure adequate refugee protection safeguards. Asylum seekers are, by definition, individuals who have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in or by their home states. For this reason, it is often impossible or too dangerous for them to flee their countries of origin using proper identity documents. As one refugee practitioner interviewed for this report explained, when fleeing persecution, “the last thing that would come to your mind would be to bring your documentation . . . The thing that comes to your mind is protection and safety and that’s it, nothing else.”

UNHCR explains as follows:

Due to the circumstances in which they are sometimes forced to leave their home country, refugees are perhaps more likely than other aliens to find themselves without identity documents. Moreover, while other aliens can turn to the authorities of their country of origin for help in obtaining documents, refugees do not have this option and are therefore dependent upon the authorities of their country of refuge or upon UNHCR for assistance in this regard.

order to disrupt human smuggling and trafficking schemes, deter the misuse or abuse of travel documents, prevent the travel to North America of criminals or those who may pose a threat to national security and investigate fraudulent applications of immigration to Canada”).

DPR 2006-2007, supra note 60 at 21.

Art. 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention, supra note 11, defines a refugee as a person “who owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” Canadian law incorporates this definition almost verbatim into the IRPA, S.C. ch.27 (2001), supra note 13 at §96 which provides: “A Convention refugee is a person who, by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, (a) is outside each of their countries of nationality and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of each of those countries; or (b) not having a country of nationality, is outside the country of their former habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to return to that country.”

Interview with Saleem Spindari (Community Outreach Program Coordinator), MOSAIC British Columbia (May 16, 2012), para.75.

It is for this reason that the United Nations Refugee Convention prohibits signatory states like Canada from imposing sanctions on asylum seekers who use false documents or no documents to escape persecution.66

This principle is incorporated into domestic law via section 133 of Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), which prevents Canada from punishing asylum seekers for using false documents.67 In its 2013 decision in R. v. Appulonappa,68 the British Columbia Supreme Court explicitly recognized that Canadian law prohibits penalizing asylum seekers for using false documents or no documents to flee persecution. The Court held:

Canada, and the international community generally, while not encouraging refugees to make their way to our shores, exempts them from criminal liability for whatever illegal actions they may have taken in order to successfully arrive here. Such illegal actions invariably include arriving here with forged, or completely without, the documentation required for entry.69


66 Art. 31(1) of the Refugee Convention, supra note 11, provides as follows: “1. The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.”

67 IRPA S.C. ch. 27 (2001), supra note 13 at § 133 (stating: “A person who has claimed refugee protection, and who came to Canada directly or indirectly from the country in respect of which the claim is made, may not be charged with an offence under section 122, paragraph 124(1)(a) or section 127 of this Act or under section 57, paragraph 340(c) or section 354, 366, 368, 374 or 403 of the Criminal Code, in relation to the coming into Canada of the person, pending disposition of their claim for refugee protection or if refugee protection is conferred”). Section 122 outlines offences related to documents, and provides: “122. (1) No person shall, in order to contravene this Act, possess a passport, visa or other document, or Canadian or foreign origin, that purports to establish or that could be used to establish a person’s identity; (b) use such a document, including for the purpose of entering or remaining in Canada; or (c) import, export or deal in such a document. Id. at § 122.

68 R. v. Appulonappa, 2013 BCSC 31 (Can.) (evaluating the legality of §117 of the IRPA, S.C. ch.27 (2001), known as the “human smuggling provision”, and finding the provision unconstitutional). At the time of writing, this decision was under appeal before the Court of Appeal of British Columbia.

69 Id. at para. 59. For an example of how this provision has been treated by U.S. courts, see e.g. U.S. v. Malenge, 294 Fed. Appx. 642, 645 (2nd Cir. 2008), in which the U.S. Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit noted that refugees who flee political violence may be unable to seek asylum using proper identity documents, and emphasized that “a petitioner’s use of false travel documents to escape
The Court explained that section 133 of the IRPA “is an attempt to implement Canada’s international obligations with respect to Article 31 of the Convention”, and that the provision “defers, or prohibits, prosecution for the act of arriving at a port of entry to Canada and making a legitimate refugee claim without a visa or documentation.”70 The Court further stated that the “arrival of a legitimate refugee at a port of entry without the required documentation does not attract criminal liability.”71

By “pushing the border out” and subjecting asylum seekers to document inspection offshore, Canada seeks to block and deflect asylum seekers before they present at a territorial border and definitively trigger the legal protections set out in section 133 of the IRPA and Article 31 of the Refugee Convention. However, neither the general law of state responsibility nor international refugee and human rights law support the assertion that activities taking place outside state territory do not engage international refugee protection obligations.72 Moreover, delegating authority to surrogate screeners does not

persecution is fully consistent with an asylum claim and should not be used as a basis to deny asylum” (citing Lin v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 127, 133 (2nd Cir. 2006).
70 R. v. Appulonappa, 2013 BCSC 31, at paras. 61-63 (explaining that: “Article 31 of the Refugee Convention to which Canada is a signatory, specifically accounts for this reality, and prohibits signatories from imposing penalties for illegal entry... Section 133 of IRPA is an attempt to implement Canada’s international obligations with respect to Article 31 of the Convention”).
71 Id. at para. 144.
72 See Andrew Brouwer & Judith Kumin, Interception and Asylum: When Migration Control and Human Rights Collide, 21(4) REFUGE 6, 13-14 (2003) (noting that “at international law, no distinction is made for actions taken outside of state territory, nor for actions taken by those acting for or under the director or control of the state when it comes to attribution of responsibility. While the law is clear on this point, it is worth observing that, from a human rights perspective, to hold otherwise would be to render the international refugee protection regime ineffective. States would be able to avoid their international obligations, creating a human rights vacuum for intercepted refugees and asylum seekers”). See also François Crépeau, Delphine Nakache & Idil Atak, International Migration, Security Concerns, and Human Rights Standards, 44 (3) TRANSCULTURAL PSYCHIATRY 311, 325-326 (2007) (explaining that states use extraterritorial deflections mechanisms to “pretend that they are free of international and national legal constraints and scrutiny they face when migrants arrive on their territory”, and noting further that states “are not, however, beyond the bounds of responsibility. The International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), which were developed over the course of 30 years by the International Law Commission, provide that responsibility ultimately hinges on whether the relevant conduct can be attributed to that state and not whether it occurs within the territory of the state or outside it. The extraterritorial applicability of human rights law is further underlined by the jurisprudence of the UN Human Rights Committee and regional human rights systems especially the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights”).

absolve Canada of its refugee protection obligations.\textsuperscript{73}

Materials obtained further to a Freedom of Information request show that the CBSA Liaison Officer Program prevents thousands of people from reaching Canada each year. Between 2001 and late 2012, Canadian Liaison Officers intercepted over 73,000 persons, divided by year as follows:\textsuperscript{74}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of intercepts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>8790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>7159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>7306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>6115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>5653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>5277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>4561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>5755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>7020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>6022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012\textsuperscript{75}</td>
<td>4342</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since the Liaison Officer Program does not establish clear criteria for assessing whether intercepted individuals intend to seek asylum, much less have valid asylum claims, it is impossible to speculate how many of these individuals are genuine refugees.

Materials obtained further to a Freedom of Information request indicate that the CBSA does not sufficiently emphasize Canada’s refugee protection obligations in

\textsuperscript{73} Indeed, when a state signatory to the Refugee Convention contracts out or otherwise entrusts its functions to non-state agents, those agents act on behalf of the state and thus can be held to the same refugee protection standards as the state. See Brouwer & Kumin, \textit{id.} at 14 (stating that the “fact that it is airline staff who are checking documents and denying passage does not absolve states of responsibility, as the airline is simply acting on the basis of carrier liability legislation imposed by the state, or even, in some cases, direct advice from an Immigration Liaison Officer”, and explaining further that the Articles on State Responsibility “do not allow for such distinctions between a state organ and a person, group, or entity acting for or under the direction or control of, the state”).


\textsuperscript{75} Data current to October 9, 2012, obtained per Freedom of Information Request File A-2012-07128, \textit{id}. 

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the training materials delivered by Liaison Officers. The program does not explicitly require officers to consider the individual circumstances of intercepted individuals, or to assist persons who are fleeing persecution. The Liaison Officer Program also does not explicitly require officers to ensure intercepted individuals are not refouled to face persecution. While senior Canadian officials have indicated that Canadian practice is to refer intercepted asylum seekers to UNHCR where interception takes place in countries that are not signatories to the Refugee Convention, there is no clear data to corroborate this claim. Moreover, in some cases, asylum seekers who have been intercepted in countries that are not signatories to the Refugee Convention have faced serious risks to their lives and safety. Consider, for example, the case of Mr. K., a pro-reform journalist from Iran. Mr. K. feared persecution by Iranian authorities and fled Iran to seek asylum in Canada using false documentation. This is his story:

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76 Freedom of Information Request File A-2012-07125, filed with the Canada Border Services Agency under the Access to Information Act, R.S.C. ch. A-1 (1985) (Can.) (completed Dec. 4, 2012). These materials explain that asylum seekers may use fraudulent documents to cross international borders and claim asylum, but do not explain Canada’s protection obligations under domestic or international law. Notably as well, the International Air Transport Association (IATA) has prepared a Code of Conduct for Immigration Liaison Officers designed to “promote consistency of approach and cooperation between Immigration Liaison Officers deployed by Member States overseas”. Dated October 2002, the Code of Conduct provides that where Liaison Officers deployed by member states receive requests for asylum, they should direct applicants to a UNHCR office, to the appropriate diplomatic mission, or to an appropriate local non-governmental organization. See Freedom of Information Request File A-2012-07127, filed with the Canada Border Services Agency under the Access to Information Act, R.S.C. ch. A-1 (1985) (Can.) (completed Oct. 2, 2012) (providing a copies of the International Air Transport Association Code of Conduct for Immigration Liaison Officers dated October, 2002). While the IATA guidelines serve as a set of best practice principles, they do not have the status of international law and are not enforceable. For further discussion, see SCHLOENHARDT, supra note 57 at 297 (explaining that the IATA guidelines do not have the status of international law).

77 For a discussion of how Liaison Officer interdiction practices fail to ensure refugee protection, see Andrew Brouwer, Attack of the Migration Integrity Specialists: Interdiction and the Threat to Asylum, CANADIAN COUNCIL FOR REFUGEES (May 29, 2003), available at http://ccrweb.ca/interdictionab.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2013) (providing details about offshore interdiction, noting that liaison officers seldom differentiate between those who need protection and those who do not, and explaining how interdiction violates international law). See also Crépeau & Nakache, supra note 34 at 13 (noting that Canada’s interception policies do not provide an effective means of allowing migrants in need of protection to come to Canada).

78 See Brouwer & Kumin, supra note 72 at 10 and FN 42 (citing statements made by the Director General of Citizenship and Immigration Canada Intelligence Branch in a panel discussion on interception held by the Canadian Council for Refugees on November 22, 2002, and noting the limitations of these assertions, given that there is no information about how many persons “reportedly intercepted by or with the assistance of Canadian immigration control officers were given an opportunity to indicate their need for asylum, if any, or what procedures were followed”, and further that “there is no information on how many were referred to UNHCR, how many were referred to local asylum authorities, how many were simply turned back, or what happened to them”).
[Mr. K] travelled by air, via Moscow and Havana, hoping to reach Canada, where his brother is a citizen. However, at the airport in Havana, while transferring to the final leg of his journey, one of Canada's "migration integrity specialists" discovered his fraudulent documents and prevented him from boarding his flight to Canada. Since Cuba is not a party to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Mr. K could not claim asylum there. Before being deported to Moscow, Mr. K was able to telephone his brother in Canada, who in turn called the Ottawa office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to explain his brother's plight. UNHCR contacted their colleagues in Moscow, to make sure that Mr. K was not sent back to Tehran where they feared he would be persecuted, and was given a chance to seek asylum in Russia, which is officially a party to the 1951 Convention (albeit with significant shortcomings). Despite numerous requests, however, UNHCR staff in Moscow were denied access to Mr. K. He was briefly detained at Moscow's International Airport and then was deported back to Tehran. He was arrested on arrival in Iran.79

As Andrew Brouwer explains, Mr. K's story is "hardly unique".80 This case shows that by intercepting improperly documented persons without due consideration of their asylum claims, Liaison Officers risk condemning them to continued persecution.

(ii) United States
The United States similarly deploys Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents at overseas airports to assist carriers with passenger screening. Under the rubric of the Immigration Advisory Program, the United States positions CBP agents at designated airports to help review passenger documents and make no-board recommendations for "high risk" or inadequately documented passengers.81

79 Brouwer, supra note 77 at para. 4. See also Brouwer & Kumin, supra note 72 at 7 (discussing the case of Mr. K and additional case studies).
80 Id. at para. 5 (noting that Canada and other states have been interdicting “improperly documented” travelers abroad for years).
81 This program of pre-inspection at foreign airports was first established and authorized in 1996 under revisions to the INA §235A(a). See U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, IMMIGRATION ADVISORY PROGRAM (IAP) (Dec. 3, 2009), available at
program is identified as “a component of CBP’s layered border strategy.” Since first implemented in 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has deemed this program to be highly successful at preventing persons who lack documents, or who are considered a security threat, from reaching the United States. By 2010, the Immigration Advisory Program had expanded from its original two locations to ten locations in eight countries. By 2012, the program was operating at eleven airports in nine countries, with plans to expand further. In 2013, DHS announced that the Immigration Advisory Program and Pre-Departure vetting “experienced a 156 percent increase in the number of no-board recommendations since 2010.” With the growth of these programs, asylum seekers are likely to find it increasingly difficult to reach the physical borders of either the United States or Canada to seek protection.


2. Visa Screening Points

“The imposition of visa restrictions on all countries that generate refugees is the most explicit blocking mechanism for asylum flows and it denies most refugees the opportunity for legal migration.”

(i) Canada

Offshore inspection works in tandem with visa and immigration controls to prevent asylum seekers from reaching Canada. Because Canada does not issue visas for the purposes of seeking asylum, visa restrictions operate as de facto blocking mechanisms. As critics have long recognized, visa restrictions serve as crucial mechanisms for stemming asylum flows, and are often utilized as the “first line of defense” against the entry of undesirables. James Hathaway, for example, explains that imposing visa restrictions on nationals of refugee-producing countries is a “classic mechanism of non-entrée.”

88 See Brouwer & Kumin, supra note 72 at 8 (noting that industrialized countries frequently impose a myriad of migration controls, including visa restrictions, on countries known for producing refugees in an effort to stem asylum flows). See also Ninette Kelley, International Refugee Protection Challenges and Opportunities, 19(3) INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 401, 421 (2007) (explaining the risk posed by visa restrictions, combined with offshore interdiction and document inspection programs, to asylum seekers in need of international protection).
89 See James C. Hathaway and R. Alexander Neve, Fundamental Justice and the Deflection of Refugees from Canada, 34(2) OSGOODE HALL L.J. 213, 223 (1996) (stating that since “a Canadian visa will not be issued for the purposes of seeking asylum in Canada, refugee claimants who are honest about their intentions will be denied the documentation necessary to come to Canada legally”).
90 John Torpey, Coming and Going: On the State Monopolization of the Legitimate “Means of Entry”, 16(3) SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 239, 252 (1998) (explaining the operation of visa restrictions and passport requirements). See also Morrison & Crosland, supra note 87 at 28 (explaining how the imposition of visa restrictions can deny refugees opportunities for legal migration); Rachel Settlage, Affirmatively Denied: The Detrimental Effects of a Reduced Grant Rate for Affirmative Asylum Seekers, 27 B.U. INT’L L.J. 61, 66-69 (2009) (noting that states signatory to the Refugee Convention are increasingly implementing border and immigration measures, including visa restrictions, that make it “more difficult than ever” for asylum seekers to apply for protection); Eric Neumayer, Unequal Access to Foreign Spaces: How States Use Visa Restrictions to Regulate Mobility in a Globalized World 31(1) TRANSACTIONS OF THE INSTITUTE OF BRITISH GEOGRAPHERS 239 (2006) (explaining how many Western European countries imposed common policies of visa restrictions and carrier sanctions in the 1990s in response to the rising flow of asylum applications).
91 JAMES HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, 291 (2005) (noting that “Canada, for example, has long required the nationals of countries likely to produce refugees to obtain a visa
In order to obtain a Canadian travel visa, foreign nationals, including asylum seekers, must meet certain criteria like providing proof of a valid passport. These criteria can pose serious barriers for asylum seekers who flee persecution. Asylum seekers persecuted in or by their home state are often unable to apply for passports for fear that such an application would expose them to danger. Some may be fleeing a state whose government institutions have collapsed and is unable to issue passports. Others may lack the financial means, resources, or ability to go through the lengthy and expensive process of obtaining a passport. Obtaining a Canadian visa can also involve direct coordination and information sharing between a Canadian consular post and the applicant’s home government. This creates a risk that an asylum seeker’s home government will become aware of his or her activities, which could expose him or her to further violence and possibly also retaliation.

Like many Western countries, Canada has long relied on visa restrictions as instruments of interdiction through which to block asylum flows. In fact, Canada has a long history of imposing visa requirements on refugee producing countries when refugee arrivals from that country increase substantially. Before boarding a plane or otherwise coming to Canada”). The term “non-entrée” describes the array of legalized policies adopted by states to stymie access to refugees to their territories. See generally James Hathaway, The Emerging Politics of “Non-Entrée” 91 Refugees 40 (1992).

See e.g., Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), Visit Canada (last modified Dec. 7, 2012) available at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/visit/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2103) (explaining the procedure for obtaining a visa for entry into Canada, and outlining additional requirements satisfying immigration officers that they do not intend to stay in Canada after their visit). Canada imposes visa requirements on over 150 states and jurisdictions for a variety of reasons. See Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), Find Out If You Need a Visa to Enter Canada as a Visitor (last modified May 17, 2013) available at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/visit/visas.asp (last visited Oct. 31, 2103) (listing countries and territories whose citizens need visas to travel to Canada).

For further discussion see Brouwer & Kumin, supra note 72 at 8 (noting that it is often “impossible, or too dangerous, for a refugee to obtain the necessary travel documents form the authorities”). See Canadian Council for Refugees (CCR), Interdicting Refugees (May 1998), available at http://ccrweb.ca/files/interd.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2013) (offering a historical overview of Canada’s visa imposition policies in the context of asylum). See also Sharryn Aiken, Racism and Canadian Refugee Policy: Diverse Perspectives on Refugee Issues, 18(4) Refug 1, 6 (1999) (noting that with the “imposition of visa requirements and carrier sanctions to the stationing of immigration officers abroad, vast numbers of bona fide refugees are being caught up in the web of immigration control with devastating results”). See Hathaway & Neve, supra note 89 at 223; Brouwer & Kumin, supra note 72 at 8; Hathaway, supra note 91 at 291-292.
Statements issued by Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) suggest this is a central motivating factor in deciding when to impose visa requirements.96

Imposing visa requirements on countries that generate refugees often results in substantial drops in asylum claims. In July 2009, for example, the Canadian government imposed visa requirements on Mexico and the Czech Republic,97 and was candid in its position that imposing such requirements would help stem refugee flows from these source countries.98 This move was widely criticized as

96 See e.g. Statements of Joan Atkinson, Assistant Deputy Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Canada, noting: “It’s not surprising that the number of visitor visa holders who claim refugee status is small, because of the nature of the visitor visa screen. We put the visitor visa screen in place as a basic control mechanism to deal with irregular immigration, and we do, as you all have been noting, try to do a very careful screen of individuals who come foreword to use asking for visitor visas, to try to make that determination on whether or not they’re likely to come back.” Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration – Evidence, 37th Parl. 1st sess. Meeting No. 9 1005 (2001), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=1040661&Language=E&Mode=1&P arl=37&Ses=1 (last visited Oct. 13, 2013). See also Statements of Elinor Caplan, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Citizenship and Immigration Committee of the Parliament of Canada, CIMM 37th Parl., 1st sess. Meeting No. 33 1715 (Oct. 25, 2001), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=1041056&Language=E&Mode=1&P arl=37&Ses=1 (last visited Oct. 13, 2013) (stating: “We look at visa imposition when we think there’s a country that should not be a refugee-producing country and we have people coming and making refugee claims. We review that all the time. We have ongoing discussions with the Americans, particularly as we look at our regional approach”). See also CIC, BACKGROUNDER: THE VISA REQUIREMENT ON MEXICO, available at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/backgrounders/2009/2009-07-13.asp (last visited Oct. 30, 2013) (same with respect to visas for nationals from the Czech Republic).


98 See e.g., CIC News Release Mexico, id (citing Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism Jason Kenney stating: “The visa requirement I am announcing will give us a greater ability to manage the flow of people into Canada and verify bona fides. By taking this important step towards reducing the burden on our refugee system, we will be better equipped to process genuine refugee claims faster.”) See also CIC Press Release, Czech Republic, id. More recently, Canada’s Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird was cited as saying “The decision to put a visa on Mexican travelers was not one that was taken lightly, and frankly, in many respects, has little to do with Mexico or Mexicans and everything to do with the refugee determination system that we had”, cited in Daniel Proussalidis, Canadian Government Working to Get Rid of Visa Requirements for Mexican Visitors SUN NEWS NETWORK (Jul. 25, 2013) available at
an attempt to create “obstacles in the path of people who genuinely have a fear of persecution in their country of origin.”

Canada’s imposition of visa requirements on the Czech Republic was also criticized as an attempt to dissuade Roma peoples of Czech nationality from seeking asylum in Canada, despite evidence of anti-Roma persecution in the Czech Republic.

These 2009 visa requirements triggered a sharp decline in the number of asylum claims made from Mexico and the Czech Republic, so much so that Canada dropped in UNHCR’s ranking of top refugee receiving countries. Statistics obtained from the Canada Border Services Agency show as follows:


100 See Jack Greenberg, *Roma Victimization, From Now To Antiquity*, 41 *COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.* 1, 2 (2009-2010) (criticizing Canada’s imposition of visa requirements on the Czech Republic as an attempt to dissuade Roma peoples of Czech nationality from seeking asylum in Canada); Gerald Kernerman, *Refugee Interdiction Before Heaven’s Gate*, 43(2) *GOV’T AND OPPOSITION* 230 (2008) (examining the interdiction effect of Canada’s imposition of visa requirements on Roma peoples arriving from the Czech Republic and Hungary between 1997 and 2001).

101 According to figures released by UNHCR in March 21, 2013 Canada dropped in the UNHCR rankings of top refugee receivers out of 44 industrialized countries. In 2008 and 2009, Canada was ranked second and third highest destination country among these 44 countries. In 2012, Canada was ranked the seventh highest destination country among these same 44 countries, behind Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Sweden, France, Germany, and the United States. UNHCR attributed this drop in the ranking in part to Canada’s imposition of visa requirements on the Czech Republic. See UNHCR, *UNHCR ASYLUM TRENDS 2012: LEVELS AND TRENDS IN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES* 11 (MAR. 2013) available at http://unhcr.org/asylumtrends/UNHCR%20ASYLUM%20TRENDS%202012_WEB.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2013) (stating that the “relatively high number of Czech asylum applications during [2008 and 2009] partly contributed Canada’s high ranking. In the second half of 2009, Canada introduced visa requirements for Czech citizens. As a result, the number of asylum-seekers form the Czech Republic dropped form more than 2,000 in 2009, to almost zero in subsequent years. Canada’s ranking subsequently dropped”).
Canada’s Prime Minister indicated in 2012 that the Canadian government imposed visa restrictions on Mexico with the specific goal of deterring asylum seekers. After a meeting with Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto in November 2012, Prime Minister Stephen Harper was cited to have stated: “We have a visa requirement in place because of the massive increase we had in bogus refugee claims coming from Mexico.” The Canadian government has since engaged in talks with Mexico to eliminate the visa requirement.

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<td>109</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>28</td>
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Data obtained from the Canada Border Services Agency. Source: CIC Data Warehouse. Date: May 8, 2012 (hereinafter CBSA 2012 data) (data provided upon request). The data obtained from the Canada Border Services provides statistics on refugee claims made by nationals of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. However, for the years 2007, 2008, 2009 the statistics also include refugee claims made by nationals of Czechoslovakia. The figures are: 6 claims in 2007; 20 claims in 2008; and 107 claims in 2009. It is unclear whether these claims were counted twice, or whether this is a classification error.


Id. (citing Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s statement that Canada “would ultimately like to see visa-free travel with Mexico”). In September 2013, CBC News reported that the Mexican Ambassador to Canada criticized the Canadian government for its continued imposition of a visa on Mexico. See The Canadian Press, *Mexico ‘Really Mad’ at Canada for Imposing Travel Visas*, CBC News (Sept. 15, 2013), available at http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/mexico-really-mad-at-canada-for-imposing-travel-visas-1.1855280 (last visited Oct. 9, 2013) (citing Mexican Ambassador to Canada Francisco Suarez’s statement that Mexico is “now really mad. Canada has the most stringent visa system for Mexicans of any country in the world”). Notably as well, in October 2013, Canada and the European Union reached an agreement in principle on a comprehensive trade agreement designed to boost trade and investment ties between the two partners. See Office of the Prime Minister of Canada, *Canada Reaches Historic Trade Agreement with the European Union* (Oct. 18, 2013) available at http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2013/10/18/canada-reaches-historic-trade-agreement-european-union (last visited Oct. 23, 2013) (announcing trade agreement and outlining its terms). As part of the
On December 15, 2012, the Canadian government brought the Designated Country of Origin (DCO) policy into effect, a restrictive measure applicable to asylum seekers from thirty-seven different countries, including both Mexico and the Czech Republic. Critics speculate that Canada implemented this policy, in part, to remove existing visa requirements and facilitate travel and trade while still keeping asylum seekers at bay. The DCO policy empowers Canada’s Minister of Citizenship and Immigration to declare certain countries as “Designated Countries of Origin” or so-called “safe” countries for refugees.

At the time of writing, the Designated Country of Origin list included: Australia; Austria; Belgium; Chile; Croatia; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Iceland; Ireland; Israel (excluding Gaza and the West Bank); Italy; Japan; Latvia; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Malta; Mexico; Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Slovak Republic; Slovenia; South Korea; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; United Kingdom; United States of America. See Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Designated Countries of Origin, available at http://www.cic.gc.ca/eng/refugees/reform-safe.asp (last visited Oct. 31, 2013).

The procedure for designating countries as “safe” has been heavily criticized by refugee rights groups as vague and arbitrary. In a press release issued by the Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers, Association President Lorne Waldman stated: “The DCO scheme is unfair, and violates basic rights contained in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Unlike the requirements in its previous legislation, the Minister can designate countries as “safe” without consulting experts on human rights. Worse yet, the criteria for the designation are vague and arbitrary. They do not provide objective assurances that individual citizens can be adequately protected from persecution.” See Press Release, Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers, Designated Country of Origin Scheme is
Asylum seekers who arrive in Canada from DCO countries are required to advance their claim within shorter timelines, and are disallowed from appealing negative decisions to the Refugee Appeal Division. Speaking specifically about the Czech Republic, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Chris Alexander was cited as saying that as a result of these reforms, “[w]e have seen the number [of asylum applications] dramatically fall from the Czech Republic. That’s exceptionally good news.” Rights groups like Amnesty International, the Canadian Council for Refugees, and the Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers have criticized the DCO policy as arbitrary, unfair, and unconstitutional.

(ii) United States
The United States similarly imposes visa requirements on most countries. In order to lawfully enter the United States, asylum seekers, like other migrants, must generally apply for visas and overcome a presumption of immigrant intent. Consular Officers are wary of non-immigrant visa applicants who are
likely not to return to their home country, and are trained to identify and deny such applications. This requirement adversely impacts asylum seekers. Obtaining visas may be very difficult for genuine refugees fleeing their home countries, and indeed, denial rates are high for applicants from key refugee source countries. For example, in FY 2012, seven of the top ten refugee source countries had above-average visitor visa application refusal rates.

In addition to their respective visa policies, Canada and the United States have adopted a harmonized approach to screening travelers seeking to enter either country, as part of the Beyond the Border Action Plan. The Action Plan allows eligible for a non-immigrant visa if they can establish that they have a residence in a foreign country that they have no intention of abandoning. Persons cannot obtain permission to travel to the United States for the explicit purpose of making an asylum claim. See 8 C.F.R. § 214 (outlining categories of available visas). Rather, U.S. Department of State policy states that refugees who attempt to apply for visas in order to seek asylum in the United States should be referred directly to UNHCR. See Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center (DHS Office of Intelligence Analysis/Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs), A Primer on Visas and Visa Fraud 12-13 (2008) (hereinafter Visa Fraud Primer), available at http://www.ilw.com/immigrationdaily/news/2008,0708-visafraud.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2013).

115 See Visa Fraud Primer, id. at 9-11, 17-18 (noting that the “most common reason for a consular officer to refuse a visa to a non-immigrant visa applicant is Section 214(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. This section of the law requires applicants to convince the consular officer that the purpose of their trip is permissible under U.S. visa regulations and that they are true non-immigrants with the intention to return home after a temporary visit to the United States”, and outlining means by which to detect non compliance with this provision).

116 In addition, asylum seekers who lack financial means can be adversely impacted by INA § 212(a)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(A), which prescribes that a visa applicant’s likelihood of becoming a public charge is grounds for denial. See Visa Fraud Primer, supra note 114 at 7 (discussing requirements).

117 While the worldwide average refusal rate for temporary B-1/B-2 visas is consistently about 25 percent, the refusal rates for applicants from countries that are also top refugee source countries tend to be substantially higher. For example, according to statistics provided by the U.S. Department of State for FY 2012, 54 percent of Haitian applicants were refused temporary B-1/B-2 visas, and 61.7 percent of Somali applicants were refused temporary B-1/B-2 visas. Other top asylum seeker source countries with high refusal rates included Nepal (49.4 percent of applicants refused), Ethiopia (39.7 percent of applicants refused), and Iran (37.6 percent of applicants refused). See DOS, Nonimmigrant Visa Statistics, Multi-Year B Visa Adjusted Refusal Rates by Nationality (2006-2012), available at http://www.travel.state.gov/visa/statistics/nivstats/nivstats_4582.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2013) (outlining complete data on B-1/B-2 visa refusal rates). For annual statistics on refugees and asylees in the United States, see DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, 2011 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (2012) and DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, Annual Flow Report: Refugees and Asylees 2012 (2013). Both reports available at http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/immigration.shtm (last visited Oct. 31, 2013).

118 See Id. (describing refusal rates for top asylum seeker sending countries).

Canada and the United States to share information on visa holders, coordinate visa processing requirements, and implement biometric information sharing capabilities, and also makes allowances for the parties to “explore opportunities to broaden asylum cooperation.” It remains to be seen how the Action Plan will impact asylum seekers.

120 Id. at 10.
3. Airline Check-in, Points of Embarkation, Points of Arrival

“Rather than relying on physical interdiction, it is more common for states to seek to avoid the arrival of refugees by the adoption of relatively indivisible non-entrée policies. In essence, the goal of these mechanisms is to implement legal norms which have the effect of preventing refugees from even reaching the point of being able to present their case for protection to asylum state authorities.”

(i) Canada

Canada also imposes carrier sanctions on airlines, railways, and shipping companies when they bring foreign nationals who lack proper documentation into Canada. It is well recognized that carrier sanctions work in concert with offshore screening and visa restrictions to prevent asylum seekers from making refugee claims in Canada. By design, the threat of financial penalty creates clear incentives for carriers to err on the side of caution and prevent travelers who appear to lack proper identification from boarding Canada-bound planes or boats, irrespective of whether they are genuine refugees.

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121 HATHAWAY, supra note 91 at 291.
122 See IRPA S.C. ch. 27 (2001) (Can.), supra note 13 at § 148 (providing that: (1) A person who owns or operates a vehicle or a transportation facility, and an agent for such a person, must, in accordance with the regulations, (a) not carry to Canada a person who is prescribed or does not hold a prescribed document, or who an officer directs not be carried; (b) hold the prescribed documentation of a person whom it carries to Canada until an examination begins, present the person for examination and hold the person until the examination is completed; (c) arrange for a medical examination and medical treatment and observation of a person it carries to Canada; (d) provide prescribed information, including documentation and reports; (e) provide facilities for the holding and examination of persons being carried to Canada; (f) carry from Canada a person whom it has carried to or caused to enter Canada and who is prescribed or whom an officer directs to be carried; (g) pay for all prescribed costs and fees relating to paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (f); and (h) provide security for compliance with its obligations under paragraphs (a) to (g)). While Canada has imposed such sanctions on carriers since the early 1980s, it has retooled their use as interdiction measures in recent years. See Crépeau & Nakache, supra note 34 at 13 (explaining how various Canadian migration mechanisms have been retooled as interdiction measures in ways that contribute to the “erosion of foreigners’ rights”).
123 Hathaway & Neve, supra note 89 at 223 (noting that “visa controls imposed on refugee-producing countries, coupled with a system of carrier sanctions, can undeniably result in the exposure of genuine refugees to the risk of persecution”); Brouwer & Kumin, supra note 72 at 9-10 (examining how carrier sanctions operate as interdiction measures); Crépeau & Nakache, supra note 34 at 12-13 (same).
Carrier sanctions serve as another example of Canada’s efforts to sidestep its refugee protection obligations. By delegating authority in this way, Canada effectively co-opts private carriers into acting as proxies for Canadian border enforcement to avoid its refugee protection obligations and circumvent operational policies and constitutional restrictions regarding its treatment of others. However, as noted above, this delegation of authority does not absolve Canada of its refugee protection obligations.124

Canadian law prohibits carriers “from carrying to Canada any person who does not hold the prescribed documents required for entry into Canada.”125 Failure to meet this requirement can result in the imposition of significant fees.126 Carriers may be charged an administrative fee of up to $3200 per foreign national as well as associated removal costs including expenses incurred for accommodation and transport, medical expenses, translation services, meals, and incidentals.127 The Canada Border Services Agency has also established a program that allows airline carriers that comply with the CBSA’s Memorandum of Understanding to incur reduced carrier sanctions.128 As Citizenship and Immigration Canada explains, this program outlines a graduated system that grants airlines reduced fees

124 See Brouwer & Kumin, supra note 72 at 14 (noting that when third party screeners deny passage to migrants when acting on the basis of carrier liability legislation imposed by the state, this does not absolve the state of responsibility, and further that states cannot “deny responsibility for persons who have been brought aboard a private ship if the master of that ship was acting on instructions form the state in question”).


126 The fee obligations are outlined in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, IRPR, SOR/2002-227, supra note 50 at §§ 278-280. For further discussion, see Brouwer & Kumin, supra note 72 at 12-13 (explaining the carrier sanctions program, the procedure for imposing fees, and the procedure for entering pre-inspection agreements to allow for payment of reduced fees).

127 In accordance with IRPR SOR/2002-227, Section 278, carriers can be required to pay costs of removal, and attempted removal including: expenses incurred within or outside Canada with respect to the foreign national’s accommodation and transport, including penalties for changes of date or routing; accommodation and travel expenses incurred by any escorts provided to accompany the foreign national; fees paid in obtaining passports, travel documents and visas for the foreign national and any escorts; the cost of meals, incidentals and other expenses as calculated in accordance with the rates set out in the Travel Directive published by the Treasury Board Secretariat, as amended from time to time; any wages paid to escorts and other personnel; and the costs or expenses incurred with respect to interpreters and medical and other personnel engaged for the removal. See IRPR SOR/2002-227, supra note 50 at § 278. IRPR Section 279 establishes the procedure by which an administrative fee is assessed and outlines exceptions. IRPR Section 280 outlines administrative fees to be imposed on carriers, in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding, ranging from $0 to $3,200 depending on several criteria.

“depending on the level of interdiction success as measured against the assigned performance standards”, and is designed “as an incentive for [air] transporters to reduce the number of improperly documented persons arriving in Canada”.129 In order to avoid fees, carriers are thus put in the position of having to screen passengers and evaluate the authenticity of their documentation prior to departure.130 Canada’s carrier sanction policies have been heavily criticized for decades.131 Actions taken to avoid carrier sanctions can lead to tragic, and sometimes fatal results.132 Moreover, asylum seekers subject to improper treatment at the hands of private carriers often lack recourse to effectively challenge that treatment, even when it is inhumane. The problems with this scenario are best

129 See Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Enforcement Operation Manuals ENF 15: Obligations of Transporters 9 (2009), available at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/manuals/enf/enf15-eng.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2013). Airlines who take part in the program are required to receive training and assistance from CBSA and to comply with the CBSA’s Memorandum of Understanding. See also Crépeau et al, supra note 72 at 324 (noting that most airlines flying regular routed into Canada have signed agreements with the CBSA to reinforce the liability of carriers); Crépeau & Nakache, supra note 34 at 13-14 (critiquing the effectiveness and legitimacy of these measures).

130 See Crépeau et al., id. at 324 (noting that carrier sanctions transfer migration management to carriers who must make decisions on the possession and authenticity of documents presented by travelers to avoid substantial fines). See also Tally Kritzman-Amir, Privatization and the Delegation of State Authority in Asylum Systems, 5 Law & Ethics HUM. RTS 193, 203-204 (2011) (analyzing and advocating against reliance on carrier sanctions as a form of privatization and delegation of state authority in asylum systems).

131 See e.g., Crépeau et al., id., Brouwer & Kumin, supra note 72; Dench, supra note 32; Macklin supra note 285. See also Letter by Howard P. Goldberg, Former Vice-President of the Air Transport Association of Canada to the Immigration Legislative Review Advisory Group (May 8, 1997) cited in CCR, INTERDICTING REFUGEES supra note 94 at 25 (stating “it seems that every day air carriers are being asked to do more to ensure that those seeking to come to Canada as refugees, no matter what their motivations, are kept out”); Constance Macintosh, Assessing Human Trafficking in Canada: Flawed Strategies and the Rhetoric of Human Rights, 1 Intercultural Hum. RTS L. Rev. 407, 433 (2006) (analyzing how carrier sanctions operate as interdiction measures and citing same).

132 For further discussion see e.g. Morrison & Crosland, supra note 87 at 31 (noting that “in the case of commercial sea vessels such proactive action by ship’s crew to avoid carrier fines is known to sometimes have fatal consequences”). Notably, the International Maritime Organization Guidelines Relating to Stowaways prescribe that stowaway asylum seekers should be “treated in accordance with international protection principles,” but these guidelines are difficult to enforce. See International Maritime Organization, Annex 1 - Revised Guidelines on the Prevention of Access by Stowaways and the Allocation of Responsibilities to Seek the Successful Resolution of Stowaway Cases, IMO Assemb. Res. FAL 37/17 (Sept. 9, 2011), available at http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Facilitation/Stowaways/Documents/Resolution%2011(37)_Revised%20guidelines%20on%20the%20prevention%20of%20access%20by%20stowaways%20and%20the%20allocation%20of%20responsibilities.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2013).
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exemplified by the case surrounding the Maersk Dubai incident. In this case, seven officers of the Taiwanese vessel MV Maersk Dubai discovered three Romanian men stowed away on their vessel in two separate voyages to Canada. The officers were accused of throwing the men overboard, ostensibly to avoid incurring carrier sanctions. After receiving reports of the events from one crewmember, Canadian authorities arrested the officers while the ship was anchored in Halifax Harbor. The matter was referred to the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia. Despite finding enough evidence to warrant a trial for second-degree murder and manslaughter, the Court found insufficient jurisdiction to issue a warrant of committal, and discharged the officers.

(ii) United States

The United States similarly imposes sanctions on certain carriers that bring improperly documented persons onto U.S. territory. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) declares it unlawful for any carrier to bring into the United States “any alien who does not have a valid passport and an unexpired visa, if a visa was required.” In the event that a carrier does so, the resulting sanctions are significant, and can cost $3000 for each person brought, as well as the cost of the person’s return to their port of origin. In the event such fines go unpaid, a carrier may be denied clearance to land in the United States. Carriers may

133 For an account of this incident, see Hungdah Chiu, Sun Yun Chang, and Chih-Yu Wu, Transfer to the Republic of Chins of the Detainees Involved in the Maersk Dubai Case in Canada, 13 CHINESE TAIWAN Y.B. INT’L & AFF. 103 (1996).
135 Id. at para. 1.
136 Id. at para. 4.
137 Id. at para. 7.
138 Id. The state of Romania charged all seven officers with murder, and asked Canadian authorities to extradite them to Romania. The Republic of China (Taiwan) also expressed interest in prosecuting the officers. For subsequent judicial treatments see Romania (State) v. Cheng (1997), 147 D.L.R. (4th) 298 (Can.) and Romania (State) v. Cheng (1997), 162 N.S.R. (2d) 395 (Can.).
140 INA § 273(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1323(a).
141 INA § 273(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1323(b).
142 Id. See also Suspension of Privilege to Transport Aliens to the United States, 63 Fed. Reg. 56869 (Oct. 23, 1998) (stating that when the Attorney General finds a commercial airline has failed to comply with established regulations for the detection of fraudulent documents, the Attorney General may suspend the entry of non-citizens transported to the United States by the airline).
reduce their liability for violations of INA Section 273 by agreeing to follow particular steps and protocols for passenger screening, as articulated in a Memorandum of Understanding with the Department of Homeland Security. This program was revised in 2010 to add additional passenger screening requirements and to further coordinate participating carriers’ screening activities with Customs and Border Protection. This has been achieved, in part, through training provided by Customs and Border Protection and information sharing.

As noted above, in the absence of external oversight, asylum seekers subject to improper treatment at the hands of private carriers sometimes have no recourse by which to challenge their treatment. The U.S. District Court case of *Olga de Leon et al. v. Shih Wei Navigation Co. Ltd* exemplifies this problem. The plaintiffs in this case brought an action in tort for personal injuries suffered when they stowed away on the Well Pescadores S.A., a Panama-flagged vessel departing the Dominican Republic for the United States, with a crew from China. Five men boarded the ship undetected prior to departure, and halfway through the journey, one of the men became ill. The men decided to make their presence known to the crew to seek medical care. The ship captain had implemented a policy to give bonuses to crewmembers if the ship arrived in the United States “stowaway free” to avoid carrier sanctions. In an effort to claim this bonus and avoid financial penalty, the crew threw two of the men overboard and left the other three men on a raft in the middle of the ocean. The men in the raft were saved by another vessel after several hours at sea. The shark eaten bodies of the two other men were found sometime later.

When the surviving men and their families filed suit against the companies that owned and operated the ship in U.S. District Court, the Court dismissed the case. Despite expressing sympathy for the plaintiffs’ plight, the Court found that it had

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143 INA Section 273(e) allows for the reduction of such fines under the authority of the Attorney General. INA § 273(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1323(e). In practice, this is done when a carrier enters into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with DHS (describing MOU process).


146 Id.

147 Id.

148 Id.

149 Id.

150 Id.
no legal basis on which to assert personal jurisdiction over the defendants and dismissed the case. 151 The fate suffered by the deceased men who boarded the Well Pescadores S.A, like that suffered by the men who boarded the MV Maersk Dubai, is both tragic and alarming. These cases not only show the extreme human toll associated with these measures, but also demonstrate how policies that “push the border out” create gaps in jurisdictional authority that remove such activities from the ambit of Canadian and U.S. law.

151 Id.
4. Transit Areas

“Interception operations, particularly those carried out on the high seas or in the territorial waters of other States, do not always include sufficient protection safeguards to ensure that the principle of non-refoulement is upheld. This raises concerns that refugees and other people in need of international protection may be returned to situations where they are at risk of persecution or other serious harm.”152

(i) Canada

States also block would-be asylum seekers from reaching their shores by intercepting vessels in transit areas. This practice is known as maritime interception, and occurs when states intercept and repatriate migrants, including some asylum seekers, on the high seas or in the territorial waters of other states.153 While Canada has collaborated with the United States on joint interception activities in the past, it does not directly engage in maritime interception.154

(ii) United States

The United States, by contrast, has long engaged in maritime interception. The United States has been heavily criticized for this practice, as it has effectively


denied many genuine refugees the opportunity to be heard in their claim for protection. Over the years, interception has had particularly adverse effects on migrants and asylum seekers of Haitian origin.

The U.S. practice of intercepting migrants at sea first became a formal policy in 1981 with the signing of a bilateral agreement with Haiti, which granted the U.S. Coast Guard a right to approach, inspect, and screen passengers on Haitian vessels believed to be bound for the United States. During this period, persons whom the Coast Guard identified as economic migrants were “screened

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155 See e.g. Lori Nessel, Externalized Borders and the Invisible Refugee, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. REV. 625, 638-43 (2009) (analyzing the U.S. policy of intercepting and forcibly repatriating Haitian migrants, and describing inadequacy of procedures to determine asylum eligibility historically and in the present day); Lory Diana Rosenberg, The Courts and Interception: The United States Interdiction Experience and its Impact on Refugees and Asylum Seekers, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 199, 203 (2003) (noting that in the “ten years since the Sale decision, the United States’ increasingly restrictive interdiction policy has undoubtedly reduced refugee claims made by Haitians and other refugees who may have warranted consideration and protection under United States refugee law”); Sonia Farber, Forgotten at Guantanamo: The Boumediene Decision and its Implications for Refugees at the Base under the Obama Administration, 98 CAL. L. REV. 989, 995 (2010) (describing process of conducting “credible fear interviews” at sea during the 1990s and noting the miniscule number of Haitians and Cubans found to have credible fear compared to the number interdicted). See also RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41753, ASYLUM AND “CREDIBLE FEAR” ISSUES IN U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY 9-10 (2011) (noting that many Haitian migrants do not appear among those who claim asylum in the United States).


157 Stating that “the ongoing migration of persons to the United States in violation of our laws is a serious national problem detrimental to the interests of the United States,” President Regan justified the Agreement and interdiction policy on the grounds that “the continuing illegal migration by sea of large numbers of undocumented aliens” was resulting in “severely strained law enforcement resources” and “threatened the welfare and safety of communities in that region.” See Proclamation No. 4865, 46 FR 48107, 3 CFR, 1981 Comp., 50 (Sept. 29, 1981), available at http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/proclamations/04865.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2013). The Agreement explicitly recognized that the United States was bound to respect international law with regard to the protection of refugees and formally provided that intercepted migrants should be “screened” for possible asylum claims. Later in 1981, the United States suspended undocumented migrants from entering Florida and ordered the U.S. Coast Guard to intercept undocumented migrants from Haiti. See Executive Order 12, 324 46 Fed. Reg. 48, 107, 48, 109 (1981). Notably, in addition to this agreement with Haiti, the United States has since also established migrant interdiction agreements with many more countries in the Caribbean region, including: Dominican Republic (2003), Bahamas (2004), Suriname, Netherlands, Antilles, Aruba and Ecuador (2006). See Efthymios Papastavridis, Interception of Human Beings on the High Seas: A Contemporary Analysis under International Law, 36 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 145, 179-181 (2009) (describing agreements).
out” and repatriated, while a relatively small number of migrants who were able to make what was deemed to be a credible showing of refugee status were “screened in” and ultimately transported to the United States to file a formal application for asylum.  

Between 1981 and 1991, the U.S. Coast Guard intercepted approximately 59,000 Haitians. In May 1992, by way of Executive Order 12807, the United States government proclaimed that its international legal obligations under the Refugee Convention did not extend outside U.S. territorial waters, such that it was no longer necessary to screen migrants intercepted at sea. The policy established by Executive Order 12807 remains in effect.

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158 This history is outlined in detail in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993), at 162-163. Notably, the informal standard for determining whether the individual expressed “credible fear” of persecution was the precursor to the more formal “credible fear determination” now stipulated by statute as a screening mechanism for refugees in expedited removal proceedings. See Rosenberg, supra note 155 at 201-202 (discussing background, scope and implementation of U.S. high seas interception policies, as well as the deterring effect of U.S. expedited removal and detention policies).

159 Between 1981 and late 1991, the U.S. Coast Guard intercepted approximately 25,000 Haitian migrants. In the wake of political upheaval in Haiti in September 1991, the United States Coast Guard suspended repatriations for several weeks, but resumed interdiction and forced repatriation by November 18, 1991, interdicting over 34,000 Haitian migrants over six months. The United States Department of Defense established temporary facilities at the United States Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to accommodate interdicted Haitians during the screening process. On May 22, 1992, the United States Navy determined that no additional migrants could safely be accommodated at Guantanamo. See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) id at 162-163.

160 See Executive Order 12807, 57 FR 23133 (1992), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=23627 (last visited Nov. 2, 2013) (stating that “the President has authority to suspend the entry of aliens coming by the sea without necessary documentation” and that “the international legal obligations of the United States under the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees... do not extend to persons located outside the territory of the United States”).

161 See U.S. COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, DISTRICT ELEVEN RESPONSE (Dr) LAW ENFORCEMENT ALIEN MIGRANT INTERDICTIO N OPERATIONS available at http://www.uscg.mil/d11/dr/MigrantInterdiction.asp (last visited Oct. 23, 2013) (stating that “Under Executive Order 12807 (1992) and in support of USC Title 8, the USCG migrant interdiction policy is designed to interdict undocumented migrants prior to landfall in the United States. Based on these instructions, the USCG is authorized to stop and board vessels when there is reason to believe such vessels are engaged in: (a) the "irregular transport of persons"; (b) violations of U.S. immigration law; and/or (c) violation of the immigration laws of a foreign country with which the U.S. has an agreement. This mission consists of detection and monitoring of migrant smuggling vessels and apprehending, detaining, and assisting in the repatriation of migrants”).
The U.S. policy of maritime interception and repatriation was challenged before the United States Supreme Court in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. The Court ruled that the practice of interception and repatriation did not violate international refugee law, even though repatriated persons were being returned to countries where they faced possible risks of persecution, with no hearing on their asylum claim. UNHCR was very critical of the Sale decision, stating it was a “setback to modern international law”, and that maritime interception violates the Refugee Convention. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has since ruled that the United States’ treatment of interdicted migrants as outside the jurisdiction of the Refugee Convention is contrary to international law.

The U.S. Coast Guard continues to monitor maritime transit routes to intercept boats outside U.S. territorial waters. The goal of such interception is the removal and return of migrants, including persons who might seek asylum, to their countries of origin “without the costly processes required if they

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163 Id. at 188-189 (ruling that neither the Immigration and Nationality Act nor the United Nations Refugee Convention limits the United States government’s power to order the Coast Guard to repatriate undocumented migrants intercepted outside United States territory).
164 See UNHCR, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Responds to U.S. Supreme Court Decision in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 32 I.L.M. 1215 (1993) (stating that the “obligation not to return refugees to persecution arises irrespective of whether governments are acting within or outside their borders”).
165 See Haitian Center for Human Rights v. United States, Case 10.675, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 51/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. P 156 (1997). See also Nessel, supra note 155 at 641-642 (noting that the decision was widely criticized both within the United States and the international community); Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Refugee Protection in the United States Post-September 11, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 323, 362 (2005) (noting that the decision “cleared the legal way for Presidents to mistreat Haitians by holding that direct return without any screening after interdiction on the high seas does not violate the U.S. obligation not to return refugees to countries of persecution”).
166 This policy is outlined in the U.S. Coast Guard’s law enforcement manual. See U.S. COAST GUARD, MARITIME LAW ENFORCEMENT MANUAL (MLEM) (Chapter 6) 6-10, available at http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/AMIO/FOIA_Docs.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2013). The Manual states: “Units shall interdict undocumented migrants, wherever located, who are attempting to reach the U.S., but have not yet entered the U.S. This includes migrants intending to transit through the territory of a third country before proceeding to the U.S.” (at Section C.1.B), and further: “National and Coast Guard policy is to interdict undocumented migrants prior to landfall in the U.S. as far at sea as possible” (at Section C.1.c.1). See also generally JOANNE VAN SELM & BETSY COOPER, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, THE NEW “BOAT PEOPLE”: ENSURING SAFETY AND DETERMINING STATUS 11 (2005) available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/boat_people_report.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2013) (noting that the U.S. Coast Guard monitors common transit routes on the high seas and intercepts boats “as far as possible from US shores”).
After an earthquake devasted Haiti in January 2010, the United States government announced that it would continue to intercept and repatriate Haitians who might attempt to reach the United States by boat. Although the policy continues, in recent years, the United States has engaged in fewer interceptions than it has in the past.


168 See e.g. News Release, Department of Homeland Security (May 17, 2011), Secretary Napolitano Announces the Extension of Temporary Protected Status for Haiti Beneficiaries available at http://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/05/17/secretary-napolitano-announces-extension-temporary-protected-status-haiti (last visited Oct. 25, 2013) (confirming that DHS “has been repatriating Haitians seeking to illegally enter the United States since the earthquake in 2010”, that the U.S. Coast Guard “has been intercepting Haitians at sea” and that CBP has been “removing inadmissible Haitians who have arrived at U.S. ports of entry”). See also News Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Policy for Resumed Removals to Haiti (Apr. 1, 2011) available at http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1104/110401washingtondc2.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2013) (noting that while ICE temporarily ceased removing Haitian nationals following the January 12, 2010 earthquake, it was “resuming limited removal of convicted criminal Haitians with final orders of removals” as of January 2011, excluding Haitian nationals without criminal records, Haitians who have temporary application status, who have applications for temporary protection status, or who are otherwise present in the United States with lawful status); Spencer Hsu, Officials Try to Prevent Haitian Earthquake Refugees from Coming to the U.S., WASH. POST (Jan. 18, 2010) available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/17/AR2010011701893.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2013) (describing efforts to prevent Haitian migration in the aftermath of the earthquake). Rights groups like Human Rights First were heavily critical of the U.S. response to the 2010 earthquake, and in a letter to DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano dated March 12, 2010, urged that crucial steps be taken to assist displaced Haitians and prevent Haitians from risking their lives at sea, including rescinding the so-called “shout test”, a process by which Haitians intercepted at sea are returned to Haiti unless they express fear through physical resistance or shouting. See Human Rights First et al, Haiti Sign ON Letter to DHS (March 2010) available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/Haiti_Sign_On_Letter_to_DHS_march_2010.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2013). Notably, DHS appropriated extra funds to prepare its facility at Guantanamo to receive Haitian nationals. In this particular case, only $260,000 were appropriated to prepare the facilities at Guantanamo. For discussion, see Royce Bernstein Murray & Sarah Petrin Williamson, Migration as a Tool for Disaster Recover: A Case Study on U.S. Policy Options for Post-Earthquake Haiti, CGD WORKING PAPER 255 (2011), available at http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1425143 (last visited Nov. 2, 2013). Though the number has fluctuated, fewer interdicted migrants are housed at Guantanamo Bay today. In 2010 there were just one dozen migrants at the facility. See Farber, supra note 55 at 992-997 (2010) (describing historical trends and usage of Guantanamo as a holding facility for interdicted refugees).

169 For example, the U.S. Coast Guard reported that between 1991 and 1995, an intense period of interdiction, it interdicted over 120,000 migrants from 23 countries. See U.S. COAST GUARD, supra note 167. In 2004, there was another peak of 10,899 interdictions, followed by a steady annual decrease in numbers. In FY 2010-2013, for example, the U.S. Coast Guard recorded approximately 2,000-3,000 interdictions per fiscal year. For an overview, see U.S. COAST GUARD, ALIEN MIGRANT INTERDICTION: TOTAL INTERDICTIONS- FISCAL YEAR 1982 TO PRESENT, available at
5. Land Border

“The reality is we don’t have many refugees coming to Canada compared to Europe because you see not many people are being able to come here. It’s far; the only land crossing we have is with the United States.”170

(i) Canada

Over the last decade, Canada has intensified its regulation of the land border it shares with the United States, imposing significant restrictions on asylum seekers. Before the Safe Third Country Agreement came into effect, the Canadian government authorized the application of “direct back” procedures at the Canada-U.S. border, which allowed Canadian authorities to temporarily return foreign nationals arriving at the border to the United States, without assurances as to their capacity for return.171 Although the “direct back” policy was not originally intended to apply to asylum seekers, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) issued administrative guidelines in 2001 authorizing officers to direct back asylum seekers in “exceptional circumstances.”172 In January 2003, CIC issued new guidelines altering its policy so as not to require...
U.S. authorities to provide assurances that asylum seekers who were directed back could return to Canada for their scheduled interviews.\textsuperscript{173}

In April 2004, a coalition comprised of Amnesty International Canada, Canadian Council for Refugees, Freedom House, Global Justice Center, Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinical Program, Harvard Law School Advocates for Human Rights, and Vermont Refugee Assistance filed a complaint against the Canadian government with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, challenging the legality of the “direct backs” policy.\textsuperscript{174} The Petition led to decision finding that Canada failed to abide by its refugee protection obligations under international law.\textsuperscript{175} In 2006, UNHCR also expressed significant concern about Canada’s use of the “direct back” policy, and strongly recommend that Canada discontinue the practice.\textsuperscript{176} Soon after, the Canadian government issued a policy guideline stating that direct backs will be phased out and used only in exceptional circumstances.\textsuperscript{177} As the practitioners interviewed for this report confirmed, the “direct back” policy is now rarely if ever utilized, especially given the coming into force of the Safe Third Country Agreement.\textsuperscript{178}

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\textsuperscript{175} Id. (concluding that Canada had violated Arts. XXVII and XVIII of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man by failing to protect the right to seek asylum in a foreign territory, failing to conduct a basic, individualized assessment with respect to the risk of refoulement, and failing to provide effective access to judicial review of the application of the direct back policy).


\textsuperscript{177} CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CANADA, A PARTNERSHIP FOR PROTECTION: YEAR ONE REVIEW (Nov. 2006) available at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/laws-policy/partnership/chapter4.asp (last visited Nov. 3, 2013) (noting that the “CBSA has decided to phase out the use of the direct back policy for refugee claimants arriving from the U.S. at the land border”, and further stating: “Since August 31, 2006, its use is limited to extraordinary situations, subject to oversight by CBSA National Headquarters in consultation with CIC”).

\textsuperscript{178} See Interview with Rebecca Cohen (Senior Attorney) and Kelly Steffens Aubuchon (Staff Attorney), Freedom House (Jul. 27, 2012), paras.141-146; Interview with Martha Mason (Executive Director), Rod McDowell (Board President), and Ronald Gray (Board Vice-President), Fort Erie Multicultural Centre (Jul. 25, 2012), paras. 196-198; Interview with Peter Murrett (Attorney), Vive La Casa (Jul. 27, 2012), para. 106; Interview with Michele Jenness (Executive Director), Vermont Immigration and Asylum Advocates (Aug. 10, 2012) paras. 212-217; Interview with Betsy Tao (Directing Attorney), Northwest Immigrant Rights Project (Aug. 28, 2012) paras.61-62.
Another significant change in the regulation of the land border came with the creation of the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) in 2003, an integrated border management agency responsible for border, immigration, and customs services. The CBSA’s creation transferred the handling of port of entry asylum claims away from CIC, an agency whose mandate centers on facilitating integration and maintaining Canada’s humanitarian tradition. The CBSA, in contrast, falls under Canada’s Public Safety mandate, and functions as an enforcement agency centering on national security and public safety.

The creation of the CBSA had a profound effect on the climate of refugee assessments along the land border, and signaled a shift away from a culture of protection to a culture of enforcement and policing. Indeed, the Canada-U.S. border is now regulated through a fusion of law enforcement and security goals, and an escalation of policing tactics and hardline rhetoric on restricting the flow of goods and people across the border.
(ii) United States

In recent years, border enforcement has become a centerpiece of United States migration policy. Under a strategy of “prevention through deterrence,” successive governments have concentrated ever more resources at the northern and southern border in manpower and technology, and imposed increased penalties for illegal entry.

2013 (providing an overview of border infrastructure designed to enhance security along the Canada-U.S. border).

184 See e.g. REY KOSLOWSKI, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, THE EVOLUTION OF BORDER CONTROLS AS A MECHANISM TO PREVENT ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION (2011), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/bordercontrols-koslowski.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2013) (documenting physical and virtual border systems and border technologies implemented by the United States in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, designed to screen passengers more effectively at official entry points and to prevent people from crossing the border clandestinely between entry points, focusing specifically on the U.S.-Mexico border).

Despite the 2011 cancellation of the Secure Border Initiative Network ("SBInet")\(^\text{186}\), which aimed to create a “virtual fence” comprised of a complex network of advanced surveillances equipment to secure the United States land borders, the U.S. government has substantially increased the militarization of the southern border regions, with the use of unmanned drones and the deployment of ever larger numbers of border agents and National Guard troops.\(^\text{187}\) Coupled with the continuing restriction of legal means of entry, this tightening of the border is devastating to asylum seekers, many of whom must first reach the United States to make a claim for refugee protection.

While the United States has focused much of its attention on the southern border it shares with Mexico, it has also worked with Canada to enhance security

\(^{26, \text{2012.}}\) A copy of the complaint is available from the Northwest Immigrants Rights Project at http://nwirp.org/Documents/PressReleases/forkscomplaint.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2013). A settlement was reached Sept 20, 2013, the details of which are available at http://aclu-wa.org/sites/default/files/attachments/2013-09-23--Fully%20Executed%20Settlement%20Agreement.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2013) (outlining, inter alia, agreement that all Border Patrol agents assigned to the Port Angeles Station are required to receive additional training in Fourth Amendment protections, including those related to vehicle stops; to provide plaintiff’s attorneys with reports for 18 months documenting all stops in the Olympic Peninsula; and to comply with judicial decisions setting limits on stops and interrogations).


along its northern border.\footnote{See generally US DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, NORTHERN BORDER STRATEGY (2012), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/policy/dhs-northern-border-strategy.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2013) (outlining unified DHS strategy to guide the policies and operations at the U.S.-Canada border).} For example, the United States increased the number of CBP Officers along the northern border from 340 agents in 2001 to over 2,220 agents in 2012.\footnote{Id. at 4.} It has also increased the number of CBP officers stationed at ports of entry, from 2,721 officers in 2003 to approximately 3,700 officers in 2012, and also currently stations approximately 400 personnel in pre-screening and pre-inspection locations in Canada as well as at the U.S. Embassy in Ottawa and consulates across the country.\footnote{Id.}

The United States deploys additional technologies to monitor the northern border, including thermal camera systems, mobile surveillance systems, unmanned aircraft systems, an accompanying operations center, and national distress and command and control networks.\footnote{Id.} The DHS Domestic Nuclear Detection Office also deploys radiation portal monitors to all CBP northern border ports of entry.\footnote{Id.} Pursuant to the Beyond the Border Action Plan, the United States and Canada have further enhanced security along their shared border through, for example, integrated cross-border enforcement and cybersecurity measures.\footnote{Id.}

In principle, restrictive border policies are designed to decrease and regulate border crossings, including by asylum seekers. However, attempts at denial of physical entry are not necessarily effective in preventing people in desperate circumstances from accessing destination states like the United States, or for that matter, Canada.\footnote{See e.g. Kathleen Newland, Drop in Asylum Numbers Shows Changes in Demand and Supply, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE (Apr. 2005), http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=303 (last visited Nov. 6, 2013) (analyzing UNHCR compiled government reports on asylum applications in 50 industrialized countries compared against restrictive asylum policies adopted in these countries).} While the militarization of the U.S. borders has steadily
grown since 2001, statistical reports seem to indicate the number of asylum seekers claiming protection has been on the increase, especially over the past year.  

PART FOUR: SAFE THIRD COUNTRY AGREEMENT

Canada further tightened its border by implementing the Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA). As noted above, the STCA is a bilateral agreement between Canada and the United States that prohibits third country nationals who first set foot in the United States from making refugee claims in Canada at the land border, and vice versa, subject to certain exceptions. Since it came into effect on December 29, 2004, the STCA ushered in what one practitioner described as a “crisis on the border.”

Refugee advocates on both sides of the border strenuously opposed the STCA when it was first introduced. In 2005, a coalition comprised of the Canadian Council for Refugees, Amnesty International Canada, the Canadian Council of Churches, and the claimant John Doe, challenged the STCA before the Federal Court of Canada. The coalition argued that the United States failed to respect its non-refoulement obligations under the Refugee Convention and the Convention Against Torture, and thus could not be considered a “safe” third country for refugees. In 2007, the Federal Court of Canada found that the United States failed to comply with its refugee protection obligations under international law, could not be properly classified as “safe”, and declared the STCA to be invalid. In 2008, the Federal Court of Appeal overturned this decision and declared the STCA valid on other grounds. The Supreme Court of Canada denied leave to appeal.

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196 Interview with Michele Jenness (Executive Director), Vermont Immigration and Asylum Advocates (Aug. 10, 2012) para. 18.
199 Canadian Council for Refugees et al. v. Canada, [2007] FC 1262 (Can.) at paras. 239-240 (listing criteria that individually and collectively undermine the claim that the United States complies with its international non-refoulement obligations, and further concluding this evidence of U.S. “non-compliance with Article 33 are sufficiently serious and fundamental to refugee protection that it was unreasonable for the [Governor-in-Council] to conclude that the U.S. is a ‘safe country’”). The Court also found violations of sections 15 (equality) and 7 (life, liberty, and security of the person) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and declared the STCA to have no force and effect.
200 See Canada v. Canadian Council for Refugees et al., [2008] FCA. 229 (Can.). Notably, the Court of Appeal restored the STCA’s validity, but did not disturb the Federal Court’s findings on the United
Since the STCA does not prescribe a mechanism for meaningful monitoring, there is little information available about its effects. The monitoring provisions mandated in the agreement focus narrowly on whether the STCA is being applied according to its terms, not on how the STCA, when correctly applied, impacts asylum seekers. Our investigations reached the following conclusions:

First, due to deficiencies in the U.S. asylum regime, the STCA endangers asylum seekers and denies them access to fundamental protections to which they are entitled under international law. Second, the effects of the STCA have been felt unevenly on either side of the border, as the STCA has resulted in large numbers of asylum seekers being kept in the United States and out of Canada. Indeed, the STCA has drastically reduced the number asylum claims made at the Canadian border each year. Further, the exceptions to the STCA are applied inconsistently and inflexibly, raising concerns that asylum seekers who should be granted admission into Canada under the STCA are being turned away for arbitrary or unprincipled reasons. Third, the STCA has prompted rise in human smuggling, and likely also human trafficking, across the Canada-U.S. border. These activities make the border more dangerous, place asylum seekers at risk, and raise serious security concerns for both Canada and the United States.


See STCA, supra note 6 at Art. 8 (outlining review provisions). See also CANADIAN COUNCIL FOR REFUGEES, CLOSING THE FRONT DOOR ON REFUGEES: REPORT ON THE FIRST YEAR OF THE SAFE THIRD COUNTRY AGREEMENT 31 (2005), available at http://ccrweb.ca/closingdoordec05.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2013) (hereinafter CCR, CLOSING THE FRONT DOOR) (analyzing STCA’s monitoring provisions, and stating that the concerns with the STCA if that “when correctly applied, the Agreement will have devastating impacts on the lives of asylum seekers and promote irregular border crossings”).
1. Denying Access to Fundamental Protections

“We call it a safe country, but it is safe for whom?”

The STCA’s operational legitimacy hinges on the assumption that the United States and Canada are equally “safe” countries for refugees. Although the United States has improved its asylum procedures in recent years, several key aspects of U.S. asylum law and policy fall below international standards and fail to ensure adequate protection standards. By stranding in the United States asylum seekers who would have otherwise been able to seek refuge in Canada, the STCA weakens the legal safeguards available to them, and jeopardizes their ability to obtain fundamental protections.

While a comprehensive discussion of the U.S. asylum system is outside the scope of this report, in the analysis that follows we identify how the U.S. asylum system deviates from international protection standards in relation to: immigration detention; expedited removal; withholding of removal; and statutory bars to asylum.

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203 Interview with Saleem Spindari (Community Outreach Program Coordinator), MOSAIC British Columbia (May 16, 2012), para. 4.
204 As noted above, the “safe” designation attests to each country’s formal compliance with the Refugee Convention, the Convention Against Torture, and its general human rights record. See supra note 48.
207 Some of the practitioners interviewed for this report also noted that asylum seekers who are returned to the United States under the STCA are sometimes charged with misrepresentation or visa fraud. These reports are alarming given that, as noted above, Art. 3 of the Refugee Convention prohibits signatory states from penalizing asylum seekers for lacking proper travel documents. See Interview with Peter Murrett (Attorney), Vive La Casa (Jul. 27, 2012), paras. 56, 61-73; Interview with Rebecca Cohen (Senior Attorney) and Kelly Steffens AuBuchon (Staff Attorney), Freedom House (Jul. 27, 2012), paras. 71-72; Interview with Peter Murrett (Attorney), Vive La Casa (Jul. 27, 2012), paras. 56, 61-73. These practitioners further noted that given this possibility, they now regularly caution asylum seekers about the possibility that they may be accused of fraud. Given the unavailability of
Detention
Data collected for this report indicates that asylum seekers who are returned to the United States pursuant to the STCA are often subject to detention. Returned asylum seekers are held in dedicated immigration detention facilities with immigrant detainees, in jails with the general prison population, or in dual-purpose facilities doubling both as jails and immigration detention centers. Given the relative absence of female-dedicated detention facilities along the Canada-U.S. border, women asylum seekers returned to the United States under the STCA are more likely to be detained in jails in penal conditions of confinement.

Comprehensive information on the practice, it is difficult to comment on how common this practice is at Canada-U.S. border crossings. For a case example involving a Safe Third Country Agreement claimant being criminally prosecuted for fraud see U.S. v. Malenge 94 Fed. Appx. 642 (2nd Cir. 2008), supra note 69. This case involved an asylum seeker from the Democratic Republic of Congo who sought admission to the United States from Canada under the STCA’s family member exception, and, upon entry into the United States, was criminally prosecuted for fraud. The Court’s findings suggest the practice of prosecuting asylum seekers for fraud was so commonplace at certain border crossings at that time so as to be labeled a “blanket policy”.

Interview with Rebecca Cohen (Senior Attorney) and Kelly Steffens AuBuchon (Staff Attorney), Freedom House (Jul. 27, 2012), para. 38; Interview with Peter Murrett (Attorney), Vive La Casa (Jul. 27, 2012), para. 54; Interview with Michele Jenness (Executive Director), Vermont Immigration and Asylum Advocates (Aug. 10, 2012) para. 86-88.

As one practitioner described, speaking of the Clinton County Jail, a mixed purpose facility: “[returned asylum seekers] are intermingled with people facing criminal charges or doing short-term sentences. Everyone wears the standard black and white striped uniform...it has met the detention standards, but don’t ask me how.” See Interview with Michele Jenness (Executive Director), Vermont Immigration and Asylum Advocates (Aug. 10, 2012) para. 86. The U.S. immigration detention system has expanded dramatically in the last decade. The total number of migrants who passed through ICE detention per year rose from 204,459 individuals in 2001, to a record breaking 429,247 individuals in FY 2011. ICE’s average daily detention capacity for FY 2013 is 34,000 beds. The average number of daily detention has nearly doubled from 2004, when it averaged 18,000 beds. See National Immigration Forum, The Math of Immigration Detention: Runaway Costs Do Not Add Up to Sensible Policies 3-4 (Aug. 2013), available at http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/mathofimmigrationdetention.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2013). In FY 2012, the number of detainees would sometimes exceed the quota and rise up to 36,000 on some days. See Julia Preston, Immigration Official Defends Release of Detainees, New York Times (March 20, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/20/us/immigration-official-defends-release-of-detainees.html?_r=0 (last visited Oct. 29, 2013) (citing statements by John T. Morton, director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement).

See e.g. Interview with Peter Murrett (Attorney), Vive La Casa (Jul. 27, 2012), paras. 42-54 (stating that “the women are put in local county jails...with really questionable conditions, and they’re put in with the general population: with the drug violators, with the violent criminals”); Interview with Michele Jenness (Executive Director), Vermont Immigration and Asylum Advocates (Aug. 10, 2012) paras. 86-88 (stating that women who are rejected at the border pursuant to the STCA and returned to the United States can be “sent to one or two far flung jails...mixed population, where nobody sees them again and they probably have a telephonic hearing with a judge in Buffalo”); Interview with
The U.S. immigration detention system has come under increasing critical scrutiny in recent years.\(^{211}\) While DHS and ICE committed to overhaul the U.S. immigration detention system in 2009,\(^{212}\) core problems persist at the level of

Martha Mason (Executive Director), Rod McDowell (Board President), and Ronald Gray (Board Vice-President), Fort Erie Multicultural Centre (Jul. 25, 2012), paras. 32 and 216 (noting that some non-governmental groups along the border were considering renovating their long-term facilities to provide a shelter for women asylum seekers who are detained, due to the absence of female-dedicated facilities along the border, and concerns that female asylum seekers will be held in mixed facilities or in local jails).


\(^{212}\) See Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Fact Sheet: 2009 Immigration Detention Reforms (Oct. 6, 2009) available at http://www.dhs.gov/news/2009/10/06/new-immigration-detention-reform-initiatives-announced (last visited Nov. 1, 2013) (recognizing the need to implement reforms to “enhance the security and efficiency of ICE’s nationwide detention system while prioritizing the health and safety of detainees”). As part of these reforms, ICE announced a revised parole policy for asylum seekers, permitting parole from detention for non-citizens arriving at United States ports of entry who establish their identities, pose neither a flight risk nor danger to the community, have a credible fear of persecution or torture, and have no additional factors that weigh against their release. See Press Release, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Ice Issues New Procedures For Asylum Seekers As Part Of Ongoing Detention Reform Initiatives (Dec. 16, 2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/0912/091216washington.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2013). See also HRF DETENTION BLUEPRINT, id (noting that while ICE has taken steps to address some problems in the existing system, as of December 2012, more needed to be done to move this transformation forward including individualized assessments of detention with prompt immigration court review; use of cost-effective alternatives to detention; a reduction in reliance on detention as the default tool for
law, policy, and practice. In a report released in 2013, the non-partisan United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), for example, concluded that despite this commitment to overhaul the immigration detention system, longstanding concerns about asylum seekers held in detention remain unaddressed.

The U.S. immigration detention regime falls far below international law requirements. UNHCR has long made clear that in principle, asylum seekers should not be detained, and that detaining asylum seekers for anything but a brief period of time is contrary to international law norms and should be avoided. The U.S. immigration detention system fails to comply with these standards. As several studies have shown, the United States detains asylum seekers for lengthy periods of time, sometimes for several months and at times, years.

enforcement; the phasing out of jails and jail-like facilities; and the use of facilities with conditions appropriate for civil immigration detention when detention is used).

Despite DHS and ICE’s stated commitment to shift away from the reliance on jails and jail-like facilities, many asylum seekers and other detainees continue to be held in such places. For an account of persistent problems with the detention of asylum seekers in jails and jail-like facilities despite this public commitment, see USCIRF, ASSESSING DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS, supra note 211. See also Press Release, USCIRF, Asylum Detention Needs Improvements (Apr. 19, 2013) available at http://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/whats-new-at-uscirf/39790press-release-on-uscirf-report-asylum-detention-needs-improvements-april-19-2013.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2013) (noting that while ICE has made progress toward implementing the 2009 reforms, “most asylum seekers continue to be detained in jail-like, not civil, facilities”); NATIONAL IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CENTER, DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, ONE YEAR REPORT CARD: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S IMMIGRATION DETENTION REFORMS (2010), available at www.immigrantjustice.org/icereportcard (last visited Nov. 1, 2013) (arguing that despite a strong commitment from ICE leadership, there remain significant problems and a lack of implementation of new policies to prevent the widespread violation of the human rights of persons in immigration detention).

See USCIRF, ASSESSING DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS supra note 211 at 4-10 (2013) (stating: “While USCIRF welcomes ICE’s establishment of civil detention facilities to house asylum seekers and other low level immigrant detainees, the Commission remains concerned that some asylum seekers are still not being held in civil facilities. USCIRF urges that all asylum seekers who must be detained – whether before or after a credible fear determination – be held in civil facilities. In addition, USCIRF finds that further improvements are needed to expand detainees’ access to legal information, representation, and in-person hearings”).

UNHCR, REVISED GUIDELINES ON APPLICABLE CRITERIA AND STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DETENTION OF ASYLUM-SEEKERS 1, 3 (1999) available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/3c2b3f844.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2013) (stating that as a general principle, asylum seekers should not be detained and urges that exceptions this principle (protection of national security and public order, verification of identity, identification of basis of claim in a preliminary interview, destruction of documents/use of fraudulent documents to mislead) should be clearly prescribed by national law in conformity with principles of international law and should only be resorted to when absolutely necessary).

See SEEKING PROTECTION, FINDING PRISON, supra note 211 at 38-40 (documenting results of
In addition, many detained asylum seekers do not have access to prompt court review of their detention.\textsuperscript{217} This is inconsistent with UNHCR’s 2012 Guidelines on Detention, which emphasize that detained asylum seekers should be granted the right to “be brought promptly before a judicial or other independent authority to have the detention decision reviewed” within 24 to 48 hours.\textsuperscript{218} The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants’ 2012 Report similarly emphasizes the need for “automatic, regular and judicial review of detention in each individual case.”\textsuperscript{219} The U.S. immigration detention system violates these internationally recognized standards.

U.S. law also does not require detention decisions to be made on an individual basis, but rather, permits detention to be applied automatically for broad

\textsuperscript{217} See HRF DETENTION BLUEPRINT, supra note 211 at 6. Notably, in March 2012, the United States Department of Justice denied a petition requesting reform of regulations to provide arriving asylum seekers with immigration court custody hearings, a decision that was heavily criticized by rights groups. See e.g. Press Release, Human Rights First, Human Rights First Welcomes Revised UNHCR Guidance on Use of Immigration Detention (Sept. 21, 2012), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2012/09/21/human-rights-firsts-welcomes-revised-unhcr-guidance-on-use-of-immigration-detention/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2013) (criticizing decision to deny the petition requesting reform of regulations to provide arriving asylum seekers with immigration court custody hearings, and urging compliance with the UNHCR 2012 Detention Guidelines).

\textsuperscript{218} See e.g. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, DETENTION GUIDELINES: GUIDELINES ON THE APPLICABLE CRITERIA AND STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DETENTION OF ASYLOM-SEEKERS AND ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION 27 (2012) (hereinafter UNHCR DETENTION GUIDELINES) available at http://www.unhcr.org/505b10ee9.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2013) (outlining the minimum procedural guarantees to which asylum should be entitled when faced with the prospect of being detained, or during detention, including the right to be informed of the reasons of their detention, the right to be informed of the right to legal counsel, the right to be brought promptly before a judicial or other independent authority, regular periodic review of detention, access to asylum procedures, contact with UNHCR). See also Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on U.S. Immigration Policy and Practices, ¶¶ 139, 418, 431, 529, Doc. 78/10, (Dec. 30, 2010), available at http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/migrants/docs/pdf/Migrants2011.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2013) (urging the United States to ensure that immigration courts be allowed to review release decisions by immigration officers).

categories of non-citizens. This approach, precluding individualized, case-by-case assessments, results in the detention of asylum seekers without any consideration of their specific circumstances, medical needs, trauma, past trauma, or language comprehension. For example, the United States often automatically detains asylum seekers subject to expedited removal, a process discussed in detail below.

The mistreatment of immigrant detainees in U.S. detention facilities is substantially documented, and includes inadequate medical care, discrimination, penal conditions of confinement, as well as physical and sexual violence. In a number of facilities, asylum seekers are subject to oppressive conditions of confinement, including humiliating strip searches, inmate “counts”, and physical restraints. Human Rights First describes these conditions as follows:

. . . the overwhelming majority of detained asylum seekers and other civil immigration law detainees are still held in jails or jail-like facilities. At these facilities, asylum seekers and other

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221 See HRF DETENTION BLUEPRINT supra note 211 at 11 (analyzing the need for individualized assessments in detention settings).
222 See e.g., INA §§ 235, 236 (listing classes of non-citizens, including those in expedited removal, who are subject to mandatory detention).
224 See generally, KAREN TUMLIN, LINTON JOAQUIN & RANJANA NATARAJAN, A BROKEN SYSTEM: CONFIDENTIAL REPORTS REVEAL FAILURES IN U.S. IMMIGRANT DETENTION CENTERS vi, viii-x (2009) available at www.nilc.org/document.html?id=9 (last visited Nov. 1, 2013) (describing in detail penal conditions found at immigration detention centers throughout the United States). See also USCIRF, ASSESSING DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS, supra note 211 at 4-6 (describing ongoing problems and continued use of penal detention for detained immigrants, including asylum seekers, even after announced reforms).
Immigrants wear prison uniforms and are typically locked in one large room for up to 23 hours a day, they have limited or no outdoor access and typically visit with family through Plexiglas barriers. They are often handcuffed and/or shackled by U.S. immigration authorities when they arrive at U.S. airports or border entry points and when they are transported to detention facilities, to immigration court, or to the hospital.225

Studies also show that some immigrant detainees are subject to greater incidents of mistreatment, for example women226 and LGBTQI detainees.227

Asylum seekers can also be subject to segregation and solitary confinement, a practice that has been shown to carry severe long-term adverse health consequences.228 Notably, on September 4, 2013, ICE issued a new directive

225 HRF DETENTION BLUEPRINT, supra note 211 at 9 (detailing conditions of detention for asylum seekers and criticizing these conditions as inconsistent with U.S. commitments under the Refugee Convention).
226 See e.g. HRW, DETAINED AND AT RISK, supra note 223 (describing sexual abuse and assault in immigration detention facilities); Rentz, supra note 223 (describing allegations of sexual abuse in immigration detention facilities); Foley, supra note 223 (same).
In recent years advocacy groups have filed lawsuits against the U.S. government challenging the systemic mistreatment of LGBTQI migrants. See e.g., National immigrant Justice Center, LGBT Clients Who Reported Gross Mistreatment in Immigration Custody Remain Detained (Jul. 5, 2011), http://www.immigrantjustice.org/staff/blog/lgbt-clients-who-reported-gross-mistreatment-immigration-custody-remain-detained (last visited Nov. 1, 2013) (detailing suits filed and discussing subsequent attention drawn to problem of LBQTI mistreatment in immigration detention).
228 For an overview of the use of solitary and segregation in U.S. immigration detention see SARAH DAVILA-RUHAAK, STEVEN D. SCHWINN & THE JOHN MARSHALL LAW SCHOOL HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, CONCERNING THE USE OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION FACILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2013) available at http://repository.jmls.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=whitepapers (last visited Nov. 1, 2013) (documenting widespread use of solitary confinement in immigration detention and violations of due process rights, minimum standards of humane treatment, and personal liberty); PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BURIED ALIVE: SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN THE US DETENTION SYSTEM (APRIL 2013) available at https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_Reports/Solitary-Confinement-April-2013-full.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2013) (noting that relatively short periods in solitary confinement can cause severe and lasting physiological and psychological harms, sometimes rising to the level or torture and unusual punishment, and advocating that solitary confinement not be used in immigration detention); PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND NATIONAL IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CENTER, INVISIBLE IN ISOLATION: THE USE OF SEGREGATION AND SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION (2012) available at
calling for the regulation of the use of solitary confinement in immigration detention. It still remains to be seen whether this new directive will be effectively enforced and create a robust system by which ICE can monitor the use of solitary confinement in immigration detention facilities.

Once detained, asylum seekers face significant barriers to advancing successful asylum claims. For example, in some detention facilities asylum seekers have little access to legal counsel and legal aid organizations. Data collected for this


For commentary on this directive see e.g. American Civil Liberties Union, New Limits Announced on ICE’s solitary confinement of Immigrants (Sept. 6, 2013) available at https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights-prisoners-rights/new-limits-announced-ices-solitary-confinement-immigrants (last visited Nov. 1, 2013) (noting that the new directive is a “welcome and much-needed step towards curtailing practice that is both inhumane and horrifyingly common”).


Id. at 43–44. Some of these barriers include: diminished access to legal aid and legal counsel; inability to participate in gathering evidence; inability or high cost of making telephone calls; and lack of facilities to meet with legal counsel. Asylum seekers detained in remote locations can be required to attend hearings with immigration judges and interviews with asylum officers by video-conference, which can impede their ability to demonstrate credibility. See id. at 3-4, 7-9, 55-56, 59-61. See also NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., ISOLATED IN DETENTION: LIMITED ACCESS TO LEGAL COUNSEL IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION FACILITIES JEOPARDIZES A FAIR DAY IN COURT (2010) (hereinafter ISOLATED IN DETENTION) (describing systemic barriers faced by detained immigrants in the United States); AMNESTY INT’L, JAILED WITHOUT JUSTICE: IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN THE USA (2009) available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/JailedWithoutJustice.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2013) (same); Hamilton, supra note 290 at 110-120 (same).

See e.g., ISOLATED IN DETENTION, id. at 3 (finding that 80 percent of detainees were “held in facilities that were severely underserved by legal aid organizations”). Studies have shown more generally that detained asylum seekers face far greater difficulties both in obtaining legal assistance and that even when it is available, are less likely to succeed with their defense to removal. See e.g., Steering Committee of the New York Immigrant Representation Study Report, Accessing Justice: The Availability and Adequacy of Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 357 (2011). Asylum seekers who are detained are in general much less likely to obtain legal representation. See NINA SIULC ET AL., LEGAL ORIENTATION PROGRAM: EVALUATION AND PERFORMANCE AND OUTCOME MEASUREMENT REPORT, PHASE II 62 (2008), available at http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/LOP_evaluation_updated_5-20-08.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2013).
report similarly suggests that detained asylum seekers encounter obstacles in securing legal assistance. As one attorney interviewed for this report explained: “legal access is definitely a concern,” given the “small percentage of people being represented” and “attorneys already having trouble seeing their clients.” In some situations, the trauma of detention can be severe, prompting asylum seekers to withdraw or abandon their claims. Indeed, in its 2013 report, USCIRF emphasized that penal detention conditions risk re-traumatizing asylum seekers, and may lead some to prematurely terminate their asylum claim. Similarly, practitioners interviewed for this report explained that some asylum seekers withdraw their claims because they simply “cannot bear to stay in detention”.

(ii) Expedited Removal

Expedited removal is a process by which “arriving aliens” attempting entry at the U.S. border or who are apprehended within 100 miles of it, who have no documents or whose documents are deemed false or inconsistent with visa status, can be removed from the United States with few if any legal protections, except in the case of some asylum seekers. To trigger the asylum exception,

233 See e.g. Interview with Rebecca Cohen (Senior Attorney) and Kelly Steffens AuBuchon (Staff Attorney), Freedom House (Jul. 27, 2012), paras. 38-39 (noting a general access problem, and difficulties in locating and contacting detained individuals); Interview with Betsy Tao (Directing Attorney), Northwest Immigrant Rights Project (Aug. 28, 2012), para. 30 (noting more specific access problems, caused by detention facilities having insufficient attorney contact rooms and insufficient holding spaces in visitation areas, or expecting attorneys to wait for lengthy periods of time before seeing their clients, which can act as a disincentive to providing such services).

234 Interview with Betsy Tao (Directing Attorney), Northwest Immigrant Rights Project (Aug. 28, 2012), para. 41.

235 HRF, SEEKING PROTECTION, FINDING PRISON, supra note 211 at 7, 43-46.

236 USCIRF, ASSESSING DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS, supra note 211 at 2.

237 Michele Jenness (Executive Director), Vermont Immigration and Asylum Advocates (Aug. 10, 2012) para. 90.

238 See INA § 235(b)(1)(A) (expedited removal provisions); 8 C.F.R. § 1.2 (defining “arriving alien”). Since it was first introduced in 1996, expedited removal has undergone a steady expansion, both in terms of the classes of individuals subject to the process and the geographic area where it is implemented. Even in its expanded form, expedited removal can be used when CBP officers determine that an individual is inadmissible for one, or a combination of, the following: fraud or misrepresentation (INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(i)); falsely claiming U.S. citizenship (INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(ii)); an intending immigrant who is not in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa or other suitable entry document (INA §212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)); a nonimmigrant who is not in possession of a passport valid for a minimum of six months from the date of the expiration of the initial period of stay (INA §212(a)(7)(A)(i)(II)(i)); or a nonimmigrant who is not in possession of a valid nonimmigrant visa or border crossing card at the time of application for admission (INA §212(a)(7)(A)(i)(II)(ii)). Expedited removal also applies to aliens determined to be inadmissible under sections 212(a)(6)(C) or (7) of the
an asylum seeker must indicate fear of torture or persecution, after which he or she is granted a screening interview; only if he or she can demonstrate a “credible fear” of persecution or torture may a person in expedited removal seek asylum before an immigration judge. During the credible fear determination process, asylum seekers are subject to mandatory detention, with detention practices varying depending upon circumstances and location. Asylum seekers

INA who are present in the U.S. without having been admitted or paroled following inspection by an immigration officer at a designated port-of-entry, who are encountered by an immigration officer within 100 miles of the U.S. border, and who have not established to the satisfaction of an immigration officer that they have been physically present in the U.S. continuously for the 14-day period immediately prior to the date of encounter. Individuals apprehended in the border region have made up increasingly large portions of the total number of people subject to expedited removal during recent years. See e.g., DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, USCIS ASYLUM OFFICE, CREDIBLE FEAR WORKLOAD REPORT SUMMARY FY 2012 INLAND CASELoad (2012) (showing 1,547 cases received from inland apprehensions in first quarter of FY 2012) and DHS, USCIS ASYLUM OFFICE, CREDIBLE FEAR WORKLOAD REPORT SUMMARY FY 2012 PORT OF ENTRY (POE) CASELoad (2012) (showing 561 cases received from border port-of-entry in same period), available at http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Outreach/Notes%20from%20Previous%20Engagements/2012/January%202012/CredibleFearandReasonableFearWorkload.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2013). For further discussion, see ALISON SISKIN & RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33109, IMMIGRATION POLICY ON EXPEDITED REMOVAL OF ALIENS (2008), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/54512.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2013). Expedited removal can also apply to non-citizens who arrive in the United States by sea and are not admitted or paroled. See CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, CBP INSPECTOR’S FIELD MANUAL, section 17.15(a) (2006), available at http://www.aila.org/content/fileviewer.aspx?docid=41867&linkid=253319. See also DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, NOTICE DESIGNATING ALIENS SUBJECT TO EXPEDITED REMOVAL UNDER SECTION 235(b)(1)(A)(ii) OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT, 67 F.R. 68924 (Nov. 13, 2002), available at http://www.uscis.gov/link/docView/FR/HTML/FR/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-79324/0-0-0-79342/0-0-0-80383.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2013).

For an overview of the credible fear screening process see U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, QUESTIONS & ANSWERS: CREDIBLE FEAR SCREENING (last updated Jun. 18, 2013) available at http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/questions-answers-credible-fear-screening (last visited Oct. 23, 2013); ALISON SISKIN & RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33109, IMMIGRATION POLICY ON EXPEDITED REMOVAL OF ALIENS (2008), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/54512.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2013) (outlining expedited removal process). See also 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.30(d) and (e) (setting out procedures and standard of proof for credible fear determinations); 8 C.F.R § 208.30(f) (specifying that after a positive credible fear determination is made, the asylum officer is to issue a Notice to Appear for the asylum seeker to appear before an immigration judge for a consideration of their claim); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.30(e)(2), (e)(4) (specifying that “In determining whether the alien has a credible fear of persecution, as defined in Section 235(b)(1)(B)(v) of the Act, or a credible fear of torture, the asylum officer shall consider whether the alien's case presents novel or unique issues that merit consideration in a full hearing before an immigration judge”).

See INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. §1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) (stating that if a person in expedited removal is found to have a credible fear of persecution or torture they should be detained for further review of their claim); INA §235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), 8 U.S.C. §1225(b)(1)(B)(IV)(stating that any alien subject to the
who are not found to have demonstrated “credible fear” may have that order reviewed by an immigration judge, but if that holding is upheld have no opportunity to apply for asylum or withholding, are ordered removed, and have only limited avenues by which to review this determination.241

Data collected for this report indicates that in at least some cases, asylum seekers returned to the United States pursuant to the STCA are placed in expedited removal proceedings.242 Practitioners noted that at some border crossing points, asylum seekers were put in expedited removal proceedings automatically upon their return to the United States, while at others only sporadically.243 The rates varied by location and by officer.244 This finding is alarming given that U.S. legal directives prohibit the use of expedited removal for asylum seekers returned to the United States pursuant to the STCA.245 It is also
alarming given that when the STCA was first tabled, UNHCR expressed concern that the STCA might expose asylum seekers to expedited removal upon their return to the United States. Noting the deficiencies in the U.S. expedited removal procedures, and the failure to ensure that “bona fide refugees are not removed to a country of feared persecution”, UNHCR recommended that Canada “create an exception in the Regulations for asylum seekers who may be placed in expedited removal proceedings in the U.S.”

The expedited removal process creates significant challenges for asylum seekers, especially for those who are unable to advocate for themselves sufficiently to obtain a credible fear interview. The inquiry whether the asylum seeker should receive a credible fear screening is unmonitored, conducted quickly, and occurs in the absence of legal representation. Some studies suggest that
bona fide asylum seekers pass through the expedited removal process unrecognized and unprotected.\textsuperscript{250}

The deficiencies in the expedited removal process have been well documented. In a study released in 2005, the non-partisan USCIRF identified a substantial number of serious flaws in the treatment of asylum seekers and refugees in expedited removal.\textsuperscript{251} The flaws documented by USCIRF include: failure to provide applicants with crucial information, failure to ask mandatory questions, failure to refer cases to an asylum officer where credible fear is expressed, applicants signing sworn statements allowing for their removal without reviewing the statements, and officers completing forms containing incorrect details, or otherwise lacking crucial information.\textsuperscript{252} In response to the reactions generated by USCIRF’s initial 2005 criticism, DHS stated that it was taking measures to improve the expedited removal process.\textsuperscript{253} However, in its 2007 and 2009 follow up evaluations, USCIRF continued to criticize DHS for failing to take specific action with respect to some of the most serious flaws in the expedited removal process, and reiterated its concern that due to these flaws, asylum seekers subject to expedited removal continue to be “at the risk of being returned to countries where they face persecution.”\textsuperscript{254}

\textsuperscript{250} Id. See also Pistone & Hoeffner, supra note 248 at 196 (estimating in a study published in 2006 that thousands of genuine asylum seekers have been refused entry by the United States because of problems and deficiencies in the expedited removal law, policy, and practice).

\textsuperscript{251} USCIRF REPORT Vol. 1, supra note 249 (documenting problems and deficiencies).


\textsuperscript{253} In 2006, for example, DHS began reviewing all credible fear determinations to evaluate whether the law was applied correctly, see Memorandum from Joseph E. Langlois, Chief Asylum Division, USCIS, Revised Credible Fear Quality Assurance Review Categories and Procedures, 2–3 (Dec. 23, 2008), available at http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/Static_Files_Memoranda/Archives%201998-2008/2008/cf_qa_review_categorycatproc_23dec08.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2013) (announcing new procedural requirements required for all credible fear determinations effective Dec. 23, 2008). In 2009, ICE set out new criteria for the granting of parole to asylum seekers who were subject to expedited removal, see supra note 212. In a press release issued Dec. 23, 2009, USCIRF stated that the new guidelines “are an important first step in overhauling the United States’ deeply flawed detention system” but also noted that “more needs to be done both by the agency and in Congress”. See Press Release, USCIRF, ICE Parole Guideline Is an Important First Step in Fix Flawed Treat of Asylum Seekers (Dec. 23, 2009), available at http://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/press-releases/2891.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2013).

As noted above, asylum seekers subject to expedited removal are mandatorily detained.\textsuperscript{255} Moreover, even after credible fear is found, individuals may continue to be detained while their applications are pending.\textsuperscript{256} In its 2013 report USCIRF identified persistent problems with the detention of asylum seekers subject to expedited removal.\textsuperscript{257}


\textsuperscript{255} See \textit{e.g.} HRF, \textit{SEEKING PROTECTION, FINDING PRISON, supra} note 211 at 37 (describing cases where asylum applicants remained in detention for many months pending credible fear reviews). ICE contends, in response to ongoing criticism, that it is improving the timeliness of credible fear determinations. According to the USCIS Credible Fear Workload Report Summary for FY 09-12, over 90 percent of credible fear determinations are completed within 14 days, with steady improvement in timeliness between FY 2009 and 2012. USCIS reports that in FY 2012, over 97 percent of credible fear determinations were completed in 14 days or less. \textit{See USCIS ASYLUM OFFICE, CREDIBLE FEAR WORKLOAD REPORT SUMMARY FY 09-12} (2012), \textit{available at} http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Outreach/Notes%20from%20Previous%20Engagements/2012/July%202012/CredibleFear-FY2009-2012.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2013). Partial statistics for FY 2013 suggest there has been a substantial increase in credible fear claims and reviews since the middle of 2012, and that the percentage of reviews occurring within 14 days has dropped. From October 2012 to June 2013, 80.26 percent of credible fear determinations have been timely completed. See USCIS Asylum Division, Asylum Office Workload (March 2013) at 35-40. Posted Aug 13. 2013 on the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) InfoNet (password protected), re-posted and publicly available at www.cayerdysonlaw.com/newsandlinks/images/081413%20Asylum%20Statistics.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2013). For the latest available statistics about the overall credible fear workload for FY 2013 to date see USCIS, Credible Fear Workload Report Summary (Preview) (July 20, 2013) \textit{available at} http://preview.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Notes%20from%20Previous%20Enfamements/2013/July%202013/FY13-CFandRF-stats2013-06-30.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2013).

\textsuperscript{256} In its 2013 report, for example, USCIRF reported that while 80 percent of detained asylum seekers found to have credible fear are now released on parole, the 20 percent who remain in detention often do so for reasons such as failure to substantiate community ties or inability to pay bond. \textit{See USCIRF, ASSESSING DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS, supra} note 211 at 9-10.

\textsuperscript{257} USCIRF, \textit{ASSESSING DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS, id.} at 9-10 (concluding that while ICE had made progress towards ensuring that asylum seekers found to have a credible fear are paroled rather than detained, more needed to be done to ensure that asylum seekers, when detained, are not held in jails or jail-like facilities, and have adequate access to legal information, representation, and in-person hearings).
placed at risk of return to countries where they face persecution.

(iii) Withholding of Removal
U.S. law provides two primary forms of protection for persons fleeing persecution: asylum and withholding of removal.\(^{258}\) Asylum offers the most complete form of protection: it entitles the person to permanent residence in the United States, and eligibility for U.S. citizenship and a right to family reunification.\(^{259}\) U.S. law also allows for a more limited form of protection known as withholding of removal, which provides only basic non-refoulement protection without the associated entitlements that come with a granting of asylum.\(^{260}\) Withholding of removal protects a person from being returned to a country of persecution; it does not provide him or her with secure status in the United States.\(^{261}\) Withholding protection is mandatory, although it is subject to fundamental limitations in scope.\(^{262}\)

Unlike other states parties to the Refugee Convention, the United States imposes a higher standard of proof for withholding of removal, and requires an applicant to demonstrate that the threat to his or her life or freedom is “more likely than

\(^{258}\) U.S. law also provides alternative protection from removal under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment of Punishment, Art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987). In the United States, an asylum seeker eligible for protection under Art. 3 of the Convention Against Torture will be granted withholding of removal so long as he or she is not mandatorily barred from asylum. If barred from withholding but still eligible for protection, an asylum seeker will be granted deferral of removal, a less-secure form of protection. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16, 208.17, 1208.16, 1208.17. Also see ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM, supra note 205 at § 2:1 and Ch. 7 (discussing the differences between protection under the Refugee Convention and the Convention Against Torture).

\(^{259}\) Asylum is a form of protection granted to persons who are victims of past persecution or who can demonstrate a future fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, in keeping with the Refugee Convention, whose states are unable or unwilling to provide protection. See INA §§ 101(a)(42)(A), 208(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1) (incorporating Art. 1(A) of Refugee Convention into U.S. law). Under U.S. law, asylum is formally a discretionary remedy, though discretionary denials are not the norm in practice. INA § 208(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). The United States Supreme Court has described the general discretionary nature of asylum as consistent with the United Nations Refugee Convention. See e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440–41 (1987) (discussing discretion under the Refugee Convention). Also see ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM, supra note 205 at § 1:2 and § 6:42.


\(^{261}\) Also see ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM, supra note 205 at § 1:2 (outlining the protections afforded to asylum seekers granted withholding of removal status).

\(^{262}\) Id.
Those who are denied asylum even pursuant to certain procedural bars, such as the one-year filing deadline discussed directly below, only have access to withholding of removal protection.

(iv) Bars to Asylum

U.S. law also imposes legal and procedural bars that deny asylum seekers access to full and fair consideration. We survey two of these bars here: the one-year filing deadline and the “material support” bar.264

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) imposes a one-year filing deadline on asylum seekers.265 This filing deadline requires asylum seekers to file their claim within a year of arriving in the United States, unless they can meet one of several limited exceptions.266 The one-year filing deadline does not comply with international standards prescribing that asylum requests should not be excluded from consideration based on failure to fulfill formal requirements. The European Court of Human Rights, for example, has held that imposing time limits on asylum applications does not accord with the principles outlined in the Refugee

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263 Id. at §2:2; §2:26-§2:28 (distinguishing and explaining standards of proof in withholding or removal and asylum). The asylum standard has been identified as “more generous” than the withholding for removal standard. See INS v. Cardoza Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430-33 (1987) (describing and comparing standards). See also James C. Hathaway & Anne K. Cusick, Refugee Rights are not Negotiable, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 481, 508-509 (2000) (describing standards, and critiquing the U.S. asylum system for its “impoveryished” understanding of international protection). Because withholding is subject to a higher standard, in principle, asylum seekers in the United States with a well-founded fear of persecution, if they are denied asylum as a matter of discretion, may nonetheless be returned to their country of origin if they fail to meet the higher withholding standard.

264 U.S. law also bars claimants convicted of “aggravated felonies” and classifies as “aggravated” a range of offences that would not be similarly classified under Canadian and international law. See INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (defining “aggravated felony”); INA §208(b)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i) (providing that individuals convicted of aggravated felonies will be considered to have been convicted of a particularly serious crime, rendering them ineligible to apply for asylum).

265 INA § 208(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). Individuals barred from asylum as a result of the one-year filing deadline can still be eligible to apply for withholding of removal, which, as noted above, is subject to a higher standard of proof. See ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM, supra note 205.

Convention.\textsuperscript{267} Similarly, UNHCR has stated that asylum seekers should not be denied consideration for failure to fulfill formal requirements, noting that “[w]hile asylum-seekers may be required to submit their asylum request within a certain time limit, failure to do so, or the non-fulfillment of other formal requirements, should not lead to an asylum request being excluded from consideration.”\textsuperscript{268} UNHCR has criticized the United States for implementing the one-year filing deadline on grounds that it can result in\textit{ bona fide} refugees being removed from the United States to face persecution, and has urged the United States to review this policy.\textsuperscript{269}

United States rules and practice surrounding the one-year filing deadline create tremendous and unfair burdens on genuine refugees.\textsuperscript{270} The one-year filing

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{267} See Jabari v. Turkey, Appl. No. 40035/98, 2000-VIII, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶40 (finding that the implementation of time limits on asylum application does not accord with the principles outlined in the Refugee Convention).
\item \textsuperscript{269} See e.g. UNHCR, \textit{Submissions by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Compilation Report Universal Periodic Review: United States of America} (Apr. 2010) available at http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4bcd741c2.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2013) (stating that “some individuals prevented from applying for asylum by the one-year deadline could be removed despite having a valid asylum claim” and urging the United States “to undertake a comprehensive review of its asylum adjudication system.”) In 2010, researchers at Georgetown University completed a comprehensive analysis on the impact of the one-year bar on affirmative asylum applications filed between October 1, 1996 (when the one-year rule was first implemented) and Jun. 8, 2009. During that period, one third of affirmative asylum applications were filed late and DHS denied more than 15,000 asylum applications on the basis of lateness alone. As a result, they concluded, more than 21,000 genuine refugees were denied asylum during the time frame studies solely because of the one-year filing deadline. See Philip Schrag, Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Jaya Ramji-Nogales & James P. Dombach, \textit{Rejecting Refugees: Homeland Security’s Administration of the One-Year Bar to Asylum}, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 679, 688, 753–754 (2010) (hereinafter Schrag et al). The authors found substantial inconsistencies in how the one-year filing deadline was applied, with applicants from certain nationalities far more likely to be excused for lateness than others. For example, late Guatemalan applications were far more likely to be rejected than late Iraqi applications. \textit{Id.} at 721–732, 739. \textit{See also} Ashley Huebner and Karen Zwick, National Immigrant Justice Center (2013) \textit{Rethink Immigration: Repeal the One-Year Asylum Deadline}, available at http://www.immigrantjustice.org/staff/blog/rethink-immigration-repeal-one-year-asylum-deadline#.UmRu0WRDuos (last visited Oct. 23, 2013) (identifying problems with the one-year filing deadline and advocating for its repeal); Karen Musalo and Marcelle Rice, \textit{The Implementation of the One-Year Bar to Asylum}, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 693 (2008) (providing case studies that illustrate the negative impact of the one-year deadline).
\item \textsuperscript{270} It is worth noting that the one-year filing deadline was not intended to prevent genuine asylum seekers from obtaining protection. This intent is reflected by the legislative history. On September 30, 1996, Senator Orin Hatch, one of the bill’s sponsors stated that: “the way in which the time limit
deadline has also been criticized for undermining the efficiency of the asylum adjudication system, for leaving asylum seekers in legal limbo, for diverting limited time and resources in ineffective ways, and for having a particularly detrimental impact on women fleeing gender-related persecution.

In June 2013, the United States Senate passed a Comprehensive Immigration Reform Bill that includes provisions to repeal the one-year filing deadline. These reforms were proposed after the Department of Homeland Security concluded in 2011 that the filing deadline leads to genuine refugees being denied asylum, expends resources without helping uncover or deter fraud, and was rewritten in the conference report—with the two exceptions specified—was intended to provide adequate protections to those with legitimate claims of asylum.” See 142 Cong. Rec. S11838-01 (Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Orin Hatch).


272 See e.g., Elisa Massimino, How the U.S. Asylum Deadline Hurts Women, The Daily Beast (Jun. 14, 2013) available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/witw/articles/2013/06/14/immigration-reform-abolish-the-asylum-deadline-that-hurts-women.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2013) (noting that women asylum seekers are disproportionately impacted by the one-year filing deadline and outlining reasons as to why). See also Schrag et al, supra note 269 at 651, 702, 753–754 (noting that the filing deadline tended to have a disproportionately negative impact on female applicants, who were far more likely than male applicants to be late filers); Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (Now Human Rights First), Refugee Women at Risk: Unfair U.S. Laws Hurt Asylum Seekers (2002) available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/refugee_women.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2013) (arguing that women may be adversely affected by the one-year filing deadline because, for example, women who must care for children may lack the time and resources to seek legal help while caring for their families, women who have been subject to physical or sexual violence may suffer psychological and physical trauma, making it difficult for them to discuss their experiences within one year of arrival in the United States. Also, seeking legal representation may be difficult for women who come from countries where they could not approach government or legal authorities).

makes the asylum process more difficult.\textsuperscript{274} The proposed legislation has not been enacted and the one-year filing deadline is still in effect.\textsuperscript{275}

The United States further bars from asylum and withholding any person who has provided “material support” to terrorist organizations or activities.\textsuperscript{276} The 2001 USA PATRIOT Act implements an expansive definition of “material support”, and also applies a very broad definition of the term “terrorist activities”.\textsuperscript{277} The Act does not require proof that an individual provided support knowingly but rather, permits an individual to be barred from protection if he or she “reasonably should have known” they were affording material support to terrorists.\textsuperscript{278} These provisions have been heavily criticized for being overbroad, and for straying from international standards that require individual responsibility to justify exclusion from refugee protection.\textsuperscript{279} At the end of 2007, Congress amended the law to broaden the authority to grant exemption from the law’s over-breadth.\textsuperscript{280} These amendments effect only limited groups of individuals. Human rights and refugee rights groups have criticized the relevant government agencies for failing to establish workable procedures to implement this exemption effectively.\textsuperscript{281}


\textsuperscript{275} S.744 as amended passed the Senate on June 27, 2013 by a vote of 68-32. See Immigration Policy Center, \textit{A Guide to s.744}, \textit{supra} note 273 at 4.


\textsuperscript{278} \textit{Id.}


\textsuperscript{281} Human Rights First criticized this policy and called for a legislative solution that would \textit{inter alia} focus the definition of “terrorist activity” on violence against civilians and non-combatants and ensure the administration’s swift implementation of the discretionary authority given to it by Congress. See
Before the STCA came into effect, *bona fide* asylum seekers who failed to meet the higher standard of proof required for withholding of removal, or who were statutorily barred from asylum in the United States, could seek asylum in Canada. Since the STCA’s implementation, this safety valve has been essentially closed for asylum seekers who are not found to fit within the STCA’s exceptions.

The STCA not only closes Canada’s border to asylum seekers, it also serves another example of Canada’s willingness to avoid its refugee protection obligations. As Audrey Macklin explains, since the STCA permits Canada to return asylum seekers to the United States despite evidence that they may be at risk of being returned to a country of feared persecution, it “allows Canada to do indirectly what it cannot do directly, namely deny refugees the rights to which they are entitled according to international and domestic law.”282 Contrary to the assurances outlined in its preamble, the STCA denies asylum seekers fundamental protections and exposes them to the risk of being returned to countries of feared persecution.


2. Restricting Access to Asylum

“They’re caught in no man’s land with nowhere to go. They’re trapped.”

(i) Keeping Asylum Seekers Out of Canada

The STCA was designed to serve as a “burden-sharing” vehicle to promote and enhance cooperation in refugee status determinations between Canada and the United States. It is well established that before the STCA came into effect, more asylum seekers crossed the border from the United States into Canada than in the other direction. Canada is far removed from most conflict regions,

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284 See STCA, supra note 6 at Preamble (emphasizing the parties’ commitment “to the notion that cooperation and burden-sharing with respect to refugee status claimants can be enhanced”). See also Macklin, supra note 29 at 394-395 (noting that in the context of the STCA “burden-sharing” refers to the asymmetrical flow of refugee claimants between the United States and Canada, and promotes “the notion that each state should take responsibility for a proportion of the refugee flow that is commensurate with its population, or resources, or some combination thereof”). Macklin further critiques the use of the phrase “burden sharing” for portraying refugees as a liability and advocates instead for use of the expression “responsibility sharing” as better capturing the fact that the international refugee regime “operates on the basis of duties voluntarily assumed by the states which acceded to the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol” at 394. See also Stephen H. Legomsky, Secondary Refugee Movements and the Return of Asylum Seekers 15(4) INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 567, 606-607 (2003) (noting that focusing on the burdens of refugee protection is inappropriate given that refugees “bring not only ‘burdens’ but also benefits and opportunities” and advocating for use of the expression “responsibility sharing”). Any discussion of asymmetry in asylum flows must also recognize the profound asymmetry between the number of asylum seekers admitted by Canada and the United States, and states located closer to conflict regions. As Legomsky explains, while destination states like Canada and the United States accept significant numbers of refugees “those numbers constitute only a tiny proportion of the world’s total refugee population,” and “some of the more common destination state practices have the effect of distributing the responsibility for refugee protection inequitably, with the effect of distributing obligation disproportionately on “developing countries and on countries whose frontiers are geographically most accessible”, at 570-572. For further analysis of responsibility sharing in the context of the Safe Third Country Agreement, see Michelle Foster, Responsibility Sharing or Shifting? “Safe” Third Countries and International Law, 25 (2) REFUGE 64 (2008).

285 Between 1995 and 2001, approximately one-third of all refugee claimants in Canada entered at the Canada-U.S. border, ranging in numbers from roughly 6,000 per year to 14,000 per year. In contrast, during this same period, approximately 200 refugee claimants entered the Unites States from Canada annually. See Audrey Macklin, CALEDON INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL POLICY, THE VALUE(S) OF THE CANADA-U.S. SAFE THIRD COUNTRY AGREEMENT 11 (2003), available at http://www.caledoninst.org/Publications/PDF/558320703.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2013). See also Joe Fontana, M.P. (Chair), Standing Comm. on Citizenship and Immigration House of Commons of Canada,
and many asylum seekers who seek protection in Canada must first travel through the United States.\textsuperscript{286} As one practitioner interviewed for this report explained: “The reality is we don’t have many refugees coming to Canada compared to Europe because, you see, not many people are able to come here. It’s far; the only land crossing we have is with the United States.”\textsuperscript{287}

Canada and the United States were driven by different motivations in negotiating towards the STCA. While the United States entered into the STCA primarily to fortify the border, Canada entered into the STCA primarily to deter asylum seekers from making refugee claims in Canada.\textsuperscript{288} In a report released by U.S. Custom and Border Protection, Canada Border Services Agency, and Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the agencies explain: “[w]hile the primary focus for

\textsuperscript{Hands Across the Border: Working Together at Our Shared Border and Abroad to Ensure Safety, Security, and Efficiency, Doc. No. RP1032046, 8 (Dec. 2001), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/hoc/Committee/371/CIMM/Reports/RP1032046/cimm02rp/cimm02r p-e.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2013) (noting that at that time, approximately one-third of all refugee claimants seeking asylum in Canada entered through the United States).}

\textsuperscript{286} For asylum seekers who travel overland from South or Central America, it is impossible to reach Canada without first passing through the United States. For asylum seekers who travel by air from overseas locations, the relative scarcity of direct flights to Canada from many regions of the world often requires transit through the United States. See Legomsky, \textit{supra}, note 284 at 583 (discussing barriers that prevent asylum seekers from reaching Canada without first entering the United States, and noting that the STCA “will result in Canada returning more refugee status applicants to the United States than vice versa, a significant consequence in the light of the differences in approval rates and reception conditions”).

\textsuperscript{287} Interview with Saleem Spindari (Community Outreach Program Coordinator), MOSAIC British Columbia (May 16, 2012), para. 40.

\textsuperscript{288} See \textit{e.g.}, Macklin, \textit{supra} note 285 (discussing the parties’ motivations in entering the STCA). Critics further suggest that in implementing the STCA, Canada and the United States were motivated by considerations that were neither acknowledged nor initially disclosed. In August 2002, the Canadian Council for Refugees obtained a document entitled “Draft Note to Accompany a Canada-United States Agreement for Cooperation in the Examination of Refugee Status Claims from Nationals of Third Countries” (Jun. 2002) (unpublished), cited in Macklin, \textit{supra} note 285 at 3-4. The text of the Draft Note was also provided by the Canadian Council for Refugees upon request. The Note indicates that in exchange for agreeing to the STCA, Canada would “resettle up to 200 persons per year referred by the Government of the United States who are outside the United States and Canada. . .and have been determined by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada to be in need of international protection.” Soon after the STCA came into effect, Canada resettled 14 Haitian refugees from Guantanamo Bay, referred to Canada for resettlement by United States officials under Art. 9 of the STCA. See UNHCR, STCA Monitoring Report, \textit{supra} note 176 at 19. Refugee advocates criticized the Draft Note as a “side deal” agreed to by Canada to push the STCA through, and as an indication of Canadian and U.S. willingness to “trade” in interdicted individuals. See \textit{e.g.}, Campbell Clark, \textit{Plan to Send Canada Refugees from Ships Criticized}, The Globe and Mail (Print Edition) (Aug. 5, 2002) (citing Bill Frelick, Director of Refugee Programs for Amnesty International in the United States criticizing the Note, stating “[i]t’s basically come down to trading in people and it’s unseemly”).
the United States was security, Canada sought to limit the significant irregular northbound movement of people from the United States who wished to access the Canadian refugee determination system.” 289 And indeed, the effects of the STCA have been felt unevenly on either side of the border, as it has kept large numbers of asylum seekers out of Canada and in the United States. 290

Statistics obtained from the Canada Border Services Agency show that Canada has found several hundred claimants ineligible under the STCA each year since the STCA’s implementation, as follows: 291

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Rejected Refugee Claimants under the Canada/US Safe Third Country Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>544</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These numbers, however, only tell part of the story. The STCA not only turns asylum seekers away at the border, but also deters asylum seekers who are aware of the policy from presenting themselves at the border. As a result, its effects are far more significant than the above numbers reveal. Statistics

289 See United States Customs and Border Protection, Canada Border Service Agency, and Royal Canadian Mounted Police, U.S.-Canada: Joint Border Threat and Risk Assessment 12 (2010), available at www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/security-securite/pip-pep/jbra-ecmrf-eng.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2013). See also Macklin, supra, note 285 at 16 (noting that the United States’ concern with national security “explains why the United States would assent to an agreement that it refused to sign a few years earlier and which can only amount to a make-work project for the US asylum system”).

290 While practitioners in Canada reported a decline in the number of asylum seekers entering Canada since the STCA’s implementation, practitioners in the United States reported a corresponding rise in the number of asylum seekers housed in their shelters or being held in detention. See interview with Martha Mason (Executive Director), Rod McDowell (Board President), and Ronald Gray (Board Vice-President), Fort Erie Multicultural Centre (Jul. 25, 2012), paras. 11-12, 24 and 32; Interview with Lynn Hannigan (Director) and Sister Judith Carroll (Counselor), Casa El Norte (Aug. 3, 2012), paras.34-35.

291 CBSA 2012 data, supra note 100. These figures include claimants rejected at the border, in addition to two additional claimants rejected in 2005 (one at the airport, one inland); five claimants rejected in 2005 (two at the airport, three inland) and one additional claimant rejected in 2011 (inland).

obtained from CBSA show a striking decline in asylum claims made at the Canada-U.S. border after the STCA came into effect, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Asylum Claims Made at the Border Pre-STCA</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Asylum Claims Made at the Border Post-STCA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>4,041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>6,224</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>4,478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>9,556</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>8,191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>13,270</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>10,802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>14,007</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>6,295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>10,856</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>4,642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>10,938</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2,563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>8,904</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>3,790</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assessed differently, these same statistics show a steady decline in the number of asylum claims made at the border each year relative to the total number of asylum claims received by Canada:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage of Asylum Claims Made at the Border Pre-STCA</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage of Asylum Claims Made at the Border Post-STCA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>31.7%</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>28.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>32.4%</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>34.9%</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

293 CBSA 2012 data, supra note 100. Statistics from 1997-2001 cited in Closing the Front Door, supra note 202. There were slight inconsistencies between the CBSA data presented in Closing the Front Door and the data provided by the CBSA in 2012. Where such inconsistencies in data were identified, this report cites to the data provided by CBSA in 2012. A Freedom of Information request completed by Citizenship and Immigration Canada (Sept. 13, 2012) (CR-12-0226; DPU-12-1422) shows that the gender division for claims lodged at the border is as follows: 2005: 114 females and 185 males; 2006: 151 females and 251 males; 2007: 208 females and 292 males; 2008: 248 female and 392 males; 2009: 340 females and 423 males; 2010: 345 females and 416 males; 2011: 245 females and 345 males. CBSA also provided copies of informational bulletins relating to the STCA further to Freedom of Information Request File A-2012-01381 /TW, filed with the Canada Border Services Agency under the Access to Information Act, R.S.C. ch. A-1 (1985) (Can.) (completed Jun. 11, 2012).

294 Id.
Notably, before July 2009, asylum seekers from countries on which Canada had imposed a temporary suspension of removals were allowed entry into Canada under the STCA’s “moratorium country exception”. Since moratorium countries are, by definition, countries with some of the most egregious human rights records in the world, asylum claims from these countries are among the most compelling and urgent. As the above numbers demonstrate, after the Canadian government removed this exception in 2009, the number of asylum claims made at the Canada-U.S. border declined even further. The removal of the moratorium country exception was acutely felt on both sides of the border. Fort Erie Multicultural Centre in Fort Erie, Ontario, for example, reported a fifty percent drop in the number of asylum seekers staying at their shelter after the moratorium country exception was removed. Practitioners in Vive La Casa in Buffalo, New York, reported a correlating rise in the number of asylum seekers housed in some U.S. shelters.

(ii) Inconsistent Application of STCA Exceptions
Data collected for this report further indicates that Canadian border officials sometimes apply inconsistent and inflexible evaluation standards when considering the STCA’s exceptions. Of the four exceptions identified in the STCA, the family member exception is the most frequently used. To trigger this

\[\text{Regulation Amending the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, 143 (16) CAN. GAZETTE 1470-72 (Aug. 05, 2009), available at http://canadagazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2009/2009-08-05/pdf/g2-14316.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2013) (noting that the STCA’s exception for nationals benefiting from a temporary suspension of removals has “left Canada open to large influxes from the United States of refugee protection claimants from nationals of [temporary suspension of removals] countries”, and announcing that the amendment to repeal this provision “will protect the integrity of the refugee status determination system by ensuring that refugee protection claimants who have had the opportunity to have their claims assessed in the United States are not making claims in Canada, and will reduce pressures on, and costs to, the refugee protection system”).}\]

\[\text{Interview with Martha Mason (Executive Director), Rod McDowell (Board President), and Ronald Gray (Board Vice-President), Fort Erie Multicultural Centre (Jul. 25, 2012), paras. 22, 151-154.}\]

\[\text{See Interview with Martha Mason (Executive Director), Rod McDowell (Board President), and Ronald Gray (Board Vice-President), Fort Erie Multicultural Centre (Jul. 25, 2012), paras. 24 and 32 (speaking of increased intake at Vive La Casa).}\]

\[\text{See Interview with Martha Mason (Executive Director), Rod McDowell (Board President), and Ronald Gray (Board Vice-President), Fort Erie Multicultural Centre (Jul. 25, 2012), para. 97. The practitioners we interviewed noted that the document holder and public interest exceptions are rarely applied at the Canadian border. These practitioners further noted that the unaccompanied minor exception was more frequently applied at the Canadian border in the years 2005-2010, but that fewer unaccompanied minors are now entering Canada under this exception, paras. 97-104. For an account of child claimants presenting at the Canadian border see Annie Poulain, Réfugiés: des dizaines d'enfants}\]
exception, an asylum seeker must satisfy a Canadian border services officer that he or she has a family member in Canada. While the burden of proof is on the claimant, officers are required to make reasonable efforts to confirm family relationships. The necessity of applying flexible standards of proof is recognized in the Operations Manual used by Canada’s border agents, which states:

Credible testimony may be sufficient to satisfy a decision-maker in the absence of documentary evidence or computer records. It may be appropriate in these circumstances to request that the applicant and the relative provide sworn statements attesting to their family relationship.

When the STCA was first implemented, Canadian officials stated they would take a generous and liberal approach to the family member exception, and would not insist on proof of original documents to prove family relationships. Data collected for this report, however, indicates that Canadian border officers sometimes apply inflexible standards in evaluating the family member exception.

Practitioners on both sides of the border spoke of a growing insistence on original documentation to satisfy the STCA’s family member exception, and


300 CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CANADA, PROCESSING CLAIMS FOR REFUGEE PROTECTION MANUAL, 63 (2012) available at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/manuals/pp/pp01-eng.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2013), cited in CCR & SOJOURN HOUSE, id. at 24. These same principles are outlined in Statement of Principles accompanying the Safe Third Country Agreement. See PROCEDURAL ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH IMPLEMENTING THE AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION IN THE EXAMINATION OF REFUGEE STATUS CLAIMS FORM NATIONALS OF THIRD COUNTRIES: STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, available at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/laws-policy/safe-third.asp (last visited Oct. 23, 2013), at para. 2 (noting that while the burden of proof is on the applicant to satisfy a decision-maker as to the existence of a family relationship “credible testimony may be sufficient to satisfy a decision-maker in the absence of documentary evidence of computer records”, and that in such circumstances it may be appropriate to request the applicant and relative to provide sworn statements attesting to the family relationship.).

301 CCR & SOJOURN HOUSE, id. at 25 (citing statements made at a meeting in Niagara Falls Dec. 16, 2004).
noted that some Canadian officials place an inordinately high value on original identity documents.\textsuperscript{302} As one attorney explained:

The Canadians are really big on documents. They like to see an original birth certificate and original photo ID, or passport preferably or a country ID from the individual coming into Canada, and they’ll accept copies of documents from the relatives in Canada . . . So we’re very insistent on documents because in our experience, the Canadians are insistent on it. The better the documents, the better your chances of getting in.\textsuperscript{303}

The emphasis on original documentation can erect significant hurdles for some asylum seekers. In some cases, obtaining original documents — or any documents at all — is nearly impossible.\textsuperscript{304} Asylum seekers typically flee their countries of origin quickly and unexpectedly, and cannot bring their identity documents with them for fear of being discovered. Others flee from regions where it is difficult or dangerous to obtain identity documents — or any documents — because the government is unstable, corrupt, or ineffective. As noted above, the UNHCR expressly recognizes that due to these and other circumstances, asylum seekers are “perhaps more likely than other aliens to find themselves without identity documents”.\textsuperscript{305} Without identity documents, such claimants face serious barriers in gaining admission into Canada, even in situations where they may fit within the STCA’s family member exception.

Practitioners on both sides of border described a general lack of uniform procedure in assessing family relationships, and inconsistency in evaluating the family member exception.\textsuperscript{306} Some Canadian border officials have even denied entry to claimants who present at the border with original documentation

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\textsuperscript{302} Interview with Peter Murrett (Attorney), Vive La Casa (Jul. 27, 2012), para. 32; Interview with Lynn Hannigan (Director) and Sister Judith Carroll (Counselor), Casa El Norte (Aug. 3, 2012), paras. 43-46.
\textsuperscript{303} Interview with Peter Murrett (Attorney), Vive La Casa (Jul. 27, 2012), paras. 32 and 34.
\textsuperscript{304} For discussion see supra, notes 63-65.
\textsuperscript{305} United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Identity Documents for Refugees, supra, note 65 at para.3.
\textsuperscript{306} Interview with Peter Murrett (Attorney), Vive La Casa (Jul. 27, 2012), para. 40; Interview with Rebecca Cohen (Senior Attorney) and Kelly Steffens AUBuchon (Staff Attorney), Freedom House (Jul. 27, 2012), paras. 29-34. Interview with Lynn Hannigan (Director) and Sister Judith Carroll (Counselor), Casa El Norte (Aug. 3, 2012), para. 68.
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showing a family relation in Canada.\textsuperscript{307} The assessments varied dramatically between officers.\textsuperscript{308} As one practitioner explained: “As far as I can tell, it’s entirely subjective.”\textsuperscript{309} As another noted: “they can decide at any point that they don’t believe the person or there is something not quite right and just return them to the U.S.”\textsuperscript{310} Practitioners further reported that claimants who were not particularly close with their Canadian family members often faced difficulties when officers interpreted the lack of closeness as an indicator of fraud.\textsuperscript{311} In one case, an asylum seeker who was unable to satisfy the officer as to the validity of the family relationship on the basis of documentation and testimonials had to provide DNA evidence to substantiate the claim.\textsuperscript{312}

Practitioners on both sides of the border also pointed to a growing culture of hostility and disbelief at the Canadian border since the STCA came into effect, and noted that asylum seekers are frequently dismissed, disgraced, and demeaned.\textsuperscript{313} As one practitioner described: “I saw a huge shift . . . before it was an attitude of kindness and we’re obligated as a country to accept refugees.”\textsuperscript{314} Other practitioners described a similar shift in attitude, and noted that asylum seekers are increasingly “treated as if they’re criminals before they’re found guilty.”\textsuperscript{315} Being met with accusation and disbelief can impose terrible burdens on asylum seekers. As one practitioner described:

People are afraid. When they go through the process, they’re hungry, they haven’t slept the night before, they’re afraid . . . It’s
just a terribly traumatic experience about wondering if they are able to come in. And unfortunately a lot of officers don’t make that easy for them on the human level . . . you have to be humane – show some sort of human respect.316

In a 2010 study into the experience of refugee claimants at port of entry interviews, the Canadian Council for Refugees and Sojourn House arrived at similar conclusions.317 Based on a combination of claimant experiences and practitioner observations, the study found significant inconsistencies among border agents in evaluating family relationships, and similarly observed that claimants from certain countries appear to encounter stricter standards of evidence than others. The study concludes that Canadian border officers’ “unreasonable and inconsistent assessments of family relationships have in some cases undermined the fair application of the family member exception.”318

The tendency towards inflexibility and disbelief is demonstrated by the case of Cishahayo v. Canada.319 This case involved asylum applicant Audace Cishahayo, who fled Burundi to seek asylum in Canada. Mr. Cishahayo arrived in Washington, D.C. on November 2, 2011, and twelve days later, made a claim for Canadian refugee protection at the Canada-U.S. border.320 He sought entry into Canada under the family member exception to the STCA, as he had two sisters in Canada, one of whom was a Canadian citizen and the other recognized as a Convention refugee and in the process of applying for permanent residence.321 Mr. Cishahayo presented his passport from the Republic of Burundi, as well as a national identification card and a health insurance card both of which bore his photo and listed the names of his parents to establish the relationship with his Canadian citizen sister.322 A CBSA officer interviewed Mr. Cishahayo in person,

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316 Interview with Lynn Hannigan (Director) and Sister Judith Carroll (Counselor), Casa El Norte (Aug. 3, 2012), paras. 144 and 162.
317 CCR & SOJOURN HOUSE, supra note 299 at 3, 23-25 (based on interviews with 45 claimants and 37 practitioners about experiences at Canadian ports of entry, report identifies inconsistencies in evaluating family relationships under the STCA family member exception, and in some cases, inflexibility leading to the rejection of claimants who in fact have family members in Canada and should benefit from the exception to the safe country rule).
318 Id. at 25.
319 Cishahayo v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), [2012] FC 1237 (Can.)
320 Id. at paras. 1-3.
321 Id.
322 Interview with Michele Jenness (Executive Director), Vermont Immigration and Asylum Advocates (Aug. 10, 2012) para. 62.
interviewed one of Mr. Cishahayo’s sisters over the telephone, and also asked that same sister to fax copies of her Canadian passport and a photo identification card. The officer doubted the authenticity of Mr. Cishahayo’s identity documents and family connections, rejected his claim, and returned him to the United States pursuant to the STCA.

Upon his return to the United States, Mr. Cishahayo was initially detained in Clinton County Jail. He then wrote a letter to the Chief Supervisory Customs and Border Protection Officer in Champlain, New York requesting that his negative eligibility decision be reconsidered. He enclosed six identity documents to supplement the documents he had presented to the CBSA upon his initial attempt to enter Canada, namely: a birth certificate, proof of residence, marriage certificate, baptismal certificate, and copy of the biographic page of a previous Burundian passport. The CBSA officer tasked with reconsidering Mr. Cishahayo’s claim concluded that the documents did not bring any new information to light, and recommended that the negative eligibility decision regarding Mr. Cishahayo’s admissibility into Canada stand.

With the benefit of assistance on both sides of the border, Mr. Cishahayo appealed his negative eligibility decision before the Federal Court of Canada. The Court ultimately allowed his application, and sent his claim back for reassessment by a different officer. Asylum seekers who do not have the benefit of legal assistance no doubt encounter far greater barriers in contesting improper decisions made by Canadian border agents.

This case highlights the inflexible application of the STCA’s family member exception at certain border crossings, and also points to the very real possibility that asylum seekers who show family connections in Canada and present original identity documents may nonetheless be denied entry into Canada for arbitrary or unprincipled reasons.

324 Cishahayo v. Canada, [2012] FC 1237 (Can.) supra note 319 at paras. 4-5.
325 Id. at para. 6.
326 Id. at para. 8.
327 Id. at para. 8.
328 Id. at paras. 25-26 (finding that “an officer reconsidering a negative eligibility decision under the STCA has the duty to give the applicant an opportunity to disabuse the officer of any concern over the authenticity of the applicant’s documents. . . the officer in the present case breached the duty of procedural fairness by not giving the applicant this opportunity before drawing an adverse inference from the officer’s concern over document forgery”).
(iii) Limited Access to Appeal
In December 2012, provisions implementing Canada’s new Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) came into effect. These provisions prohibit asylum seekers who lawfully enter Canada under one of the STCA exceptions from appealing negative decisions to the RAD. As Citizenship and Immigration Canada explains:

The RAD will provide most claimants and the Government of Canada with an opportunity to establish that the [Refugee Protection Division] decision was wrong in fact or law or both. It will also allow for the introduction of new evidence by claimants that was not reasonably available when the [Refugee Protection Division] rejected the claim and, in exceptional cases, allow for an oral hearing . . . DCO claimants, and those determined to have a manifestly unfounded claim or a claim with no credible basis, would not have access to the RAD. Refugee claimants who were subject to an exception in the Safe Third Country Agreement and those who arrived as part of a designated irregular arrival would also not have access.

These provisions fundamentally restrict STCA claimants’ legal rights, as there is no principled reason to carry the STCA over to restrict asylum seekers’ access to appeal. They impose an arbitrary distinction on STCA claimants, and weaken the scope of protection available to them under Canadian law.

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329 The basis for the Refugee Protection Division is set out in §110 of the IRPA, S.C. ch. 27 (2001) (Can.), which states: "110. (1) Subject to subsections (1.1) and (2), a person or the Minister may appeal, in accordance with the rules of the Board, on a question of law, of fact or of mixed law and fact, to the Refugee Appeal Division against a decision of the Refugee Protection Division to allow or reject the person’s claim for refugee protection". The RAD has the power to confirm or set aside a decision of the Refugee Protection Division, or to refer a matter back to the Refugee Protection Division for reassessment. See IRPA, S.C. ch.27 (2001) supra note 13 at §111. The IRPA further prescribes that members of the RAD are to be appointed by the Governor in Council, see IRPA § 153(1)(a). Appeals may be made on errors of law or errors of mixed fact and law, see §110(1).
3. Making the Border More Dangerous and Disorderly

“The STCA...creates more risk than it protects the security of this country.”

(i) Prompting a Rise in Illegal Activity Along the Border

Insofar as the STCA and other interdiction measures create substantial barriers for asylum seekers to reach Canada through authorized measures, they create incentives for irregular migration. UNHCR has repeatedly cautioned that enhanced border restrictions trigger increases in unauthorized border crossings:

[T]he myriad of migration controls which many countries, including Canada, have established, also have the effect of making it more difficult for asylum seekers to seek protection. In many cases, persons in need of protection have no option other than to resort to the use of false documents and the services of smugglers.

As Janet Dench, Executive Director the Canadian Council for Refugees, further explains: “the higher the fences created by interdiction,” the more migrants are “forced to turn to smugglers to help them overcome the barriers.” Not only are these services extraordinarily expensive, but also, asylum seekers who use smugglers to cross the border are at increased risk of exploitation.

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332 Interview with Saleem Spindari (Community Outreach Program Coordinator), MOSAIC British Columbia (May 16, 2012), para. 26.
334 Dench, supra note 32 at 35.
Before the Safe Third Country Agreement came into effect, critics cautioned that its implementation would encourage unauthorized border crossings, and leave asylum seekers more vulnerable to exploitation. For example, in a hearing before the U.S. Subcommittee on Immigration and Border Security in 2002, Amnesty International USA warned that the Safe Third Country Agreement “could foment illegal smuggling and encourage traffickers who prey upon desperate refugees.”\textsuperscript{336} In the course of parliamentary hearings before the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration Canada in 2002, UNHCR explained:

Asylum seekers who know they can no longer seek admission at the border—because they are not entitled under the agreement to do so—may very well engage the services of smugglers to take them across the border illegally, in order to make a claim inland. Indeed, this is what we have seen happen in other countries that have implemented similar arrangements.\textsuperscript{337}

Amnesty International Canada further cautioned as follows:

As you’ve heard from many of us, a crude instrument of this sort simply exposes countless individuals to the risk of unlawful detention, puts women at risk of not receiving protection from very compelling harms, and is going to increase the likelihood that people are going to take dangerous, stupid chances . . . and cross borders illegally. Such an instrument will only further misery and insecurity and does not seem, from our perspective, to be getting to the nub of the problem.\textsuperscript{338}

\textsuperscript{338}Id. at 1715 (testimony of Alex Neve, Secretary General of Amnesty International Canada).
Given the clandestine nature of unauthorized border crossings and human smuggling activities, it is difficult to report on these activities with any precision. However, data collected for this report suggests that unauthorized border crossings and human smuggling activities across the Canada-U.S. border have generally increased since the STCA came into effect in 2004. A 2012 Threat Assessment Report issued by the Canada-U.S. Integrated Border Enforcement Team (IBET) indicates that Canada-bound human smuggling attempts between border ports of entry increased by 58 percent in 2011 as compared with the previous years.\footnote{INTEGRATED BORDER ENFORCEMENT TEAM, CANADA/UNITED STATES IBET THREAT ASSESSMENT FOR 2012 (REPORTING ON YEAR 2011), obtained via Freedom of Information Request File A-2012-07453, filed by Jim Bronskill with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police under the Access to Information Act, R.S.C. ch. A-1 (1985) (Can.) (completed Oct. 12, 2013) (hereinafter IBET 2012 THREAT ASSESSMENT). Copy provided upon request. See also Jim Bronskill, Canadian Press, Canada-bound human smuggling attempts jumped 58% in 2011: report NATIONAL POST (Nov. 20, 2013) available at http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/11/20/canada-bound-human-smuggling-attempts-jumped-58-in-2011-report/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2013) (reporting on findings made in a 2012 Integrated Border Enforcement Team threat assessment report, obtained pursuant to an Access to Information Request, and stating that the “Authorities apprehended 487 people as smugglers attempted to sneak them into Canada at remote locales, up from 308 in 2010, says the binational report on border security”). See also Royal Canadian Mounted Police, CANADA/UNITED STATES IBET THREAT ASSESSMENT 2010 (REPORTING ON YEAR 2009), available at http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ibet-eipf/reports-rapports/2010-threat-menace-eng.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2013) (hereinafter IBET Threat Assessment 2010) (noting a “considerable decrease in the number of human smuggling events” in 2009 as compared with 2008, as well as “a decrease in the number of intercepted migrants”).} The report, obtained under the Access to Information Act, concludes as follows:

Canada-bound human smuggling activity [between ports of entry] has surged in 2011. The number of human apprehensions was 487 in 2011, compared to 308 in 2010, representing a 58% increase in activity.\footnote{IBET 2012 THREAT ASSESSMENT, id. at 4.}

Refugee advocates have attributed the rise in human smuggling activities, in part, to the Safe Third Country Agreement.\footnote{Bronskill, supra note 339 (stating “An advocacy group for refugees attributes the 58% rise in Canada-bound human smuggling attempts to an agreement between the countries that has prompted desperate refugees to turn to criminal groups willing to help them across the border. Under the Safe Third Country agreement, which took effect in December 2004, Canada and the U.S. recognize each other as safe places for refugee claimants to seek protection”).} As practitioners interviewed for this report explained, before the STCA came into effect, “there was no reason for
Indeed, in 2003 Canadian officials estimated that 90 percent of migrants, including asylum seekers, crossed the border into Canada at official ports of entry. Practitioners interviewed for this report indicated a sharp increase in unauthorized border crossings after the STCA came into effect, stating “we see more now than ever . . . people are risking their lives . . . It’s their only way to get into Canada.”

Statements made by Canadian government agencies further support the claim that the STCA is partially responsible for triggering the rise in unauthorized border crossings. For example, a 2007 IBET Threat Assessment Report states that “more migrants are attempting to find a way around the provisions for the Safe Third Country Agreement, arriving in Canada by air, ferry or illegally between the ports of entry in order to enter refugee claims in Canada inland.” Moreover, a 2010 CBSA Evaluation Study, pointing to an increase in “inland” asylum claims made from within Canadian territory, suggests “that the rise in inland claims is due in part to irregular migrants entering Canada between [ports of entry] to file refugee claims at inland CBSA and/or CIC offices, to avoid being turned back at the border based on the Safe Third Country Agreement.”

In some cases, attempts to cross the Canadian border without inspection have turned tragic. Practitioners interviewed for this report state that some asylum seekers have been injured or drowned while attempting to enter Canada by

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342 Interview with Lynn Hannigan (Director) and Sister Judith Carroll (Counselor), Casa El Norte (Aug. 3, 2012), para. 109.
343 BORDERING ON FAILURE 1 (2006), supra note 7 at 22 citing Denis Coderre, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Address at the Renaissance Club (Mar. 11, 2003). The border spans 5.255 miles, or 7,000 miles when including Alaska.
344 Interview with Lynn Hannigan (Director) and Sister Judith Carroll (Counselor), Casa El Norte (Aug. 3, 2012), para. 111. See also Interview with Saleem Spindari (Community Outreach Program Coordinator), MOSAIC British Columbia (May 16, 2012), para. 28; Interview with Michele Jenness (Executive Director), Vermont Immigration and Asylum Advocates (Aug. 10, 2012) para. 164; Interview with Peter Murrett (Attorney), Vive La Casa (Jul. 27, 2012), para. 92.
345 Royal Canadian Mounted Police, CANADA-UNITED STATES IBET THREAT ASSESSMENT (2007) available at http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ibet-eipf/reports-rapports/threat-menace-ass-eva-eng.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2013) (providing an overview of “illegal activity with a cross-border nexus”, and reporting further that “Apprehensions have decreased since 2005 at certain key IBET locations, such as Windsor/Detroit and Pacific, due to successful intelligence-led investigations. These investigations have also displaced human smuggling activity to other parts of the border. U.S. CBP/BP reported 1,417 apprehensions at the Canada/U.S. border in 2005, compared to 1,113 in 2006”).
swimming or otherwise crossing the Niagara River. Others have been seriously injured by attempting to cross the border on railway bridges. One man who attempted entry in this manner, for example, lost both his legs. Uniformly, practitioners on both sides of the border interpreted these attempts as signs of extreme desperation. As one practitioner explained: “It is very dangerous as you can imagine . . . For us, to see someone swim the Niagara River, or take the canoe across the river, they’re obviously desperate.”

Asylum seekers who attempt to cross the border clandestinely are also more likely to be labeled as “irregular” upon arrival and be subject to state sanctions and diminished legal protections. Indeed, recent changes in Canadian law empower the Minister of Public Safety to designate two or more people who arrive in Canada together as “designated foreign nationals” or “irregular arrivals” based on a mere suspicion – not proof – that they have been smuggled into Canada. The consequences of being designated “irregular” include mandatory detention (for those over fifteen years of age), with limited detention review options, no right to appeal adverse decisions, and no right to apply for permanent residence or family reunification for five years even after a refugee claim is recognized. These restrictions erect serious barriers for genuine asylum seekers, and impede their ability to advance successful claims.

347 Interview with Lynn Hannigan (Director) and Sister Judith Carroll (Counselor), Casa El Norte (Aug. 3, 2012), Casa El Norte (Aug. 3, 2012), para. 89-93; Interview with Martha Mason (Executive Director), Rod McDowell (Board President), and Ronald Gray (Board Vice-President), Fort Erie Multicultural Centre (Jul. 25, 2012), para. 38.
349 Interview with Lynn Hannigan (Director) and Sister Judith Carroll (Counselor), Casa El Norte (Aug. 3, 2012), paras. 98 and 114.
350 Macklin, supra note 29 at 366 (explaining the different legal consequences that flow from being categorized as “illegal”). See also CATHERINE DAUVERGNE, MAKING PEOPLE ILLEGAL (2008) (analyzing the intertwining nature of asylum and illegality in the context of unauthorized border crossings).
(ii) Destructive Impact on Refugee Shelters and Centers Along the Border
As the number of asylum seekers being processed and sheltered by Canadian non-governmental organizations, faith groups, and refugee shelters working along the Canada-U.S. border has decreased as a result of the STCA, some of these groups have been forced to consider alternative functions for their shelters. Some have had to lay off qualified staff persons and scale back their operational budgets and services in order to remain open.

These organizations offer crucial, life-saving services for asylum seekers, such as housing, food, legal assistance, emotional support, counseling, language services, and information about Canada’s refugee assessment process. If these service providers close their doors, the border will become even more dangerous for asylum seekers who will have fewer places to turn for assistance.

352 Interview with Martha Mason (Executive Director), Rod McDowell (Board President), and Ronald Gray (Board Vice-President), Fort Erie Multicultural Centre (Jul. 25, 2012), para. 164.
353 Id.
PART FIVE: CONCLUSIONS

“All Canadians must now understand that our humanitarian tradition and our openness towards refugees are historic artifacts. The battle lines in the current fight are not about leading the world, but about following it to a worse future for refugees.”

For decades, Canada was known for its leadership in matters of refugee protection. After the Supreme Court of Canada released its decision in Singh v. Canada in 1985, the Canadian government revamped its refugee regime to ensure that asylum seekers had access to fair and reasoned refugee determinations. Canada introduced a tribunal process for first-instance refugee decisions to ensure asylum seekers had an opportunity to have their claim heard and assessed on the merits. These reforms entrenched procedural fairness as a cornerstone of Canadian asylum policy, and established Canada as a world leader that raised the standards of refugee protection worldwide.356 Canada was not just recognized for its progressive laws, but also, for the generosity of its people. In 1985, UNHCR awarded the “people of Canada” the Nansen Refugee Award, awarded annually to a person or group for outstanding work on behalf of the forcibly displaced, in recognition of “the major and sustained contributions of the People of Canada to the cause of refugees”. Canadians are the first and only people to have been honored collectively with this award.358

355 Singh v. Canada, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 (Can.).!!!
356 See Testimony of Deborah E. Anker, Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinic, Citizenship and Immigration Committee of the Parliament of Canada (Feb. 8, 2007), CIMM, 39th Parl., 1st sess. Meeting No. 33, 2 (Feb. 8, 2007), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/hoc/Committee/391/CIMM/Evidence/EV2683238/CIMMEV33-E.PDF (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) (hereinafter Anker CIMM Testimony) (offering testimony about the Safe Third Country Agreement and stating that for “decades Canada has served as a model whose example raised the standards or refugee protection worldwide, and especially in the United States.”)
Canada’s leadership in refugee protection was particularly influential in the United States. For example, throughout the 1980s, the United States refused to grant asylum to all but a trickle of asylum seekers fleeing civil wars and conflict in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala. In contrast, throughout this time, Canada served as an important safety valve for Central American refugees who, as United States policy makers and courts later acknowledged, faced discrimination under the United States asylum regime. Canada’s example inspired major reforms in U.S. policy towards Central America.

In 1993, Canada became the first state signatory to the Refugee Convention to issue guidelines recognizing women’s eligibility to claim refugee protection on grounds of gender related persecution. The Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board’s release of the Gender Guidelines is credited with starting “a

359 See Susan Gzesh, *Central Americans and Asylum Policy in the Regan Era*, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE: MIGRATION INFORMATION SOURCE available at http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=384 (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) (describing the United States’ response to the civil wars in the region, and nothing that President Ronald Reagan “saw these civil wars as theaters in the Cold War. In both El Salvador and Guatemala, the United States intervened on the side of those governments, which were fighting Marxist-led popular movements. In Nicaragua, however, the United States supported the contra rebels against the socialist Sandinista government.”) See also MARIA CRISTINA GARCIA, *SEEKING REFUGE: CENTRAL AMERICAN MIGRATION TO MEXICO, THE UNITED STATES, AND CANADA* (2006) (detailing the United States response to the political upheaval in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala, through comparative analysis with Mexico and Canada).

360 For example, between 1982 and 1987, Canada admitted 15,877 asylum seekers from Central America. Canada also admitted asylum seekers from the region at much higher approval rates than the United States. From 1980 to 1986, Canada approved between 21 and 60 percent of Salvadoran asylum applications, and between 28 and 71 percent of Guatemalan asylum applications. By comparison, the United States approved between 3 percent and 5 percent of Salvadoran and Guatemalan petitions during this period. See Garcia, *Canada: A Northern Refuge*, id. at para 10. See also Garcia, *SEEKING REFUGE*, supra note 412 at 130 (citing Statistics Canada for figures of asylum seekers admitted during the period); Susan Bibler Coutin, *Cause Lawyering and Political Advocacy: Moving Law on Behalf of Central American Refugees*, in Austin Sarat and Stu Scheingold, eds., *CAUSE LAWYERING AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS* (2006) (analyzing of the sanctuary movement in the United States and its influence in shifting United States policy); Anker CIMM Testimony, supra note 356 at 2 (stating that during the 1980s Canada “Served as an important safety valve for central American refugees”).

361 See Anker CIMM Testimony, supra note 356 at 2 (stating that during that “Canada’s example inspired major reforms in the U.S. system and even changes in U.S. policy towards central America”).

movement for profound change – for fairness and equal treatment of women and children – not only for refugee law, but for human rights more generally.”\textsuperscript{363} Canada’s leadership prompted the United States to issue similar gender guidelines two years later.\textsuperscript{364} More broadly, the Guidelines’ release established Canada as “the country that really led the way in terms of the international community granting protection to women fleeing gender persecution.”\textsuperscript{365}

With the rapid expansion of Canada’s border technologies under the rubric of the Multiple Borders Strategy, entry into the Safe Third Country Agreement, and most recently, the introduction of new legislation, Canada has radically changed course. The Multiple Borders Strategy measures and Safe third Country Agreement result in the effective denial of rights to which asylum seekers are entitled under domestic and international law. These measures also create incentives for unauthorized border crossings and dangerous activities that threaten the lives and safety of asylum seekers. Indeed, since the Safe Third Country Agreement came into effect in 2004, unauthorized border crossings and human smuggling activities across the Canada-U.S. border have been on the rise. Tragedies of asylum seekers losing life or limb in desperate attempts to cross the border and seek refuge in Canada now occur. These stories show the immense human toll that comes with disallowing persecuted people the right to seek asylum in Canada.


\textsuperscript{365} See Wendy Young, Director of Gov’t Relations, Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children, Comment, Comments on the Occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of the Immigration and Refugee Board Gender Guidelines, Canadian Council for Refugees (last updated March 2003), http://ccrweb.ca/gendergcom.htm (noting further that Canada’s leadership “was particularly effective in setting an example for the US which issued guidelines shortly thereafter”). See also Shauna Labman and Catherine Dauvergne, Evaluating Canada’s Approach to Gender-Related Persecution: Revisiting and Re-embracing ‘Refugee Women and the Imperative of Categories’ in Efrat Arbel, Catherine Dauvergne, and Jenni Millbank eds. Gender in Refugee Law: From the Margins to the Centre (forthcoming, 2014) (evaluating the current situation or women claiming asylum protection in Canada, considering the inter-relationship between public discourse, high-level doctrinal developments, and scholarly critique).
In addition to closing its border to asylum seekers, the Canadian government has also ushered in sweeping changes to Canada’s refugee system.\textsuperscript{366} Under the current system asylum seekers face vastly accelerated timelines, have limited recourse to appeal negative decisions, and have restricted access to safety nets like humanitarian and compassionate considerations and Pre-Removal Risk Assessments.\textsuperscript{367} The Canadian government also dramatically scaled back the provision of health care for refugees and refugee claimants, and now denies basic, emergency, and life-saving medical care to thousands of people who have lawfully sought Canada’s protection.\textsuperscript{368} Widely condemned as “manifestly unfair” and “draconian”,\textsuperscript{369} these reforms have been criticized as bringing “a dramatic end to what was once known as Canada’s humanitarian tradition.”\textsuperscript{370}

Now more than ever, with global displacement on the rise,\textsuperscript{371} and with more states parties to the Refugee Convention adopting regressive asylum policies and punitive exclusion measures, Canadian leadership is crucial in the international arena. By closing its borders to asylum seekers, Canada is setting a poor example for other nations, and contributing to the deterioration of refugee protection around the world. Canada is turning its back on a proud history of refugee protection, and reneging on its fundamental refugee protection obligations under domestic and international law.

\textsuperscript{366} See Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act, S.C. 2012 c-17 (Can.), supra note 1 (implementing legislative changes).


\textsuperscript{370} Dauvergne, supra note 354.
